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Industrial automation systems have strict requirements which differ a lot from the re-
quirements of traditional information technology systems. How security is implemented 
differs as well between the systems. Many components in industrial automation systems 
were designed for isolated environments and as such they don’t have security features 
on them. These components are still being used in systems because of the long life time 
of the equipment in industrial automation systems. Because of these reasons, the tech-
nologies used in traditional information technology systems cannot be used in industrial 
automation systems without proper research and testing. 
Traditionally different software components are executed each on their separate hard-
ware. This is to provide isolation for software components. The isolation is needed to 
avoid the bugs and vulnerabilities in one software component from affecting other soft-
ware components. Using separate hardware for each software component can be costly 
and hard to maintain. Virtualization is a technology which allows executing multiple 
software components on same hardware while simultaneously isolating them from each 
other. Virtualization also provides some advanced features like fault tolerance. These 
features could be useful in industrial automation systems as well. The problem is that 
most of the virtualization technologies and solutions are developed for traditional in-
formation technology environments. As such research is needed to see if these technol-
ogies and solutions can be used for industrial automation. 
In this thesis a literature review is done for the existing virtualization technologies and 
some virtualization solutions are compared with each other. Some existing literature of 
using virtualization in industrial automation is also reviewed. Based on the literature 
reviews and the virtualization solution comparisons, the virtualization applicability to 
industrial automation is evaluated. 
The virtualization is found to be suitable to be used in industrial automation systems. 
However, proper selection of used hardware and virtualization solutions matters. As 
part of this thesis, a suggestion is made how a virtualized industrial automation system 
could be implemented. Virtualization adds new requirements for an industrial automa-
tion system and using virtualization affects all the steps in the system’s lifecycle model. 
As such virtualization should be taken into account from the beginning when designing 
an industrial automation system which uses virtualization. 
ii 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Ari Lappalainen: Virtualisoinnin soveltuvuus teollisuusautomaatioon 
Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto 
Diplomityö, 120 sivua, 6 liitesivua 
Tammikuu 2016 
Automaatiotekniikan diplomi-insinöörin tutkinto-ohjelma 
Pääaine: Automaation tietotekniikka 
Tarkastajat: Professori Hannu Koivisto, Projektitutkija Mikko Salmenperä 
 
Avainsanat: virtualisointi, teollisuusautomaatio, tietoturva, soveltuvuus, toteut-
taminen, kirjallisuuskatsaus 
Teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmillä on tiukat vaatimukset, jotka poikkeavat paljon taval-
listen tietojärjestelmien vaatimuksista. Tietoturvan toteutustavat myös poikkeavat näi-
den kahden eri järjestelmän välillä. Monet komponentit teollisuusautomaatiojärjestel-
missä on suunniteltu eristettyihin ympäristöihin eikä niissä tästä syystä ole tietoturva-
ominaisuuksia. Näitä komponentteja on edelleen käytössä järjestelmissä, koska laitteis-
ton elinikä on pitkä teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmissä. Näiden syiden vuoksi tavallisis-
sa tietojärjestelmissä käytettyjä teknologioita ei voi käyttää teollisuusautomaatiojärjes-
telmissä ilman kunnollista tutkimusta ja testausta. 
Tavallisesti useita ohjelmistoja ajetaan erillisillä laitteistoilla. Tämän tarkoituksena on 
eristää ohjelmistot toisistaan. Ohjelmistojen eristämisellä vältetään ohjelmistoissa olevi-
en koodivirheiden ja haavoittuvuuksien vaikutukset toisiin ohjelmistoihin. Erillisten 
laitteiden käyttö jokaista ohjelmistoa varten voi olla kallista ja tällaisen järjestelmän 
ylläpito voi olla vaikeaa. Virtualisointi on teknologia, joka mahdollistaa useamman oh-
jelmiston ajamisen samalla laitteistolla samalla kuitenkin eristäen ne toisistaan. Virtu-
alisointi voi tarjota myös joitain kehittyneitä ominaisuuksia kuten vikasietoisuutta. Nä-
mä ominaisuudet voisivat olla hyödyllisiä myös teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmissä. On-
gelmana on kuitenkin, että virtualisointiteknologiat ja -ratkaisut ovat tyypillisesti kehi-
tetty tavallisiin tietojärjestelmiin. Tästä syystä täytyy tutkia, että voidaanko näitä tekno-
logioita ja ratkaisuja käyttää teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmissä. 
Tässä opinnäytetyössä tehdään kirjallisuuskatsaus olemassa oleviin virtualisointitekno-
logioihin ja joitain virtualisointiratkaisuja verrataan keskenään toisiinsa. Lisäksi käy-
dään läpi olemassa olevaa kirjallisuutta virtualisoinnin käytöstä teollisuusautomaatiojär-
jestelmissä. Virtualisoinnin soveltuvuutta teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmiin arvioidaan 
perustuen kirjallisuuskatsauksiin ja virtualisointiratkaisujen vertailuun. 
Virtualisointi arvioidaan soveltuvaksi käytettäväksi teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmissä. 
Tämä vaatii kuitenkin oikeiden laitteiden ja virtalisointiratkaisujen käyttöä. Tämän li-
säksi tässä työssä tehdään ehdotus siitä, miten virtualisoitu teollisuusautomaatiojärjes-
telmä tulisi rakentaa. Virtualisointi lisää uusia vaatimuksia teollisuusautomaatiojärjes-
telmälle ja virtualisoinnin käyttö vaikuttaa järjestelmään sen jokaisessa elinkaaren vai-
heessa. Tästä syystä virtualisointi pitäisi huomioida jokaisessa järjestelmän elinkaaren 
vaiheessa, kun virtualisoitua teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmää ollaan kehittämässä. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer systems are a lot more complex nowadays than they used to be. Different 
pieces of software have different features and the pieces of software communicate with 
each other to produce useful information and to create useful actions. The problem with 
the complexity is that it is easy to make errors when coding a complex piece of soft-
ware. Because of this the software can contain coding errors and security vulnerabilities. 
These coding errors and vulnerabilities can affect the execution of other pieces of soft-
ware if the underlying hardware is shared between the pieces of software. To minimize 
the effects of these coding errors and vulnerabilities, pieces of software are often set to 
execute on their own dedicated machine in traditional information technology (IT) sys-
tems. This can be costly as each piece of hardware requires electricity to function and 
each piece of hardware has to be bought separately [22][76]. Maintaining such systems 
can also be complicated [76][94]. 
To solve these problems a technology called virtualization has been developed. Virtual-
ization can be considered as a technology where one creates an emulated version of 
some already existing entity. This allows separating a resource or a service request from 
its actual implementation [116]. Virtualization allows sharing same hardware between 
different pieces of software while simultaneously isolating them from each other. A new 
trend in traditional IT environments has been to use virtualization to reduce the costs of 
building and maintaining IT systems. Many different virtualization methods and solu-
tions have been developed over the years to solve different kinds of problems. Common 
virtualization technologies are network, storage, hardware, operating system –level, and 
application virtualization technologies. 
Industrial automation systems typically differ a lot from the traditional IT systems. The 
reason for this is the strict requirements for these systems. Industrial automation sys-
tems control physical processes and any unpredicted behavior can cause damage to en-
vironment or people. Because of this many different hardware and software solutions 
have been developed that can meet the strict requirements of these systems. The solu-
tions differ a lot from the solutions used in traditional IT environments as these envi-
ronments don’t have similar requirements. This has caused there to be many proprietary 
solutions for the industrial automation systems which makes these systems often heter-
ogeneous. Traditional IT environments typically use mass produced general purpose 
hardware and software instead. Other difference is that the industrial automation sys-
tems have typically worked in isolated environments while traditional IT environments 
are often networked with other systems. As a result many of the solutions developed for 
the industrial automation systems don’t have any security features. 
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A new trend in industrial automation is to adapt technologies used in traditional IT envi-
ronments to the industrial automation systems. Cost savings can be achieved this way. 
The challenge with adapting these technologies is the different requirements of the sys-
tems. A technology is not necessarily suitable for industrial automation systems simply 
because it cannot fulfil the requirements the industrial automation systems have. One 
example of adapting a technology from traditional IT systems to industrial automation 
systems is the Industrial Ethernet. 
There is interest to adapt virtualization to industrial automation systems in hope of cost 
savings and ability to use the features provided by many different virtualization solu-
tions. These features can include fault tolerance methods and methods for backing up all 
the contents of a machine. However, the virtualization applicability to industrial auto-
mation must be first evaluated before the existing virtualization solutions can be used in 
the industrial automation systems. 
The goal of this thesis is to review the virtualization technologies used in traditional IT 
environments, to analyze if they are suitable for industrial automation, and to suggest 
how a virtualized industrial automation system could be implemented. To do this the 
requirements, the architecture, the equipment and the security of traditional industrial 
automation systems are explained. After this a literature review of existing virtualization 
technologies is done. The principles how these technologies work and what advantages 
and disadvantages they have are described. Previous literature of using virtualization for 
industrial automation is also reviewed. Some of the existing virtualization solutions are 
compared to see what features they offer that could be useful or are required for virtual-
ization in industrial automation. The literature reviews and the virtualization solution 
comparisons are used to analyze the virtualization applicability to industrial automation. 
The Chapter 2 describes how the traditional industrial automation systems are done. The 
requirements, the architecture and the equipment used in the systems are described 
briefly. Also the security risks, issues and the used security solutions to these issues are 
described in their own subchapters. The Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 focus on describing 
the different virtualization technologies, how they are implemented, and what ad-
vantages and disadvantages they have. The Chapter 3 gives an overview of the main 
technology concepts used in network virtualization and then a concrete example of a 
network virtualization solution, where these concepts are being used, is presented. The 
Chapter 4 describes how storage devices are virtualized and what data virtualization is. 
The Chapter 5 focuses on hardware virtualization. Hardware virtualization is a technol-
ogy which focuses on virtualizing physical machines like servers. Virtualizing physical 
hardware is a complex task and as such there are many different technologies and tech-
niques used in hardware virtualization. These technologies and techniques are described 
in this chapter. The Chapter 6 describes operating system –level virtualization technolo-
gy. While the hardware virtualization virtualizes the whole hardware, the operating sys-
tem –level virtualization virtualizes only the operating systems used on the physical 
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machines. The techniques how the operating systems are virtualized are described in 
this chapter. The last virtualization technology is the application virtualization and it is 
described in the Chapter 7. How the application virtualization differs from the operating 
system –level virtualization is described along with the different technologies and tech-
niques used in application virtualization. The Chapter 8 focuses on the security of these 
different virtualization technologies. The security benefits, risks, challenges, approaches 
and recommendations are described in their own subchapters. In the Chapter 9 the pre-
vious literature related to using virtualization in industrial automation is reviewed.  The 
possible benefits of using virtualization in industrial automation are described along 
with the challenges that virtualization technologies have when applying to industrial 
automation systems. Some virtualization solutions are then compared to see what fea-
tures they have. After this the virtualization applicability to industrial automation is ana-
lyzed based on the literature review done about the virtualization technologies, the liter-
ature review of using virtualization in industrial automation, and the virtualization solu-
tion comparisons. Lastly a suggestion is made how a virtualized automation system 
could be implemented. This is done by describing what considerations and requirements 
the virtualization adds to the different steps in a lifecycle of an industrial automation 
system. Some future research suggestions are also made. In the Chapter 10 the conclu-
sions for this thesis are made. 
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2. INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION 
The industrial automation systems monitor and control physical systems. As a result 
they have much stricter requirements than traditional IT environments which mostly just 
manipulate data and don’t control physical systems. Any failures to meet the require-
ments of industrial automation systems can cause damage to environment or even loss 
of human lives. [35][110] 
The concept of real-time is important in industrial automation. There are five different 
real-time types: hard real-time, firm real-time, isochronous real-time, soft real-time and 
best effort. [100] These are shown in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Different real-time types. 
In hard and firm real-time the usefulness of an action or data becomes zero after a cer-
tain time limit. In hard real-time the system fails if the action is not done or the data is 
not received before the time limit. In firm real-time the system doesn’t necessarily fail if 
the limit is sometimes passed. The action or the data is simply discarded. In isochronous 
real-time an action or data is useful only within some time period. Outside of this time 
period the usefulness is zero. In soft real-time the usefulness of an action or data starts 
decreasing after a certain time limit, but they don’t become useless immediately. In best 
effort there are no real-time limits and actions and data are always useful. Traditional IT 
environments typically have best effort or soft real-time requirements while some indus-
trial automation systems have hard and isochronous real-time requirements. Control 
loops typically have isochronous real-time requirements and alarms have hard real-time 
requirements [100]. In order to meet the real-time requirements, the functionality of the 
software and the hardware in a system must be deterministic. [2] The determinism can 
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be indicated with latencies and jitter. Latency indicates the average execution time of 
some action and jitter indicates the variance of this value [35]. The actual time limits 
can vary a lot between different applications [72]. Some industrial automation applica-
tions might require cycle times of tens of microseconds with maximum jitter of couple 
microseconds and some applications might require cycle times of 10 milliseconds with 
maximum jitter of 100 microseconds. 
Other important requirements for industrial automation systems are dependability, reli-
ability, availability and security [12][100]. The industrial automation system should be 
safe to use and they should not cause any harm to humans or to environment. For this 
reason safety certified components are used and redundancy [12] is introduced to the 
systems to mitigate the effects of different kinds of faults. The industrial automation 
systems are also expected to work continuously for long periods of time as a stop in the 
production can cause large monetary loses. 
A generic industrial automation system model consists of five different levels. Each of 
these levels has its own functionality. The model is shown in the Figure 2 and it is based 
on the ISA-95 automation model [98]. 
 
Figure 2. The structure of a generic industrial automation system. 
The model can be divided into two different parts: the enterprise domain and the control 
domain. The enterprise domain consists of the level 4. This level focuses on managing 
the whole organization and all the manufacturing plants belonging to the organization. 
The focus is at business planning and logistics. [98] This level has the least strict re-
quirements and the systems at this level are traditional IT environments [100]. The time 
frames for operations can be anything from days to years. Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) software components typically work at this level. The control domain consists of 
the rest of the levels. The level 3 is focused on managing the manufacturing process in 
one manufacturing plant. This contains tasks like product scheduling, monitoring and 
resource management. Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) typically operate at 
this level although some of the functionality might be spread to the other levels. The 
levels 0-2 are focused on the actual process control. [98] The level 0 contains the actual 
physical processes which are being controlled. The level 1 contains any sensors and 
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actuators which are used to measure and to manipulate the processes. The controllers 
which monitor and control the processes are at the level 2. [12] In the control domain 
the time frames for operations can be anything from microseconds to days depending on 
the processes which are being controlled [98]. 
The equipment used in industrial automation systems differ a lot from the equipment 
which is used in the traditional IT systems. Many of the components in the industrial 
automation systems must operate in harsh environments with chemicals, dust and phys-
ical forces. Ordinary consumer products are not designed for such environments. [35] In 
addition the strict requirements placed on the automation systems means that special-
ized equipment must be used which can fulfil those requirements. For example dedicat-
ed specialized embedded devices are almost always used at the levels 1 and 2 as the 
controllers instead of general purpose computers. Other difference between the tradi-
tional IT system and the industrial automation systems is that the equipment in industri-
al automation systems is heterogeneous with many proprietary technologies [100] while 
the equipment in traditional IT systems is more homogenous and general purpose. Be-
cause of this the equipment in industrial automation systems generally has fewer fea-
tures and is pricier than general purpose equipment. Some equipment that is used in 
industrial automation systems are programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote and 
master terminal units, input/output systems, fieldbuses, sensors and actuators, data man-
agement and processing servers, human machine interface (HMI) and intelligent field 
devices. The fieldbuses use their own proprietary protocols for transferring the messag-
es [26]. The lifecycle of the equipment in industrial automation can also be long and the 
same equipment can be in use for decades while in traditional IT environment the 
equipment can change every couple of years. As a result of this there are many old de-
vices which can require old operating systems and machines which are used to config-
ure the old devices [100]. The same equipment is used in industrial automation systems 
for long time because changing the equipment requires stopping the production and in-
tegrating the new equipment to an existing system made out of heterogeneous compo-
nents can be challenging. 
Because the equipment is pricey, there have been attempts to adapt technologies from 
IT systems to the industrial automation systems. One example of this is the Industrial 
Ethernet technologies [12]. These technologies aim to use Ethernet technology to trans-
fer the real-time data simultaneously with non-real-time data. Because of the require-
ments of the industrial automation systems many of the Industrial Ethernet solutions 
still require special technologies which make them pricier [35]. 
2.1 Security 
As the industrial automation systems differ a lot from the traditional IT systems, how 
the security is implemented also differs between these two systems. This chapter focus-
es on the security of the industrial automation systems. 
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2.1.1 Challenges, Risks and Issues 
Typically there hasn’t been any reason for the automation systems inside the manufac-
turing plants to communicate with the outside world and the control domains have 
worked as isolated environments. Because of this many of the equipment developed for 
the levels 3, 2 and 1 don’t have any security features implemented in them. Another 
reason for the lack of the security features is the fact that they would negatively impact 
any real-time and timing capabilities of the equipment. [110] The limited processing 
power in many embedded devices doesn’t allow implementing security features 
[35][110]. Many of the protocols used in the control domain are also transferred in plain 
text format [110]. Some passwords might be used for the software in the systems, but 
they are not used for security. They are used to prevent accidental changes and as such 
the passwords might be hardcoded to the software and there is no way to change them. 
[100] However, these things have changed with newer equipment. The increased pro-
cessing power in machines and embedded devices and the increased need for network-
ing with the systems mean that most of the new equipment has some kind of security 
features implemented in it. However, because of the long life cycle of industrial auto-
mation equipment, much of the older equipment without security features is still in use. 
PLCs’ firmware and operating systems can have bugs or new functionality can be added 
to them. This requires patches to be applied to the operating systems and firmware. The 
PLC’s don’t typically have any kind of validation for the correctness of the software 
that is applied to them. The patches are validated that they work correctly before releas-
ing them, but if any of the patches is infected with some malicious code at some point, 
the firmware or the operating system of the PLC could become infected when the patch 
is applied to the PLC. This can alter the functionality of the PLC. Similarly any control 
programs which are uploaded to the PLCs don’t have this kind of validation either [35]. 
Some malicious person could upload malicious control programs to the PLCs. The 
PLCs can also lack any access control to them. 
The long lifetime of the equipment in the industrial automation systems also causes 
risks. As the result of the long lifetime some of the software used can be really old and 
already considered obsolete outside the industrial automation systems. The software 
might contain vulnerabilities or bugs which will never be fixed. [110] Other reason why 
software might have vulnerabilities or bugs is simply because they haven’t been updat-
ed. The automation systems often run constantly and closing down the system for 
maintenance is avoided when a new patch is released [35][110]. The maintenance could 
cause huge monetary losses as the production is halted. In addition patches are often 
delayed as the system is already working and applying the patch might in some cases 
alter the functionality of the system. The problem with applying changes to the software 
is that they often have to applied to the live system because lack of proper testing sys-
tem [110]. The testing is hard because the industrial automation systems are made out of 
heterogeneous components with complex interactions and each system is made out of 
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different components. While some patch might work perfectly fine in some industrial 
automation system, it could cause problems in another industrial automation system 
because of different components that have been used. 
There are two trends currently ongoing in the industrial automation systems: using In-
dustrial Ethernet to connect the industrial automation systems to other systems and us-
ing Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technologies instead of specialized industrial 
automation technologies. Industrial Ethernet allows more freedom with how the indus-
trial automation systems are connected to other systems. For example the systems can 
easily be connected to the Internet as the Internet uses Ethernet. Connecting the automa-
tion system to the Internet is a huge security risk as the automation systems may lack 
any security features. Using the COTS technologies in automation systems would allow 
lowering the costs of building a system as the components used in COTS technologies 
are mass produced and have a lower price point than components used in specialized 
industrial automation technologies [100]. The lower price allows using more powerful 
components which on the other hand allows using more advanced features provided by 
the software developed for the COTS technologies. However, using COTS technologies 
in automation systems also exposes them to the security risks the COTS technologies 
have. This includes viruses, malware, software vulnerabilities, and so on. 
People can cause risks as well. The automation systems are generally operated by plant 
technicians and process engineers. This means that they are not IT security experts. 
[110] Someone might unintentionally or intentionally spread virus or malware into the 
automation system with a memory stick or with something similar. 
2.1.2 Security Approaches and Recommendations 
A common way of providing security to the industrial automation systems is to isolate 
the part of the system, which doesn’t have security features, from rest of the system. 
This is done by dividing the system into zones and by adding a DeMilitarized Zone 
(DMZ) in between different zones as a buffer. The DMZ should not allow any traffic to 
go through it. The traffic can only go into it or out of it. Unsecure and secure networks 
are connected to the DMZ by adding firewalls between the networks and the DMZ. This 
means that the unsecure and the secure networks can communicate with the DMZ and 
the DMZ can communicate with them, but the unsecure and the secure networks cannot 
directly communicate together. If an unsecure network needs any data from a secure 
network, the data is first transferred to a machine at the DMZ and then the unsecure 
network can request the data from this machine. [35][110] The concept of the DMZ is 
shown in the Figure 3 on the next page. 
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Figure 3. An example of DMZ implementation. Modified from [35]. 
In industrial automation the DMZ is often placed between the levels 3 and 4, and called 
as a level 3.5 [74]. However, the DMZ can also be implemented in other places as well. 
For example in between the external networks and the office network could be another 
DMZ. The traffic is strictly controlled and monitored between the DMZ and the net-
works connected to it. Security tools can be applied to the edges of the DMZ. For ex-
ample intrusion detection systems and antivirus tools can be implemented. Additionally 
virtual private network (VPN) endpoints can be implemented to allow secure connec-
tions to be created over the networks. Instead of having to implement the security at 
every device connected to a network, the security can just be implemented at the edges 
of the DMZ. This allows the security to be managed more easily. [35] At the same time 
any problems that implementing security features to the real-time applications can cause 
(losing determinism and slowing down execution) can be avoided. The machines in the 
secure networks of an industrial automation system are not used for general purpose 
computing [135]. This lowers the risk of the machines getting infected by malware or 
viruses which spread through applications like email. The machines in the secure net-
work should be managed and installing any unnecessary software into them should be 
prevented. In practice a pure DMZ, where connections between the networks connected 
to the DMZ are not allowed, is rarely implemented. Often VPN connections are made 
which allow connecting to the industrial network directly from some other network 
without the need to use the DMZ. 
Industrial automation systems are relatively static and deterministic with only small 
changes to them during their operation. This can be used as an advantage when design-
ing the security for the industrial automation systems. Any information known about the 
operation of the industrial automation systems can be used when designing the security 
for them. [135] For example the message types and formats that are transferred in the 
automation networks are known in advance. This can be used to filter out any messages 
which don’t use these message types and formats. The networks can also be configured 
in advance without relying to dynamic configuration algorithms. Any dynamic behavior 
generally lowers the amount of determinism the system has. 
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Hardening, non-networked safety and fault-tolerance mechanisms, and redundancy are 
also used to implement security in industrial automation systems. In hardening any un-
necessary features, services or hardware are removed or disabled from the system. This 
limits the attack surface the system provides as there are less features, services and 
hardware in use which can contain vulnerabilities [35]. Non-networked safety and fault-
tolerance mechanisms are implemented outside the network which is used for the data 
communications [135]. As these mechanisms are out-of-band, they won’t be affected by 
attacks like Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Redundancy is implemented by having 
multiple pieces of hardware and software which implement the same functionality [12]. 
With redundancy there is backup software or hardware to rely on if some software be-
comes infected or hardware becomes faulty. The security is increased by using repli-
cates which don’t use exactly the same hardware or software. This reduces the risks 
caused by bugs in software or manufacturing errors in hardware. The security of the 
industrial automation systems should be documented properly [110] and the users of the 
system should be trained about the security issues and policies for the automation sys-
tems. 
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3. NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION 
There are many different technologies and protocols which are used to create networks 
and to connect machines to each other. As such networking is a complex subject which 
makes network virtualization complex subject as well. Because of this, giving a detailed 
description of network virtualization is out of the scope of this thesis. In this thesis only 
the main concepts required to implement network virtualization are presented. There are 
four important concepts which enable virtualizing physical networks: labelling, quality 
of service, software defined networking, and device virtualization. These concepts are 
briefly described in this chapter and lastly a concrete example of where these concepts 
are used is presented. 
3.1 Labelling 
In order to separate a physical network into multiple virtual networks, labelling is need-
ed. The labelling is used to identify to which virtual network the data transferred in the 
physical network belongs to. A label is added to packets that are transferred in the phys-
ical network. This label can then be used in different network devices to decide where to 
forward the data next. There are multiple different protocols which can be used to label 
the data. These protocols include Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) [50], Q-in-Q 
[50], Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) [71], Network Virtualization 
using Generic Routing Encapsulation (NVGRE) [37], Stateless Transport Tunnelling 
(STT) [25], and GEneric Network Virtualization Encapsulation (GENEVE) [39]. These 
labelling protocols can be divided into two categories: tunnelling protocols and non-
tunnelling protocols. The tunnelling protocols first encapsulate packets by adding a la-
bel and some metadata to them. Then they transfer the packets by using the protocols 
offered by the physical network. The advantages of these protocols are that the proto-
cols used in the virtual network can be different from the protocols used in the physical 
network and only the edge network devices have to understand the labels. The disad-
vantage is that these protocols will add overhead to the transferring of data as there is 
more data that is needed to be transferred over the network. The non-tunnelling proto-
cols also add labels and metadata to packets. The difference is that all the physical net-
work devices understand these label protocols natively. This allows less overhead for 
the data transfers, but the protocols used in the virtual networks must be same as the 
protocols used in the physical network and all the network devices must understand the 
label protocol. The difference between the tunnelling and non-tunnelling protocols is 
shown in the Figure 4 on the next page. VLAN and Q-in-Q are non-tunnelling protocols 
and the VXLAN, NVGRE, STT and GENEVE are tunnelling protocols. 
12 
 
Figure 4. An example of tunnelling and non-tunnelling protocols. 
3.2 Quality of Service 
The labelling allows creating virtual networks by identifying to which virtual network 
the data transferred in the physical network belongs to. In order to share the physical 
resources and in order to isolate the performance between the virtual networks, Quality 
of Service (QoS) functions must be implemented. QoS functions are used to make sure 
that each virtual network has at least certain amount of bandwidth to use in the physical 
network. 
Typical QoS services are based on queues and each port on a network device can have 
multiple queues attached to it. Packets are inserted into certain queues based on the in-
formation embedded in the packet headers and then a scheduler selects a packet from 
one of the queues to send through the physical medium attached to a port. The scheduler 
can use many different kinds of algorithms to select the next packet to be sent [89]. The 
scheduling is important since each virtual network should be able to get to use the me-
dium at some point of time. Additionally the queues can have bandwidth limits [20]. 
One example how bandwidth limits can be implemented is a technique called token 
bucket. A token is inserted into the token bucket in certain time intervals. These tokens 
represent a right to send a certain amount of bits through the medium. If the token buck-
et becomes full, the extra tokens are discarded. On the other hand if the token bucket 
becomes empty, the packets which arrive to the queue need to either wait for tokens to 
become available or they can be discarded. [17] This allows small bursts of data be sent 
thanks to the token bucket’s ability to collect tokens while still limiting the amount of 
bits which one queue can send through the medium. The QoS should be supported on 
virtual and physical network devices on the whole network. 
3.3 Device Virtualization 
Another important concept is the device virtualization. The device virtualization can 
easily be done by modifying any software that resides inside a network device to work 
on general purpose machine. When this has been done, the modified software can be 
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virtualized by using some other virtualization technologies like hardware virtualization 
or operating system –level virtualization. It is also possible that the other virtualization 
technologies are not needed and multiple virtual network devices can be created simply 
by launching multiple copies of the network device software.  
One example of network device virtualization is virtual switches. These are switches 
that work on general purpose machines and which enable switching between virtual 
machines (VMs) on those machines. The 802.1Q standard specifies standard ways how 
this kind of virtual switches can be implemented for Ethernet [49]. The actual imple-
mentation of the virtual switches varies based on the technologies that are used in the 
networks. The Appendix A describes implementation of virtual switches. Virtual Device 
Context (VDC) is an example of a technology where parts of the software of a network 
device are duplicated inside the network device itself to create multiple logical network 
devices [114]. There is also Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) specification 
which describes how the functions of network devices can be virtualized. The specifica-
tion describes architecture where functions from network devices are made to work on 
general purpose machines and which are then virtualized using some other virtualization 
technology like hardware virtualization to create multiple copies of the network func-
tions. The specification is made by European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). [82] 
3.4 Software Defined Networking 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is the last key concept for implementing network 
virtualization. Every network device has some kind of hardware and software compo-
nents. The functionality of these components can be divided into three different planes 
of operation: data plane, control plane and management plane. The data plane is respon-
sible for switching packets in the network devices. This is done based on information 
that is on the headers of the packets the network devices receive. The packets are for-
warded to correct destination based on this information. Also some QoS functions are 
on this plane. The control plane is responsible for routing the packets. It decides how 
the data plane should forward the packets based on information that the control plane 
collects from the network. Traditional network devices can have distributed algorithms 
on this plane which collect information about the network to base the routing decision 
on. Lastly the management plane provides functionality that can be used to configure 
the control plane and to manage the network devices. [32] 
In traditional network devices all of these planes reside on a network device itself. This 
means that each device has its own data, control and management planes. In SDN the 
control plane and the management plane are moved out from the network devices into 
some centralized location [76][57]. This allows the routing decisions and the manage-
ment of the network devices to be made in a centralized location removing the need for 
distributed algorithms. At the same time the implementation of the network devices 
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becomes simpler [76][57][43]. Because the network devices in SDN have only the data 
plane, they are called as switches. The difference between traditional and SDN-capable 
network devices is shown in the Figure 5. In the figure routers are used on the tradition-
al network, but they could be replaced with any other traditional network devices. It is 
also worth to note that the SDN controller doesn’t have to have the management plane 
[121]. The management plane could easily be separated to on its own separate manage-
ment component. 
 
Figure 5. Difference between SDN and traditional network devices. 
The centralization of the control and the management planes allows creating a logical 
view of the network structure that differs from the actual physical or virtual structure of 
the network. As the control plane can collect any data it wants from the network devic-
es, it can easily identify the state of the whole network [76]. For example a software 
component in control plane or in management plane could combine multiple virtual 
switches into a one logical switch [121]. This switch could be then presented for the 
administrator of the network who doesn’t have to know the actual structure of the net-
work. The controller makes sure that all the configurations are correct on the actual 
physical or virtual devices. 
3.5 Use Case 
A concrete example of network virtualization is the VMware’s NSX network virtualiza-
tion solution [121] though other network virtualization solutions exist. This technology 
uses all the network virtualization concepts presented in this chapter. The NSX is used 
on the VMware’s hardware virtualization solution to provide network virtualization. 
The NSX solution is shown in the Figure 6 on the next page. There are two physical 
machines which both host multiple VMs that are created with the virtualization soft-
ware.  
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In the NSX solution VXLAN is used as a labelling protocol to identify different virtual 
networks from each other [121]. In the figure the VXLAN traffic between the two phys-
ical machines is indicated with black arrows. The VMs belong to different virtual net-
works. The VMs 2, 3 and 4 belong to virtual network 1 and the VMs 4 and 5 belong to 
virtual network 2. The VM 1 and the NSX controllers belong to special management 
network. The traffic in these networks is indicated with red, green and purple arrows in 
the figure. To which virtual network the VMs belong to is based on the ports to which 
they are connected to in the virtual switches. 
 
Figure 6. Network virtualization with NSX. 
Although not shown in the figure, the NSX also supports QoS functions for the virtual 
switches provided by the NSX. Additionally other virtual network devices like virtual 
firewalls are also available in NSX to be deployed. The SDN is also implemented in the 
NSX. There are three important components required for the SDN in the NSX solution. 
The first component is the virtual switch which supports SDN. The second component 
is the NSX controller which manages the virtual switches and decides the forwarding 
rules for the switches. For fault tolerance purpose it is possible to have multiple control-
lers forming a controller cluster. However, each switch can be controlled only by one 
controller at a time. The third and the last component is the NSX manager. Administra-
tors can manage the networks through this manager. The manager is a plugin for 
vCenter management software which is installed on one of the VMs. The NSX com-
bines the separated virtual switches on the physical machines into a one logical switch 
which is called as virtual Distributed Switch (vDS). [121] From a management point of 
view it seems like all the VMs are connected to a same switch where the traffic is for-
warded based on the ports to where the VMs are connected to. Software in NSX makes 
sure that the traffic is forwarded correctly even if a VM is moved from one physical 
machine to another. 
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4. STORAGE VIRTUALIZATION 
Storage devices are used to store data for long periods of time. The data is stored as 
fixed sized blocks containing binary data [76]. These blocks can be accessed by some 
address which depends on the implementation of the storage device. One example of 
storage accessing method is the Cylinder-Head-Sector method where the location of a 
block on the storage device is addressed with a physical reading head of a disk, a cylin-
der on that disk and a sector on that cylinder [14]. The Storage Networking Industry 
Association (SNIA) has made a model [14] which describes common storage architec-
tures. For the purpose of this thesis a modified version of this model is show in the Fig-
ure 7. 
 
Figure 7. A model of common storage architecture. Modified from [14]. 
Two layers can be identified from the model: a file layer and a storage layer. The block 
layer handles the blocks the data is stored in on storage devices. The block layer con-
sists of block virtualization layer and block subsystems. The block systems are physical 
devices which are used to store the data. A block subsystem can contain multiple actual 
storage devices or it can be just a single storage device. The block virtualization layer is 
used to create emulated versions of the addresses used to access the storage devices. 
This virtualization layer can be implemented either on the host machine which uses the 
storage device, in the network which is used to connect to the storage device, or on the 
block subsystem itself [14]. 
The file layer handles files instead of the blocks that the storage devices use. The three 
components on this layer are file systems, file virtualization layer, and applications. The 
file systems are the systems which control how the data is stored in the storage devices. 
In most cases files can be considered as tables which contain addresses to the blocks on 
storage devices. In addition to these addresses the tables contain also some metadata 
like a filename and file size.  There can also be directories which are similar to the files 
Application
File Virtualization
Host
Network
Device
Block Virtualization
Block layer
File layer
Storage Devices
Block Subsystem
File system
17 
[102]. However, unlike the files the directories don’t have addresses to data blocks on 
the storage devices. Instead they have addresses to other directories and files. This al-
lows having hierarchical address space which can be used to access the data belonging 
to a file. This address space is called as namespace as it uses file and directory names to 
access the data. The namespace hierarchy starts from some root directory. [127] There 
are many different kinds of file systems which can be used on different kinds of storage 
devices [101]. An example of a file system is a Network File System (NFS) which can 
be used to access storage devices over network by using the namespace addressing 
method. In some cases the file systems can be directly implemented in storage devices 
or they can be implemented in the host machine that uses the storage devices. The file 
virtualization layer is used to create emulated versions of the namespaces the file sys-
tems provide. Lastly the applications are just some pieces of software which use the file 
systems to write and read data in storage devices. 
There are few different terms which are common when talking about the connectivity of 
storage devices. They are Direct Attached Storage (DAS), Network Attached Storage 
(NAS) and Storage Area Network (SAN). Directly attached storages are just storage 
devices which are directly attached to the host machine. These storages typically pro-
vide block-based interface for the host to use. Network attached storages are storage 
devices which are used over a network connection. These storages are accessed by using 
namespaces. Storage area networks are networks which are specifically developed to 
carry block data for storage devices. This means that the storage devices attached to 
these networks provide block based interface. [76] The SANs use typically fibre chan-
nels to transfer the data. However, there are some technologies which allow transferring 
the data over Ethernet. Examples of these technologies are the Fibre Channel over 
Ethernet (FCoE) and the internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI). This means 
that some of the network virtualization technologies described in the previous chapter 
can be used in part of the SANs. [106] 
4.1 Data Virtualization 
Data virtualization is a term used to describe any methods which allow to manipulate 
and to use data without knowing the actual implementation and the location of the data. 
[16] There are few important aspects to the data virtualization: unification, abstraction 
and encapsulation. Unification of the data means that the users don’t need to know 
where the data is located. The data can reside in multiple different storage devices and 
the user can use the data as if the data resides in one single storage device. The abstrac-
tion of data means that the users of the data see only the data what they need. Any data 
that is not useful for the user is abstracted away. The encapsulation of the data means 
that the technical details for accessing and using the data are hidden from the user. [65]  
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The data virtualization can be considered to consist of three different steps:  
1. “Connect and virtualize data sources into an abstract format.” [16] 
2. “Combine and federate sources into virtual data views.” [16] 
3. “Publish these views as a data service for applications or web-based tools” [16] 
The implementation of the data virtualization technology depends largely of the data 
sources and the purposes for which the data is used. However, the model of common 
storage architecture shows many features required for data virtualization. For example 
the file systems encapsulate the block access from applications by implementing a new 
method where files are used to store data instead of blocks. Applications don’t need to 
know how the actual storage devices work. In addition block virtualization and file vir-
tualization layers have technologies which provide some aspects of unification, encap-
sulation and abstraction. 
4.2 Block Virtualization 
Different storage devices have different kinds of properties and because of this the ac-
cessing methods can vary. A storage device can virtualize the access method by provid-
ing Logical Block Addressing (LBA) which can be used to access the blocks on the 
storage device. This allows one to use indexes to access the data on the storage device 
instead of using methods like cylinder-head-sector to access the data. [14] Another vir-
tualization method is called as partitioning [101]. In partitioning the storage device is 
divided into multiple partitions. Each of these partitions functions as if it is its own stor-
age device and has its own file system. 
On host machines it is possible to implement software component called Logical Vol-
ume Manager (LVM). A LVM can be used to implement virtualization for storage de-
vices on host machines [106]. The LVM uses three different concepts to manage the 
storage devices: physical volumes, volume groups and logical volumes. The physical 
volumes are actual storage devices or the partitions that are defined in the storage devic-
es. The LVM can group the physical volumes into volume groups each containing sepa-
rate storage devices and partitions. These volume groups act as if they are physical stor-
age devices. This means that a volume group will have its own address space and the 
LVM will do address translation to direct the data access to correct partition or storage 
device. This allows having a virtual storage device which spans over multiple physical 
storage devices. The logical volumes can be considered as partitions for the volume 
groups. With the logical volumes the virtual storage devices can be divided into multi-
ple virtual storage devices. Software using the LVM doesn’t need to worry where the 
actual data is stored and the software can use the virtual storage devices as they would 
use physical storage devices. [102] The LVM provides unification with the volume 
groups and abstraction with the logical volumes. It doesn’t provide encapsulation as the 
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access method to the virtual storage devices is the same as with physical storage devic-
es. The concept of LVM is shown in the Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The structure of a logical volume manager. 
The LVM allows some new concepts to be applied to the storage devices. As one vol-
ume group can be made out of multiple physical volumes, it is possible to write to and 
to read from multiple physical storage devices simultaneously. When data is being writ-
ten to a logical volume group, the written data can be divided between multiple physical 
volumes allowing faster writing operations. Similarly the read operations will be faster. 
This is called as data striping. [76] Alternatively the same data could be written to mul-
tiple physical volumes simultaneously. This is called as data mirroring [106] and it 
provides fault tolerance as the data is stored in multiple locations. The LVM is cheap to 
implement as it’s just a piece of software and it’s also flexible because of this. The dis-
advantages are that it takes up resources from the rest of the software running on same 
machine and it is only applicable to the machine it’s running on. [76] 
The LVM kind of functionality can be also implemented in storage devices themselves. 
These storage devices have multiple storage devices which are all independent from 
each other but there is a central controller which controls all of the storage devices [76]. 
This technology is also called as Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) [106]. 
The RAID storage can be used over a network or they can be locally connected [14]. 
The advantages of RAID storages compared to the LVMs are that the RAID storages 
don’t take up resources from the software on machines and that the RAID storages can 
be used by multiple machines. The disadvantages are higher price and the fact that if the 
centralized components of the RAID storage become faulty, the whole RAID storage 
becomes faulty [14]. The RAID still provides fault tolerance between the independent 
storage devices inside the RAID storage. 
Block virtualization can also be included in the storage area networks. In SAN multiple 
storages are connected to a network along with the machines which use them. The stor-
age devices are accessed by using proper addresses which specify where the data is 
stored. Switches are used to connect the devices together in the network. To implement 
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storage virtualization in SAN, it is possible to implement special components which 
implement address translation from logical addresses to physical addresses. These com-
ponents can either be in-band or out-of-band [14]. Both of these are shown in the Figure 
9. The addresses used on the figure don’t represent any actual addressing schemes. 
 
Figure 9. SAN virtualization. Modified from [106]. 
The in-band virtualization component is on the data path [106]. All the data is trans-
ferred through it. Each machine sees the virtualization component as its own storage 
device and the storage devices see the virtualization component as a machine [14]. The 
component does the address translation and forwards the writes and reads to correct 
locations. The component allows the machines to see only the storages that belong to 
them [14] and it can offer additional functionality such as data mirroring or striping. 
Data caching is also possible as all the data has to go through the virtualization compo-
nent [76]. The in-band component doesn’t require any additional software to be in-
stalled on the machines or the storage devices. However, if the virtualization component 
becomes faulty and fault tolerance is required, a small software component is required 
on the machines to notice the faulty virtualization component and to redirect the reads 
and writes to another virtualization component.  [14] 
The out-of-band virtualization component doesn’t reside on the data path. Instead it ex-
ists as a separate component from which the storage addresses need to be asked from. 
This requires a small software component to be installed on machines which makes 
them aware that the SAN is being virtualized. [14] When a machine wants to use stor-
age device, it has to first ask a proper address from the virtualization component. After 
this it can use the retrieved address to access the proper storage device. [106] It is possi-
ble to have an intelligent switch which retrieves the addresses from the virtualization 
component as it forwards the data. This way the required software component can be 
transferred from the machines to network devices. As the data is not required to flow 
through the virtualization component, the component can be made simpler than the in-
band virtualization component [14]. Having an out-of-band virtualization component 
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allows greater flexibility with data routing than having an in-band virtualization compo-
nent. Reason for this is that the data doesn’t need to go through a single virtualization 
component. The disadvantage is that functionality like data caching is not possible with 
an out-of-band virtualization component. Both in- and out-of-band components add 
some latency from the extra operations they do in networks. 
4.3 File Virtualization 
While block virtualization technologies handle the blocks the storage devices use, the 
file virtualization technologies handle the files the file systems use. A Virtual File Sys-
tem (VFS) is a file system that is built on top of more concrete file systems. Each vol-
ume or partition has its own file system and some file systems are not linked directly to 
any storage device (for example NFS). Accessing the files on these file systems depends 
on the implementation of the file systems. A VFS is used to combine the file systems in 
a way where all the file systems can be accessed in uniform manner. The VFS provides 
a namespace which can be used to access any file on any file system which has been 
connected to the VFS and which the VFS understands. The VFS does proper namespace 
translations so that the file reads and writes are directed to correct filesystems. Unlike 
the concrete file systems the VFS doesn’t handle blocks at all. [62] The VFS provides 
unification and encapsulation, but it doesn’t provide abstraction. 
The namespaces of file systems can be virtualized quite easily. As a namespace forms a 
hierarchical structure of files and directories and the hierarchy starts from a root directo-
ry, an emulated namespace can be created by creating a directory and changing it to be 
the root directory for the duration when the emulated namespace is required. From a 
root directory it should be impossible to go backwards in the directory hierarchy as the 
root folder is the first directory in the hierarchy. This means that any software which 
uses an emulated namespace can only see the files and directories that are in the directo-
ry to which the root directory temporarily was changed to. [127] The namespace virtual-
ization provides abstraction but it doesn’t provide encapsulation or unification. 
22 
5. HARDWARE VIRTUALIZATION 
The oldest and the most researched virtualization technology is hardware virtualization. 
This technology focuses on managing the hardware and virtualizing the interface be-
tween hardware and software. This means creating emulated copies of the Instruction 
Set Architecture (ISA). The ISA is an interface through which the hardware can be used, 
managed, and controlled. It can be divided into two smaller interfaces: the user ISA and 
the system ISA. The user ISA allows using some of the functions and operations offered 
by the hardware. However, the hardware cannot be configured or managed through this 
interface. This can only be done through the system ISA. [103] 
The principle of the hardware virtualization can be seen from the Figure 10. In the fig-
ure on the left side is the case where virtualization is not used and on the right side is the 
case where virtualization is used. In both cases the operating systems are running appli-
cations normally. In hardware virtualization a virtualizing layer is added on top of the 
hardware and below the operating systems [22]. The virtualization layer provides emu-
lated views of the underlying hardware on top of which the virtualization layer resides. 
This means that the virtualization layer needs to provide virtualized versions of Central 
Processing Units (CPUs), memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices that the physical 
hardware has. The virtualized CPU is what provides the emulated ISA for other soft-
ware to use. 
 
Figure 10. Hardware virtualization. 
A single set of virtual hardware (CPU, memory and I/O devices) that the virtualization 
layer creates is called as a Virtual Machine (VM) [87]. The software that resides on the 
virtualization layer and is responsible for providing and managing the virtual hardware 
is called a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) [87]. The term hypervisor is often used as 
a synonym for the virtual machine monitor [22][75]. However, VMware uses the VMM 
and the hypervisor terms to mean different things [116][4]. A VMM is the software 
component that is responsible for providing and managing the virtual hardware for a 
single virtual machine. The whole virtualization layer software is called as a hypervisor. 
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This means that one hypervisor can have multiple VMMs. The hypervisor also contains 
an operating system. The operating system can either be a general-purpose operating 
system or an operating system that is specifically developed to run the VMMs. The pur-
pose of the operating system in the hypervisor is to provide a kernel that manages the 
physical hardware resources for the VMMs. This kernel can also be called as a vmker-
nel if it is specifically developed to run the VMMs [4]. How the functionality is divided 
inside the hypervisor is not clearly defined. The rest of this thesis uses the VMware’s 
definitions for the terms VMM and hypervisor. 
Other useful terms to know are the terms host and guest [124]. The term host is used to 
indicate the physical hardware and the software that is not running on virtual hardware 
while the term guest is used to indicate the virtual hardware and the software that is 
running on the virtual hardware. For example in the Figure 10 the hardware that is not 
virtual hardware can be called as a host machine, the virtual hardware can be called as a 
guest machine, and the operating systems running on the virtual hardware can be called 
as guest operating systems. 
A hypervisor can run multiple VMs at the same time. This means that the hypervisors 
needs to manage the resources it allocates for the VMs. A VMM is the software respon-
sible for virtualizing the hardware. This sets some responsibilities for the VMM. In 
1974 Popek and Goldberg described the properties the VMM should fulfil [87]. To this 
date these properties can still be considered valid and they are used in modern hypervi-
sors [13]. There are three properties: 
1. The efficiency property: “All innocuous instructions are executed by the hard-
ware directly, with no intervention at all on the part of the control program.” 
[87] 
2. The resource control property: “It must be impossible for that arbitrary pro-
gram to affect the system resources, i.e. memory, available to it; the allocator of 
the control program is to be invoked upon any attempt.” [87] 
3. The equivalence property: “Any program K executing with a control program 
resident, with two possible exceptions, performs in a manner indistinguishable 
from the case when the control program did not exist and K had whatever free-
dom of access to privileged instructions that the programmer had intended.” [87] 
The efficiency property simply means that the user ISA instructions should be executed 
on the hardware directly to allow fast software execution. The resource control property 
is there to prevent software on VMs from affecting the behaviour of software on other 
VMs similarly to the way operating systems prevent applications from affecting other 
applications. The equivalence property means that the software running inside a VM 
should work the same way it worked without the virtualization. The two exceptions that 
Popek and Goldberg mention are linked to timing and resource availability problems 
[87]. In some cases the VMM needs to intervene and modify the instructions the soft-
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ware uses from the hardware. This is to make sure that resource control property is kept. 
The effect of this is that these instructions will take a bit longer to execute than what it 
would normally take in non-virtualized environment. The resource availability is differ-
ent in virtualized environment as well since the VMM needs some resources for itself. 
Additionally when running multiple VMs at the same time, all the VMs require their 
own resources. Since the software has fewer resources available, it will work slightly 
differently. 
There are multiple ways one can virtualize the hardware. The rest of this chapter focus-
es on explaining the different virtualization methods and how they are applied to differ-
ent hardware components. The management of these virtualized hardware components 
is discussed as well. 
5.1 Virtualization Methods 
There are three different methods that can be used to virtualize different hardware com-
ponents [116]. These methods are full virtualization, paravirtualization and hardware-
assisted virtualization. All of these methods have some advantages and disadvantages. 
How the methods are implemented depends on what hardware component is being vir-
tualized. 
Full virtualization is a software-based hardware virtualization method [116]. With this 
method the hardware component is completely virtualized and software can use these 
virtualized components the same way they would use the components without virtual-
ization. This requires that the hardware components are fully emulated in the VMM 
which can be quite complicated to implement [13][124]. The advantage of this is that 
the software used in VMs doesn’t need to be modified [116][75]. The disadvantages are 
that the emulation will affect the performance negatively compared to non-virtualized 
case and the implementation of VMM becomes complicated. 
Paravirtualization is also a software-based method. The difference to full virtualization 
is that the software running on top of the virtualization layer is modified to be aware of 
the virtualization layer [116][22]. This breaks the Popek’s and Goldberg’s third proper-
ty since the software doesn’t function the same way in virtualized environment and non-
virtualized environment. However, the benefit is that the performance is greatly im-
proved compare to the full virtualization method [22]. This is because many complicat-
ed operations can be replaced with more efficient and simpler virtualization aware oper-
ations. The VMM implements a new Application Programming Interface (API) called 
hypercall interface [22] to allow the software to use the more efficient operations. The 
advantages of this method are the better performance and simpler implementation of the 
VMM than in the full virtualization [116]. The disadvantages are that the software run-
ning in the VMs must be modified and different implementations of VMMs can have 
different hypercall interfaces. Often these modifications mean that the modified soft-
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ware can’t be used in non-virtualized environment [116]. However, with intelligent de-
sign the software can be made to work in both environments [22] and even with differ-
ent hypervisors as is the case with Linux operating systems that have paravirt_ops code 
in their kernel [129]. 
Hardware-assisted virtualization is a hardware-based method [116]. The hardware is 
developed in a way that it can provide emulated versions of itself. The advantages of 
this method are usually great performance [4][67], the simpler implementation [77] of 
the VMM, and no modifications required for the software that runs in the VMs. The 
performance and simpler implementation of the VMM are achieved because most of the 
functionality can be executed directly on the hardware which is usually faster than exe-
cuting it in software. The VMMs are still needed to configure the hardware properly for 
every VM. The obvious disadvantage is that the hardware is required to have the virtu-
alization functionality which is not always available. 
When the different virtualization methods are used together, it can be called as hybrid 
virtualization [77][67]. The goal of this is to combine the advantages and disadvantages 
of the different methods in a way that fulfils the requirements for the system running in 
the virtual environment. Different VMMs can use different combinations of virtualiza-
tion methods to provide the virtual hardware for VMs [73][116]. 
5.2 Hypervisor 
The software component in hardware virtualization which manages all the VMs is 
called a hypervisor. As mentioned earlier, the hypervisors consists of VMMs which 
provide the emulated hardware for the VMs and a kernel which manages the VMMs. 
The hypervisors can be divided into two different types depending on how they are im-
plemented. These types are type 1 and type 2 and they both have some advantages and 
disadvantages. The main difference between these two types is that the type 1 imple-
ments everything by itself and the type 2 uses some functionality of an existing operat-
ing system kernel. Both of these types are shown in the Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. The type 1 and 2 hypervisors. 
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The type 1 hypervisor can also be called as a bare metal hypervisor [116] and the type 2 
hypervisor can be called as a hosted hypervisor [1]. As mentioned, the type 1 hypervi-
sor implements its own kernel to manage the VMMs. This means that the hypervisor 
controls the usage of the hardware and it can determine how the resources are shared 
between the VMs. No other software is allowed to use the hardware without permission 
from the hypervisor to use it. The type 2 hypervisor shares the hardware with an operat-
ing system kernel. The sharing is done so that the hypervisor can use the functionality 
the operating system kernel provides. The operating system kernel is the software which 
manages the resources and decides which software can use what resources. [1] The hy-
pervisor has to wait for the operating kernel to give it access to use the hardware since 
the operating system kernel can also host applications other than the hypervisor [13][1]. 
The hardware resources the hypervisor gets are managed and shared between the 
VMMs by the hypervisor [1]. The type 2 hypervisor is connected to the operating sys-
tem kernel with a driver [13] or a kernel module. 
The advantage of the type 1 hypervisors is that it is fully in control of the hardware re-
sources. The developer of the hypervisor can determine how all the hardware resources 
should be managed and shared with the VMMs. Building a special purpose vmkernel 
also allows limiting the complexity of the hypervisor and the code which is in control of 
the hardware. [1] Many operating system kernels have functionality which is not re-
quired to manage VMMs and are more designed for normal applications. This means 
that there is code which can manage the hardware, but is not necessarily required for 
managing and creating VMMs. The hypervisors is also fully dependant of the operating 
system kernel. If the operating system is required to restart for some reason, the hyper-
visor must be restarted as well [1]. The disadvantage of the type 1 hypervisor is that it 
needs to implement everything on its own. This means that native device drivers need to 
be implemented for each device that the hypervisor is wanted to be able to use [1]. Con-
sidering the amount of different devices the computers can have, this is not an easy task. 
The type 2 hypervisors can simply use the existing native device drivers provided by the 
operating system kernel they work with [13][1]. It can also run a management applica-
tion for the hypervisor on the operating system [111] while type 1 hypervisors have to 
implement their own management tools or provide an API which can be used to manage 
the VMs. If the API approach is used, a centralized controller can be created which can 
be used to control hypervisors on different host machines through same management 
software. Other differences between these two types are that the type 2 hypervisors have 
worse performance than the type 1 hypervisors [116] and the type 2 hypervisors are 
easier to install than the type 1 hypervisors.  The worse performance of the type 2 hy-
pervisor can be explained by the hardware resource sharing with the other applications 
as the hypervisor can’t use all the hardware resources for its own functionality and it 
can’t control the resources by its own [111]. The easier installation of the type 2 hyper-
visors can be explained with the ability to use the operating system, which is used in 
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conjunction with the hypervisor to provide VMMs, to install the hypervisor similarly to 
a normal application [76]. 
5.3 Central Processing Unit 
CPU is the most important component on a computer. It provides the instructions set 
architecture that can be used to control everything the computer does. It also does the 
main computing in the computer. To understand how the CPU is virtualized by using 
the different methods, one needs to be familiar with some basic concepts: privilege lev-
els on the CPU and the types of instructions that the CPU provides. 
Privilege levels are used to provide protection for the software using the CPU [44]. Typ-
ically CPU has at least two privilege levels: supervisor mode and user mode. The user 
ISA is available to use in both modes but the system ISA is only available in the super-
visor mode. This means that only the software that is set to run in supervisory mode is 
allowed to manage the hardware. Arm is an example of a CPU architecture that uses 
supervisor and user modes [75]. Some CPU architectures like x86 have more privilege 
levels. In x86 architecture the privilege levels are called as protection rings and there 
are 4 of them numbered from 0 to 3 [116][9]. The ring 0 is the same thing as supervisor 
mode. Any software running on this ring has unrestricted access to the hardware and to 
all the instructions. The ring 3 is the same thing as user mode. Any software running on 
this ring has the most restricted access to the CPU instructions. The rings 1 and 2 are 
meant for device drivers but they are rarely used [44] and the device drivers are run in 
the ring 0 instead. Any software running on these rings doesn’t have unrestricted access 
to the hardware and the instructions but it still has more access than software running on 
the ring 3. It is said that the ring 0 is the most privileged level and ring 3 is the least 
privileged level [44]. An operating system kernel typically runs at the supervisor mode 
and user applications at the user mode. The privilege levels can be seen in the Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Privilege levels in different CPU architectures. 
Instructions that the CPU offers can be either privileged or non-privileged and sensitive 
or non-sensitive. Privileged instructions are instructions that can only be executed in the 
supervisor mode. If a privileged instruction is tried to be executed in any other privilege 
level, it will cause a general protection exception which will transfer the execution to 
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deal with the exception accordingly. This is also called as instruction trapping. Non-
privileged instructions are instructions that can be executed in any execution mode. 
There are two kinds of sensitive instructions: control sensitive instructions and behav-
iour sensitive instructions. A control sensitive instruction is an instruction which can 
change the state of the hardware. A behaviour sensitive instruction is an instruction 
which behaviour depends on the state of the hardware or the privilege level of the soft-
ware that uses the instruction. [87] Rest of the instructions are Non-sensitive instruc-
tions. Non-sensitive instructions can also be called innocuous instructions [87]. The 
system ISA is made out of the instructions that are privileged or sensitive. Rest of the 
instructions belong to the user ISA. 
5.3.1 Virtualization 
As the VMM needs to fulfil the resource control property, it needs to be the only soft-
ware which has access to the sensitive instructions. This means that there needs to be a 
method to transfer the control to the VMM when other software tries to use sensitive 
instructions. Popek and Goldberg created the following theorem: 
“THEOREM 1. For any conventional third generation computer, a virtual ma-
chine monitor may be constructed if the set of sensitive instructions for that com-
puter is a subset of the set of privileged instructions.” [87] 
When all the sensitive instructions are privileged instructions as well, these instructions 
must be executed in supervisor mode or they will be trapped if they are executed in any 
other privilege level. Any software using sensitive instructions can then be set to run in 
any other privilege level other than supervisor mode and a VMM can be created to run 
at the supervisor mode. This allows the VMM to trap all the sensitive instructions and to 
guarantee the resource isolation for different VMs. The VMM also needs to emulate the 
behaviour of the instructions for a VM to make them think they are using the hardware 
directly and to fulfil the equivalence property. [93] The VMM also stores the state of 
the CPU which consists of the values of the different registers. This way multiple 
VMMs can provide virtualization for different VMs. Emulation is not needed for non-
sensitive instructions. This kind of virtualization can be called as classical virtualization 
[3] or trap-and-emulate virtualization [4]. However, many of the new CPU architec-
tures were not designed with virtualization in mind. These architectures have instruc-
tions that are sensitive but aren’t privileged. For example both x86 [93] and ARM [24] 
architectures have these kinds of instructions. Since non-privileged instructions cannot 
be made to trap, classical virtualization cannot be used. The three earlier mentioned 
virtualization methods have been developed to solve this problem. 
Both full virtualization and paravirtualization move any software running at the supervi-
sor mode to run in some other execution mode. This operation is called as de-
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privileging [13]. There are two ways the de-privileging can be done: by moving the 
software to run in some unused privilege level or by moving the software to run in 
privilege level that is already used by other software. The de-privileging is shown in the 
Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. The different de-privileging methods. 
The method where the software shares the privilege level with some other software has 
its own challenges. These challenges are discussed more in the Chapter 5.4.1 which 
talks about the memory virtualization. Because of the challenges this method is rarely 
used. De-privileging is used to protect the VMM from other software. 
Full virtualization typically uses a method called dynamic binary translation to deal 
with the non-privileged sensitive instructions. A binary translator is a piece of software 
which converts input binary instruction sequence into a second binary instruction se-
quence that can be executed natively on the hardware. A dynamic binary translator does 
the same but at runtime. The dynamic binary translator saves the translated instruction 
sequences into a buffer called translation cache. When the binary translator gets instruc-
tion sequence which it has already translated, it can execute the already translated se-
quence from the cache. This speeds up the translation. In full virtualization the dynamic 
binary translation is used to identify sequences that have instructions that belong to the 
system ISA and then translating them into new sequences that can be controlled by the 
VMM. [13] The binary translation is used for privileged instructions as well since it’s 
faster than trapping [4][73]. These new sequences emulate the behaviour of the input 
sequences. The instructions that belong to the user ISA are executed directly on the 
CPU without the intervention of the VMM [13][4]. This allows native execution speed 
for these instructions. When the translation is done at runtime, the software running on 
VM doesn’t require any modifications. However, the translator needs to check the exe-
cuted code dynamically causing the performance to be worse than in the native execu-
tion of the code. The binary translator can also be quite complicated to implement 
[13][4]. 
The way paravirtualization differs from full virtualization is that the instructions which 
belong to the system ISA are translated when software is compiled instead of doing it at 
the runtime. The VMM offers a hypercall interface which offers functions that have 
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similar functionality to the instructions belonging to the system ISA [77][9]. The system 
ISA instruction calls are then replaced in the software code with these new function 
calls and the software is compiled. The VMM can manage the hardware this way since 
any other software uses the functions which the VMM implements. This is much sim-
pler to implement [116] in the VMM than the dynamic binary translator and no extra 
work is needed during the runtime allowing better performance than full virtualization 
[116]. The downside is the required modifications to the software that is run on the 
VMM. Sometimes these modifications can be challenging as the virtual CPU the VMM 
provides with its hypercall API is different from the physical CPU [77]. Similarly to full 
virtualization all the instructions that belong to user ISA are executed directly on the 
CPU without any performance loss. 
The implementation of the hardware-assisted virtualization depends completely of the 
CPU architecture that implements it. However, all the implementations have the same 
goal: they enable the classical virtualization. Hardware-assisted virtualization doesn’t 
require any modifications to the software that is run in VMs. Here the virtualization 
extensions for x86 and ARM architectures are explained as an example.  
Intel’s VT-x and AMD’s AMD-V are the virtualization extensions for the x86 architec-
ture processors. They differ slightly with the implementation, but they both have the 
same basic concept: two new operating modes are implemented for the CPU. The oper-
ating modes are root mode and non-root mode [80]. These new operating modes are not 
an extension to the old privilege levels, but are orthogonal to them. This means that both 
of these modes have the old privilege levels as can be seen from the Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. The new operating modes of the x86 architecture. 
Since the operating modes are orthogonal to the existing privilege levels, de-privileging 
is not needed for the software that runs in the ring 0 normally. The VMM and the soft-
ware are set to run in different operating modes so they both can use the ring 0 as shown 
in the Figure 14. The non-root mode is meant for normal software and the root mode is 
reserved for the VMM and any software needed for the virtualization. [80] 
The virtualization extensions include new in-memory control structures that are used to 
save the state of the CPU in different operating modes. Each VM has its own control 
Ring 0
Ring 1
Ring 2
Ring 3 Applications
Kernel Ring 0
Ring 1
Ring 2
Ring 3
VMM
Root modeNon-root mode
31 
structure as does the software running in the root mode. In VT-x the control structures 
are called Virtual Machine Control Structures (VMCS) and in AMD-V they are called 
Virtual Machine Control Blocks (VMCB). Every time the operating mode changes, the 
CPU saves the current CPU state to a control structure and then loads another CPU state 
from a proper control structure automatically [4][80]. Since the CPU states are saved 
separately, the software running in ring 0 in non-root mode can use instructions from 
system ISA normally without the need for intervention from the VMM. This is only true 
for instructions that only modify or read the state of the CPU. Without hardware assist-
ed virtualization for memory and I/O, the execution must still be transferred to the 
VMM to virtualize them. [3] 
The control structures some contain some other information in addition of the CPU 
state. They contain fields that can be used to specify what instruction will cause the exe-
cution to transfer to the VMM in root mode. They also contain field which is used to 
store the reason why the execution was transferred to the VMM so the VMM can do 
right decisions after that. [4][80]  
VT-x and AMD-V offer improved performance for instructions that only use the CPU 
because they can be executed natively. However, changing the execution between the 
operating modes is slow since the whole CPU state needs to be swapped [4]. This is 
why operations that transfer the execution to the VMM should be avoided. If the 
memory and I/O are virtualized in software, instructions that use these require the exe-
cution to be transferred to the VMM and the performance can suffer a lot compared to 
case where the CPU is virtualized in software as well [73]. 
The virtualization extension for the ARM architecture takes a bit different approach. 
Instead of having new operating modes it simply implements a new privilege level that 
is more privileged than the old privilege levels. [118] This new privilege level is called 
as hyp mode [8] and it is show in the Figure 15. The new level is meant for the VMM 
and the rest of the software can run on its privilege level it was designed for. All the old 
instructions that are privileged or sensitive can be configured to trap and transfer the 
execution to the new privilege level or to the old supervisor mode [118]. This allows 
using the classical virtualization method.  
 
Figure 15. The new execution mode for the ARM architecture. 
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doesn’t do this automatically like the x86 extensions do. To increase the execution 
speed in virtualization, the virtualization extension includes emulation support. When 
an instruction is trapped it must be first decoded before its emulation. Normally the de-
coding and the emulation are done in software. With the emulation support the decoding 
can be done in the hardware instead which increases the performance [118]. 
5.3.2 Management 
As the hypervisor is responsible for managing the physical hardware, it is responsible 
for deciding how the CPU resources are used. Each VMM can emulate multiple CPUs. 
These emulated CPUs are called as virtual CPUs (vCPUs). The hypervisor manages 
how these vCPUs are mapped to the physical CPUs (pCPUs). [73] It selects on which 
pCPU each of the vCPUs is run. To do this the hypervisor must schedule the vCPUs. 
The vCPUs can be modelled as threads on multicore systems [4][73]. These threads can 
be assigned to run on one core or the threads can be set to run on a multiple cores in 
which case the hypervisor selects suitable cores on which the threads are run. With this 
it is possible to dedicate a physical core for a vCPU to use. This is also called as vCPU 
pinning. Only the vCPU’s thread is set to run on one of the cores and nothing else is set 
to run on it. This removes the need for scheduling as the vCPU is the only thing that can 
run on the physical core. 
On type 1 hypervisor the scheduler must be implemented by the hypervisor itself. On 
type 2 hypervisor the scheduler is implemented by the operating system kernel. [73] 
The operating system kernel must support pinning threads on certain physical cores for 
the hypervisor to support the vCPU pinning. The scheduler uses some kind of schedul-
ing algorithm to select which vCPU is run next on a physical core. There are many dif-
ferent kinds of algorithms which can be used for the scheduling and explaining all these 
algorithms won’t be part of this thesis. However, it is important to note that with the 
hypervisor the system becomes a hierarchically scheduled system. The hypervisor uses 
its own scheduler and the operating system kernels running in VMs use their own 
schedulers to schedule the guest applications. This is show in the Figure 16 on the next 
page.  
The hierarchical structure allows few options how the scheduling can be managed. The 
scheduler in the hypervisor can simply schedule the vCPUs without considering how 
the guest schedulers work or if the guest schedulers have any requirements. Alternative-
ly the scheduler in the hypervisor can take the requirements of the guest schedulers into 
account and try to schedule the vCPUs in a way that allows the guest schedulers to meet 
their requirements. Some methods have been developed for this approach. For example 
compositional scheduling framework can be used to analyse the hierarchical scheduling 
structure and to determine settings for the scheduler in the hypervisor so that it can meet 
the requirements for the guest schedulers [131][31]. Another approach is to flatten the 
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scheduling hierarchy. In this approach the scheduler in the hypervisor uses the 
knowledge of the tasks running in the guest operating systems to determine which 
vCPU to schedule next. The hypervisors requires information of the tasks scheduled on 
the guest schedulers to make its decisions. [31] The information can be provided for 
example with VM introspection [31] or with paravirtualization. 
 
Figure 16. Hierarchical CPU scheduling. 
Even if the scheduler in a hypervisor doesn’t consider the requirements of the guest 
schedulers, there are some challenges for the scheduling in the hypervisor. These chal-
lenges are related to multiprocessor systems. Many operating systems may assume that 
the processors they use run approximately at the same rate. In virtualization this is not 
the case as the vCPUs are scheduled on the pCPUs and all the vCPUs belonging to one 
VM might not be running simultaneously. Operating systems might use spinlocks for 
their functionality. For example if one of the vCPUs holds a lock and that vCPU is 
descheduled, the other vCPUs will waste time busy-waiting while waiting for the vCPU 
holding the lock to be rescheduled and to free the lock. This will make the operating 
systems work slower than how they would work in non-virtualized environment. The 
difference between vCPU execution rates is called as skew. The solution for this prob-
lem is for the scheduler in the hypervisor to schedule the vCPUs to execute at the same 
time. [73] This is called as gang scheduling or co-scheduling. These scheduling meth-
ods can be relaxed a bit by measuring the skew between the vCPUs and scheduling 
them accordingly to keep the skew within some bounds. Alternatively the operating 
systems can be designed to not assume that the CPUs they use run simultaneously. 
Another thing the scheduler in the hypervisor should be aware of is the Non-Uniform 
Memory Access (NUMA) architecture. In NUMA architecture the computer is divided 
into nodes. Each node has a set of CPUs and a memory. The CPUs can access the 
memory belonging to the same node quickly but accessing the memory in other nodes is 
much slower. The scheduler in the hypervisors should be NUMA aware so it can sched-
ule the vCPUs to run at the optimal pCPUs to provide the best memory access for the 
vCPUs [73]. 
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5.4 Memory 
Memory is used to store data temporarily. It is used because it is much faster to use than 
some permanent storage solution like a hard disk. Memory virtualization is not a new 
technology and many operating systems use it [117]. However, when multiple operating 
systems are run simultaneously on same machine, new methods are needed for the 
memory virtualization. To understand these methods one needs to know some basic 
concepts of the memory virtualization technologies the operating systems use. Memory 
virtualization for multiple operating systems is based on these technologies. 
Memory is accessed by using physical memory addresses. These addresses point at cer-
tain locations in the memory and certain number of bits of data is located at these points 
in the memory. The addresses grow in successive order and they form physical address 
space. The traditional methods how the operating systems virtualize the memory are 
segmentation and paging. [52] 
In segmentation the memory is divided into fixed length portions. This is done by hav-
ing two values: a base and a limit. The base indicates the location from where a seg-
ment starts in the physical memory and the limit indicates the amount of physical ad-
dresses that belong to this segment. These values are stored in some CPU register. 
When a segment is created, a new address space is created called as a logical address 
space. This address space is separate from the physical address space. A logical address 
contains two fields: a segment and an offset. The segment field is used to indicate what 
segment is used and the offset field is used to indicate which address in that address 
space is used. When the logical address space is used to access memory, an address 
translation is needed from the logical address space to the physical address space or, if 
paging is used, to a linear address space. [52] This is done usually in some hardware 
component like a Memory Management Unit (MMU). The address translation consists 
of finding the base value that is linked to the segment number from a table and then 
adding the offset to it [52]. If the offset is larger than the limit, the address translation 
will generate a fault. A segment can be assigned to a piece of software and the software 
can then use the offset value to access the software’s memory like it would have direct 
access to the physical memory. The offset can be though as an emulated version of the 
physical address space. This is why the logical address space can also be called as a 
virtual address space. The details how segmentation is implemented typically vary be-
tween different CPU architectures. The concept of segmentation can be seen in the Fig-
ure 17 on the next page. The offset validation is not shown in the figure. 
The disadvantage of segmentation is that the memory, which is allocated to software, 
needs to be continuous. In paging the physical address space is divided into multiple 
equally sized blocks called as pages. When paging is done, a new address space is cre-
ated called as a linear address space. A linear address contains typically three fields: a 
directory, a table and an offset. However, there might be more or less fields in the linear 
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address depending how many levels the paging has. The directory field is used to indi-
cate an entry in a table called as a page directory. This entry has a physical address to a 
table called as a page table. The table field is used to indicate an entry in this page table. 
This entry has a physical address to a page in the memory. The offset field is used to 
indicate the physical address inside the page. In cases where there are more levels to the 
paging, all the tables can be simply called as page tables. The entries in the page tables 
simply point to other page tables or pages. When the memory is accessed by using a 
linear address space, an address translation is needed to transform the linear address to a 
physical address. Page directories and page tables are stored in the memory. The physi-
cal memory address to the current software’s page directory is stored on a register in the 
CPU. First the entry from page directory is searched with the value in the directory field 
and then the page table’s memory address, that the entry has, is stored to a register on 
the CPU. After that the entry from the page table is searched with the value in the table 
field and then the page’s memory address, that the entry has, is stored to a register on 
the CPU. Lastly the offset is added to this stored memory address to get the physical 
address. [52] If a page directory, a page table or a page is not found, a page fault is gen-
erated which transfers the software execution to the software running in supervisor 
mode so it can decide what to do. The address translation is done usually by hardware 
component like a MMU. The address translation can also be called as page walking [4]. 
The concept of paging can be seen in the Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. The typical memory virtualization methods operating systems use. 
Since the address translation needs to access the memory three times to find the correct 
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memory. To solve this problem a special cache called as a Translation Lookaside Buffer 
(TLB) has been developed [52]. It can be implemented either in software or hardware. 
The TLB is used to store address mappings from the linear addresses to physical ad-
dresses. This way the physical addresses can be directly found from the cache and the 
address translation is not needed thus making accessing the memory faster. When the 
address translation is done, the translated address is stored in the TLB. However, the 
size of the TLB is limited and when the TLB becomes full, some stored translated ad-
dress must be removed to make space for the new address [4]. There are many different 
algorithms that can be used to determine which translated address should be removed 
next. When accessing the memory and an already made translation is not found from the 
TLB, it is called as a TLB miss. In this case the memory translation has to be done mak-
ing the memory access slower. 
Each software component can have its own linear address space. This means that the 
contents of the TLB should be emptied every time the executed software changes. Oth-
erwise the TLB could contain addresses that do not map to the memory that the soft-
ware owns. The operation where the TLB is emptied is also called as TLB flushing [4]. 
The flushing is often performance heavy operation. However, the flushing isn’t needed 
if there is a way to indicate to which software component the translated addresses be-
long to. This is done by adding a tag to each translated address and the TLB which im-
plements this is called as a tagged TLB [9]. 
5.4.1 Virtualization 
When virtualizing the memory for multiple operating systems, each VM is given its 
own virtual address space to use. This address space can be called as guest physical 
memory and it’s emulated by the VMM. The physical memory is called as host physical 
memory. [117] In the software-based CPU virtualization methods parts of the VMM 
needs to reside in the guest physical memory [13][80]. The reason for this that the parts 
of the VMM that transfer the execution from the software running in a VM to the VMM 
needs to be available to use in this address space [4]. In hardware-based CPU virtualiza-
tion this is not required as the hardware transfers the execution automatically and soft-
ware is not needed for that. 
Many of the data structures used in traditional memory virtualization contain fields that 
are used for protection. These are typically linked to the privilege levels of the CPU in 
one way or another. [52] When the memory is virtualized, there is need for three levels 
of protection: one for the VMMs, one for the operating system kernels and one for the 
applications. The VMMs needs to be protected from both the operating system kernels 
and the applications while the operating system kernels need to be protected from the 
applications. [48] The protection can be done in one of two ways: by having the soft-
ware components in separate address spaces or by using the protection fields that the 
existing memory virtualization methods offer. The CPU architectures that have only 
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two privilege levels might not have more than two levels of memory protection. If soft-
ware-based CPU virtualization is used and the operating systems kernels need to be de-
privileged, they need to share a privilege level with applications. In these cases the 
VMM needs to implement the protection between the operating system kernels and the 
applications by separating them into different linear address spaces [78]. This means 
that there are two separate address spaces for each VM: one that contains the memory of 
the whole VM and one that contains the memory of the whole VM apart from the 
memory that belongs to the operating system kernel [9][88]. By having these two ad-
dress spaces the operating system kernel can manipulate the whole memory of the VM 
apart from the memory that belongs to the VMM and the applications can only manipu-
late the memory that belongs to the applications. In this method when the operating sys-
tem kernel wants transfer the execution to an application, it needs to do it through the 
VMM [88]. The VMM will swap the address space to that which doesn’t let manipulat-
ing the operating system kernel’s memory. When the execution is transferred back to 
the operating system kernel a new swap is required to change the address space back to 
the other one. If the TLB is not tagged, the address space swapping requires a TLB 
flush which is performance heavy operation [77]. This is why protection done with pro-
tection fields is superior to protection done with address space swapping in systems 
which don’t have a tagged TLB. 
As the hardware components that manage the memory are dependant of the CPU archi-
tecture they are used with, the memory virtualization methods are also dependant of the 
used CPU architecture. Some ARM CPU architectures support memory domains [8]. A 
domain is a collection of memory regions and each memory page can be set to belong to 
some domain. The access to these domains can be controlled and this way they can be 
used to protect the software components from each other [48]. 
In the x86 architecture the segmentation can use the same amount of protection levels as 
there are protection rings. However, the paging only supports two protection levels: one 
for the rings 0-2 and one for the ring 3. [52] Also the TLB in the x86 architecture is not 
tagged. This is why the software-based virtualization methods on the x86 architecture 
use segmentation to protect the VMMs from the operating system kernels and paging to 
protect the VMMs and the operating system kernels from the applications [4]. Protect-
ing the VMMs this way can cause some problems. Since a VMM shares the same ad-
dress space partially with a VM and the segments are controlled by changing the seg-
ment limits, the VMM needs to reside at the top most part of the address space. Any 
software which uses these top parts of the address space cannot use them. [13] This 
problem is called as address space compression [80]. 
The 64bit extension (x86_64) for the x86 architecture mostly removed the support for 
the segmentation as nothing really used it after the paging was implemented. This meant 
that there was no way of protecting the VMMs from the operating system kernels if they 
were de-privileged to the rings 1 and 2. Later the AMD added the segmentation back to 
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their CPU chips for the x86_64 extension seeing how it was useful for the virtualization, 
but the Intel’s CPU chips still don’t have the segmentation for the x86_64 extension. [4] 
Because of the lack of the segmentation, the operating system kernels and the applica-
tions need to be separated into different address spaces. This is the reason many VMMs 
don’t necessarily support software-based virtualization for the x86_64 extension as it 
would be slow.  
VMMs use the existing memory virtualization methods to virtualize the memory. Since 
these memory virtualization methods are often implemented in hardware components 
and many operating systems use them, the VMMs need to emulate these hardware com-
ponents for the VMs [116]. This is where the virtualization methods listed in the Chap-
ter 5.1 come into play. 
In the full virtualization two sets of mappings are required: the operating system kernels 
map the guest virtual addresses (gVAs) to the guest physical addresses (gPAs) and the 
VMMs map the guest physical addresses to the host physical addresses (hPAs) [4]. The 
main technique how emulated paging is implemented in full virtualization is called as 
shadow paging. In shadow paging the VMMs maintain mappings from the guest physi-
cal addresses to host physical addresses and mappings from guest virtual addresses to 
host physical addresses are stored into shadow pages. These pages are then used by the 
hardware memory management components. [73] When software tries to edit mappings 
in page directories or page tables in the VM, the execution is transferred to the VMM 
which validates the edits and creates proper mappings into the shadow pages [104]. Ac-
cessing the memory can be done directly since the hardware uses the mappings from 
guest virtual addresses to the host physical addresses [104]. The concept of shadow pag-
ing can be seen in the Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. The shadow paging technique. 
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The segment registers, that the x86 architectures uses to store the information about the 
segments, have some interesting attributes. They have visible and hidden portions. 
Software running at any privilege level can read or write the visible portion but it can’t 
directly access the hidden portion. When to the visible portion is written, it automatical-
ly updates the hidden proportion as well. [13] The hidden proportion contains infor-
mation like the base address of the segment and the limit. Additionally the x86 architec-
ture has data structures called as segment descriptors. These contain the same infor-
mation as the hidden portions of the segment registers. [52] If this information is 
changed in the descriptors, it won’t automatically update the hidden portion of the seg-
ment registers as the only way to update those is by writing to the visible portion of the 
segment register. Some operating systems rely on this behaviour so this must be emu-
lated as well. [13] 
The vPA to hPA mapping can be applied to segmentation as well. The main full virtual-
ization techniques for emulating the segments in the x86 architecture are shadow de-
scriptors and cached descriptors. The shadow descriptors emulate the segment de-
scriptors and the cached descriptors emulate the segment registers. They work similarly 
to the shadow pages. [13] 
The full virtualization method for the memory will be slower that executing software 
directly on the hardware. The reason for this is that the VMM needs to intervene every 
time some software tries to edit memory mappings [73][104]. Also when the VM ac-
cesses memory for the first time, the shadow pages must be created slowing down the 
memory access as well [104]. Lastly every time the executed VM is changed the shad-
ow pages must be changed to contain the correct mappings for the new VM [104]. 
In paravirtualization the operating system kernels map the guest virtual addresses direct-
ly to the host physical addresses. As the host physical memory space is used by all the 
VMs, the operating system kernels can’t map the addresses freely to the host physical 
addresses. To emulate the paging the VMMs need to provide hypercalls that can be used 
to create new pages and to edit the mappings of existing pages. This way the VMMs can 
validate that the software doesn’t try to use memory that doesn’t belong to the VM in 
which the software is running. [9] The VMMs also need to provide a hypercall that can 
be used to see which physical memory addresses are available so that the operating sys-
tem kernels can select proper mappings for the pages. The operating system kernels are 
then modified to use these hypercalls instead of the ISA instructions. To protect the 
memory, access to the memory through the ISA needs to be set to read-only [9]. Since 
the operating system kernels use gVA to hPA mappings, they can use the memory man-
agement hardware directly to access the memory. The concept of paravirtualized paging 
can be seen in the Figure 19 on the next page. 
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Figure 19. The paravirtualized paging. 
Segmentation in paravirtualization is virtualized the same way. Any edits to the segment 
descriptor tables must be done with hypercalls so that the VMMs can validate them [9]. 
Since the segmentation is used with hypercalls and the software running in a VM must 
be modified, the problem with relying on the hidden portion of the segment registers not 
changing can be avoided. 
The benefit of the paravirtualization compared to the full virtualization is that the 
VMMs don’t need to maintain shadow pages. This means that only time the VMMs 
need to intervene and do something is when the guest operating system kernels create 
new tables or modify address mappings. This allows the paravirtualization to perform 
better than the full virtualization. At the same time the implementation of the VMM 
becomes simpler. [9] 
In hardware-assisted virtualization the hardware is modified to be able to handle both 
gVA to gPA and gPA to hPA address translations. For x86 architecture there are two 
virtualization extensions for memory: Intel’s Nested Page Tables (NPT) and AMD’s 
Rapid Virtualization Indexing (RVI) [4][73]. The details of these extensions vary, but 
the concept is same in both of them. These extensions are part of the Intel’s VT-x and 
AMD’s AMD-V extensions, but it is important to note that some of the first CPUs that 
support VT-x and AMD-V don’t have nested or extended page tables. In these exten-
sions the VMMs maintain two sets of page directories and tables: one set maps address-
es from vPA to gPA and one set maps addresses from gPA to hPA [73]. When a 
memory address translation is done, the hardware component first looks up what is the 
guest physical address of a page table or a page in the entries of a guest page directory 
or guest page tables. After this the component looks up from a nested page directory or 
nested page tables what host physical address corresponds to that guest physical ad-
dress. [4] Since the hardware can handle both sets of address translations, the guest op-
erating system kernels can change the mappings they see without the need for the VMM 
involvement [80]. The concept of hardware-assisted memory virtualization for paging 
can be seen in the Figure 20 on the next page. 
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Figure 20. The hardware-assisted virtualization extension for paging. 
The hardware-assisted CPU virtualization is required for the hardware-assisted memory 
virtualization. The segment register virtualization is done by the hardware-assisted CPU 
virtualization since it automatically saves the whole CPU state when the execution 
transfers from a VM to a VMM. Since the transferring the execution happens automati-
cally, the VMMs and VMs can have their different address spaces and parts of the 
VMMs don’t need to reside in a VMs’ address spaces any more allowing the software in 
the VMs to use their whole address space. This would normally cause TLB flushes, but 
both NPT and RVI include a tagged TLB [80]. With the tagged TLB the TLB entries 
can be tagged to belong to a VMM or a VM and the TLB flushing is not needed when 
the execution is transferred between the VMs and the VMMs. In addition the NPT and 
the RVI can store data which indicates if the memory pages have been read or written to 
[52]. 
The ARM architecture has a similar memory virtualization extension. It also has a 
tagged TLB [118] and the memory management unit on it contains two sets of page 
directories and page tables similarly to the NPT and EPT [44][118]. 
The advantages of hardware-assisted virtualization are that the VMMs don’t need to be 
involved when mappings are changed inside the VMs and that the VMMs can reside in 
different address spaces without the need for TLB flushes. Both of these improve the 
performance of the memory virtualization compared to the software-based memory vir-
tualization methods [73]. However, there is one disadvantage with this method: TLB 
misses will be more costly and the memory access will take longer. This is because 
when a TLB entry cannot be found, the memory management unit needs to do the ad-
dress translation which requires the memory management unit to walk through two sets 
of page directories and page tables [4]. The negative performance effects can be less-
ened by using larger page sizes allowing pages to contain more data and avoiding some 
of the page walks [73]. 
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5.4.2 Management 
The hypervisor can implement different kinds of memory management techniques to 
improve the memory usage on the host machine as memory is a limited resource. In 
addition the type 2 hypervisors have some special considerations as they have to share 
the memory with the operating system running alongside the hypervisor. 
Depending how the type 2 hypervisor is implemented, a world switch might be required 
every time the execution switches between the hypervisor and the host operating system 
kernel. A world switch is a technique where the memory context is switched between 
the operating system kernel and the hypervisor. When the operating system kernel trans-
fers the execution to the hypervisor, the memory address space is transferred from the 
operating system kernel’s address space to the hypervisor’s address space. At the same 
time the state of the CPU is stored so it can be restored later. [13] The goal is to provide 
protection for the operating system kernel and the hypervisor from each other. As men-
tioned previously, the swapping of a memory address space has a negative performance 
impact. The addition of swapping the CPU state makes the world switch even slower 
than traditional context switch [111]. This is why implementing operating system kernel 
and the hypervisor as separate pieces of software has worse performance than type 1 
hypervisors. An alternative way of implementing the type 2 hypervisor is to implement 
it as part of the operating system kernel as a kernel module [13][60]. This requires some 
modifications or support from the operating system kernel but the world switch is not 
needed any more as the hypervisor and the operating system kernel work as a single 
piece of software [13][60]. In a way this turns the type 2 hypervisor into a type 1 hyper-
visor, but it still stays as the type 2 hypervisor as the operating system kernel can host 
normal applications and has functionality which is not for the virtualization purposes. 
The memory architecture is a hierarchical structure and there are multiple levels of 
memory. There are the main memory components, which are separated from the CPUs, 
and then there are many smaller memory components, which are embedded into the 
CPUs. These smaller memory components are called as caches and the data stored into 
them is faster for the CPU to retrieve than the data stored into the main memory. The 
closer the cache is to the actual processing unit, the faster and smaller it is. When data is 
retrieved from the main memory, it is first transferred to the caches. Each cache re-
trieves a certain amount of data from the previous cache or from the main memory and 
the processing unit retrieves the data from the cache closest to the processing unit. [51] 
The Figure 21 on the next page shows an example of memory architecture. 
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Figure 21. An example of memory architecture. Modified from [51]. 
The actual memory architecture varies between different implementations. However, 
they usually have some shared cache called as a Last Level Cache (LLC) which is the 
closest cache to the main memory. Typically the CPU manages these caches and there is 
no way for software to manage them. This can be problematic in virtualized environ-
ment where multiple VMs share the same hardware. As the LLC is shared, some VM 
processing memory intensive workload could cause data belonging to some other VM 
to be replaced in the LLC. The other VM has to transfer the data again from the main 
memory to the caches to access it. This can slow down the processing of the other VM. 
To solve this problem the Intel has developed a technology called as Cache Allocation 
Technology (CAT). With this technology it is possible to divide the LLC between VMs 
or applications in a way that they can’t override the data from the parts of the LLC 
which aren’t assigned to them. [51] The hypervisor can use this technology to provide 
separation for the memory the VMs use. Currently Intel is the only hardware provider 
providing this kind of technology. 
When a VM is created, it is allocated by the hypervisor a minimum amount of memory 
it can use. In addition it can also be given a maximum amount of memory it can use. 
[9][117] This value can be anything from the minimum amount of memory to infinity. 
The minimum amount of memory is used to guarantee that the VM will always have at 
least some memory available to use. It is called thin memory provisioning when the 
VMs on the host machine are assigned more memory than is actually available on the 
physical hardware [73]. The assigned memory is not necessarily used. If the VMs use 
more memory than is available on the host machine, it is called as memory overcommit-
ting [73]. Using more memory than is available on the host machine is not possible 
without using special techniques which allow the memory overcommitting. The hyper-
visor can implement any of the following techniques to allow memory overcommitting: 
ballooning, page sharing, hypervisor swapping, and memory compression. The detailed 
description of these techniques is presented in the Appendix B. The memory overcom-
mitting allows the host memory to be used more efficiently as some of the VMs might 
be idle most of the time and have much memory which is not being used. With memory 
overcommitting techniques it is possible to get some of this memory into better use. 
[117] It is important to note that most of these techniques affect the performance of the 
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VMs running on the hypervisor as they require complex operations to allow the memory 
overcommitting. 
5.5 Input / Output 
Virtualizing the CPU and the memory is not enough. Computers receive and send data 
by using different kinds of input/output devices. Also these devices need to be virtual-
ized for software to use. To understand the different I/O virtualization methods one 
needs to first understand how the I/O devices work in a computer. This involves know-
ing how the devices are controlled, how the devices inform the CPU of events, and how 
the data is transferred. 
There are two ways how I/O devices can typically be controlled and used. These are 
called as Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO) [1] and Port-Mapped I/O (PMIO). In the 
memory-mapped I/O the addresses to the registers that the device’s CPU has are 
mapped to the memory. The device registers can be then read or be written to by read-
ing or by writing to these memory addresses [1]. These addresses reside in the same 
address space as the software using the I/O devices. The port-mapped I/O is similar to 
the memory-mapped I/O. The difference is that the addresses reside in different address 
space and special CPU instructions must be used when reading from or writing to these 
addresses. 
The I/O devices can signal the CPU of different kinds of events in two ways: They 
don’t signal at all or they inform the CPU by using interrupts to interrupt the execution 
of the software currently running on the CPU. The first case where the I/O devices don’t 
signal the CPU about events is called as programmed I/O and the second cased where 
the I/O devices use interrupts is called as interrupt-driven I/O [108]. In the programmed 
I/O the software running on the CPU has to keep reading the registers of the devices to 
notice the events. For example if some software sends data for a device to process, the 
software needs to wait and keep polling proper register to notice when the processing is 
done. When the processing is done, the software can continue its normal execution. This 
method is easy to implement but the down side is that the CPU is reserved the whole 
time until the device informs that it is done. 
In the interrupt-driven I/O the software doesn’t wait for the device to inform when it’s 
done, but it continues the normal execution while the device is processing the data. 
Once the device is done with the processing, it sends an interrupt to the CPU which then 
transfers the execution to an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR). This interrupt handler 
does the required procedures what are needed after the data is processed. The interrupt 
delivery mechanism can be either in-band or out-of-band [126].  
In out-of-band method the interrupt is delivered to the CPU by using separate lines that 
connect to pins on the CPU [1]. This method uses Programmable Interrupt Controllers 
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(PICs) to deliver the interrupts. The devices are connected with interrupt lines to the 
programmable interrupt controller and when they want to interrupt the CPU, they signal 
it by using one of such lines. Then the PIC signals the CPU by using its own interrupt 
line. The purpose of the PIC is to combine different sources of interrupts to one or more 
lines that are connected to the CPU and to deliver the interrupts to the CPU. The more 
advanced method uses Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controllers (APICs). There 
are two different kinds of APICs: local APICs and I/O APICs. Each CPU has one local 
APIC which services that CPU. The I/O devices are connected to the I/O APICs. Devic-
es signal the interrupts to the I/O APIC they are connected to and the I/O APICs signal 
the interrupts to one of the local APICs. This local APIC signals the interrupt to the 
CPU it is servicing. [19] This is how interrupts are done in the x86 architecture, but the 
implementation of the interrupt delivery systems can be different in different CPU ar-
chitectures. 
In in-band method the interrupt is delivered by writing it to a certain reserved memory 
location. The delivered interrupts in the in-bound method are called as Message Sig-
nalled Interrupts (MSI) [1]. These memory locations point to the registers of the local 
APICs which allowing bypassing the I/O APICs [19]. 
The interrupts can be assigned priorities. When a CPU accepts an interrupt, it acknowl-
edges it to the PIC or APIC which is connected to the CPU. After this the PIC or APIC 
won’t try to interrupt the CPU with any same priority or lower priority interrupts. The 
ISR needs to send an End Of Interrupt (EOI) signal to the PIC or APIC to signal when it 
is done with handling the interrupt so that it can start receiving interrupts which are 
same or lower priority than the interrupt just handled. [52] 
When the data is transferred to the devices, it’s done by using the ISA instructions used 
to control the devices and by copying the data from the memory to the device registers. 
When the data is transferred from the devices to the memory, there are two ways this 
can be done: Either software uses the ISA instructions to copy move data from the de-
vice register to the memory or the device writes the data directly to the memory. The 
latter is called as Direct Memory Access (DMA) I/O. In DMA a device is given a prede-
termined memory region where it can write the data [108]. The device writes the data to 
that memory region and then signals the CPU when it’s done. The MSI technology uses 
DMA to write the interrupts to memory locations. The I/O system of a computer can be 
roughly presented as in the Figure 22 on the next page when a simple PIC is used. 
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Figure 22. I/O system of a computer. Modified from [29]. 
5.5.1 Virtualization 
To virtualize the I/O devices the device register access, the PIC/APIC register access, 
interrupts and the DMA need to be virtualized. The register access virtualization means 
that the MMIO and PMIO need to be virtualized. In full virtualization all of these as-
pects are emulated in software. When software in VM tries to use the MMIO or the 
PMIO, the CPU instructions are trapped and directed to the VMM so it can emulate the 
behaviour of them for the VM and to retain the control of the devices. The PMIO is 
easy to emulate since it uses special CPU instructions which can be trapped by using the 
CPU virtualization methods. The MMIO is not as easy as easy to emulate. The problem 
with MMIO is that it uses the same instructions as normal memory operations and the 
challenge is to differentiate between a normal memory access and a device access. One 
way of differentiating with the memory access and the device access is simply to not 
create gPA to hPA mappings for the MMIO addresses [61]. This will cause a page fault 
when software inside a VM tries to access the MMIO addresses allowing the VMM to 
notice the access to the MMIO addresses. 
As different devices have different behaviour and registers, the VMM needs to emulate 
these for every device separately [124]. When the instructions to use MMIO or PMIO 
are trapped, they are directed to an I/O stack on the hypervisor [124][1]. In this I/O 
stack the I/O calls can be modified and managed by different pieces of software. One 
responsibility of the I/O stack is to virtualize the functionality of the device itself [1]. 
This involves multiplexing and scheduling the I/O calls for the physical device. Last 
part of the I/O stack is an actual device driver which interacts with the physical device. 
This architecture allows the emulated device to be different from the actual physical 
device [1]. The I/O calls are simply modified and directed to proper device driver in the 
I/O stack. The emulated device can also be called as a device model [1]. The I/O archi-
tecture is shown in the Figure 23 on the next page. The arrows represent the flows of 
information.  
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Figure 23. The I/O architecture in full virtualization method. 
The interrupts need to be emulated as well. When the physical device signals an inter-
rupt, it is delivered to the device driver inside the hypervisor. A notification of this in-
terrupt is delivered to the correct VMM which emulates the device for the VM to which 
the interrupt was aimed for. The VMM then injects an emulated interrupt to the VM 
when the software in the VM is ready to receive interrupts. This is done by emulating 
the behaviour of different interrupt controllers. [1] 
Address translation is also a major part of the I/O virtualization. When DMA-capable 
devices are used, they need to be told at what memory region they can write the data. 
Since the VMs use different address spaces than the host machine, the addresses used 
for the DMA transfers need to be translated to the host address space [124][1]. Other-
wise the DMA-capable device could write to some memory locations that don’t belong 
to the VM. 
The advantage of the full virtualization is that the operating system kernels in the VMs 
can keep using the existing device drivers. These device drivers see an emulated version 
of the hardware so they can use it the way they would use the actual hardware. The dis-
advantages of the full virtualization are the complexity of the emulation and the nega-
tive performance effect it causes as the execution must be often transferred between the 
VM and the VMM in complex I/O operations. [1] 
In paravirtualization the I/O device virtualization is done completely differently. In 
paravirtualization the existing hardware I/O technologies are not emulated, but instead a 
new method to access the existing I/O devices is created. The old device drivers are 
replaced with new split device drivers. As the name tells, these new device drivers are 
split into two different parts: front-end drivers and back-end drivers [67][86]. The front-
end driver is the part of the device driver which is installed into the operating system 
kernels running in the VMs. The back-end driver is the part of the device driver which 
is installed into the VMMs.  
The VMMs provide hypercalls in their hypercall interfaces which can be used to con-
nect the back-end and the front-end drivers and to communicate between them. Typical 
way of implementing the communication is by shared memory and buffer rings [9][95]. 
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The buffer rings contain descriptors pointing to shared memory areas which contain the 
data for the I/O requests and responses. The VMM validates all the I/O requests. [9] The 
memory is shared simply for performance reasons [42] as then the data doesn’t need to 
be copied from one memory location to another. The I/O calls can be directed from the 
back-end driver to the I/O stack in the hypervisor. The native device driver is part of 
this I/O stack the same way it is in the full virtualization [92][86]. It is important to note 
the since there is no need to emulate the hardware, the whole I/O stack along with the 
native device drivers can be part of the back-end driver. This way there will be only one 
back-end driver which handles the I/O calls from all the VMs [56].  
Interrupts in paravirtualization are typically done with events or callbacks [9][1]. When 
the physical device sends an interrupt, the back-end driver reacts to it and then sends an 
event to the front-end driver in a VM or uses the front-end driver’s callback function. 
One of the I/O architectures for paravirtualization method is shown in the Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. One of the I/O architectures in paravirtualization method. 
The advantage of the paravirtualization method is better I/O performance compared to 
the full virtualization method as the hardware is not needed to be emulated and the I/O 
calls can be done with API calls which are optimized for a virtualized environment 
[73][1]. The disadvantage of this method is that it requires completely new device driv-
ers to be developed [1]. This can be more acceptable than CPU or memory paravirtual-
ization since the operating system kernels can stay unmodified [73]. 
Both of these software-based virtualization methods have a one common advantage: 
they both can encapsulate the state of the virtual devices since the virtualization is done 
in the software [1]. The VMMs know what I/O calls have been made and at what stage 
they are in the execution. This provides some benefits which are discussed more in the 
Chapter 5.6 which talks about how the hypervisor can use encapsulation to provide 
some new functionality. 
Since the I/O operations involve many different hardware components, there are many 
modifications required to the hardware to support hardware-assisted virtualization. Both 
Intel and AMD have developed a new hardware component for their x86 architecture 
which can handle the address translations when using DMA-capable devices. This new 
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component is called as Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU). Hardware 
containing the IOMMU is called as VT-d enabled by Intel [1]. The behaviour of the 
IOMMU is similar to the traditional MMU. It contains page directories and tables which 
are used to translate the guest physical memory addresses given by the software in VMs 
to the host physical addresses [53][5]. The IOMMU contains a cache to look up already 
translated addresses as well. This cache is called as Input/Output Translation Lookaside 
Buffer (IOTLB) [53]. This way the VMMs don’t need to do the translation when VMs 
use DMA-capable device. The translation is done by the hardware when a device tries 
to write data into the memory. The address mapping is done by the VMMs. 
Additionally IOMMU provides new protection domains. A protection domain defines 
an isolated environment which has part of the host physical memory. Each domain can 
be assigned one or more I/O devices. The I/O devices can write to the memory regions 
of the domains which they belong to, but they can’t write to memory regions which be-
long to other domains. The protection domains simply work by preventing the memory 
writes to addresses which are not assigned to the devices in the page tables. [53][5] 
The IOMMU also changes the message format of the MSIs. Typically the address 
where the MSI is written contains interrupt attributes such as the destination processor, 
delivery mode, etc. Because the MSIs are issued by the devices and not by the VMs, the 
protection domains won’t work [1]. This is why the MSI messages are modified to con-
tain message identifiers instead of the interrupt attributes [53][5].  These message iden-
tifiers are then used to map the MSIs to correct physical addresses by the IOMMU. 
When the message identifier is translated to the host physical address, the tables used to 
translation contain the interrupt attributes. [1] 
If guest operating systems use the IOMMU themselves for memory protection, the 
VMM needs to emulate the IOMMU as well. The IOMMU emulation can be done in 
the software using similar methods which are used to emulate traditional MMU in soft-
ware [1]. Additionally the IOMMU provides two stage address translation which can be 
used as a hardware-based virtualization method similar to the hardware-based memory 
virtualization [53]. 
IOMMU solves the address translation in hardware, but there are still the interrupts and 
the register access that needs to be virtualized. The hardware-assisted CPU virtualiza-
tion technologies can be used to virtualize the interrupt delivery. With the hardware-
assisted CPU virtualization the VMMs can inject interrupts to the control structures 
which are loaded when the execution is transferred to VMs [80]. This way the VMMs 
don’t need to emulate the delivery of the interrupts and the interrupts are handled in the 
VMs when they are executing. One problem still exists: the VMMs are needed to inject 
the interrupts to the VMs. To solve this problem Intel has developed a technology called 
as APIC virtualization (APICv). AMD has announced similar technology called as Ad-
vanced Virtual Interrupt Controller (AVIC) [46] and there are some references to it in 
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AMD’s IOMMU specification [5], but as of yet it has not been implemented in any 
CPU architecture. Because of this, only the APICv is discussed here. 
The APICv requires hardware-assisted CPU virtualization to work. This is why it is part 
of the newer CPUs which have the VT-x virtualization technology. In APICv there are 
virtual APIC-tables [52]. These tables are used to store the state of local APICs for each 
VM. When a software in a VM tries to read or write the APIC’s registers, the reads or 
writes are directed to the virtual APIC-table, and when an interrupt for a VM arrives to 
a local APIC, it is directed to the virtual APIC-table as well [79]. If the VM is currently 
running, it can process the interrupts immediately [52], but if the VM is not running, the 
interrupts can be stored in the APIC-table as pending. This removes the need to transfer 
the execution to a hypervisor so it can direct the interrupt to a correct VMM and VM 
[79]. When the CPU, to which the APIC belongs to, receives a notification vector, the 
pending interrupts, which are marked in the notification vector, are processed. This is 
called as posted-interrupt processing [52]. This allows a VMM to set the interrupts be-
longing to a VM to be processed when it sets it to execute on the CPU. APICv reduces 
the need to transfer the execution to the VMM allowing better performance [59]. 
Lastly the MMIO and the PMIO need to be virtualized as they are what allow the access 
to the device registers. The access to these can be virtualized with the hardware-assisted 
CPU and memory virtualization methods. This can also be called as device passthrough 
[73].  However, since many I/O devices are designed to be used only by one device 
driver, the functionality of the I/O devices needs to be virtualized as well. [86] If this is 
not done, the access to the I/O device can be allowed only for a one VM. One technolo-
gy developed to solve the problem of sharing I/O devices with multiple VMs is called as 
Single Root Input/Output Virtualization (SR-IOV). SR-IOV is a specification made by 
Peripheral Component Interconnect Special Interest Group (PCI-SIG) and it describes 
how I/O devices, which use Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) technology to 
communicate with the rest of the machine, can be shared with multiple VMs [29]. It 
basically provides an interface for multiple VMs to use the device at the same time so 
the functionality of the I/O stack can be transferred to the device itself. 
A typical PCI device has a configuration space and multiple functions which can be 
read or be written with the MMIO or PMIO. The configuration space contains the con-
figuration of the device and the functions are used to use the device [29]. The messages 
used in PCI communication have a Requester IDentification (RID) which can be used to 
determine who sent the message. Each function has a unique RID which can be used to 
identify it [29]. In SR-IOV the functions are divided into two categories: physical func-
tions (PFs) and virtual functions (VFs). Physical functions are able to configure and 
manage the configuration space and change the device’s behaviour. They can also allow 
using all of the functions which the device has available. The virtual functions are sim-
pler and they only contain resources required for the data transfers and they have limited 
configuration abilities. [86] 
51 
Using the physical functions and the virtual functions require separate drivers: one for 
the physical functions and one for the virtual functions. The hypervisor uses the physi-
cal functions to configure and manage the configuration space of the device. It config-
ures separate virtual functions for VMs to use. It can also be used to use the device 
when a VM is wanted to use software-based virtualization methods for the I/O virtual-
ization. [86] SR-IOV requires hardware-assisted CPU, memory and DMA virtualization 
to work. The hardware-assisted CPU and memory virtualization methods are used to 
allow direct access for the VMs to these virtual functions and an IOMMU is used to 
translate the addresses in I/O calls and data transfers. The RIDs in the PCI messages are 
used for the address translations [29]. 
The advantages of SR-IOV are that it allows software running in VMs to use the I/O 
devices directly without the need for the VMMs to intervene allowing native speed for 
the I/O calls and at the same time there is less code required to implement in the 
VMMs. The disadvantage is that the device state isn’t captured inside the VMM since 
the VMM can’t see at what I/O calls are made. This is the problem of device 
passthrough and it has some negative effects which are explained in the Chapter 5.6. 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the hardware-assisted virtualization methods, the 
Figure 25 shows two different virtualization cases. 
 
Figure 25. Different I/O virtualization cases. 
In the first case the VM 1 uses an IOMMU, APICv, and hardware-assisted CPU and 
memory virtualization methods. This allows the VM to use the device directly, but since 
the device 1 is not SR-IOV enabled, no other VM can use the device. In the second case 
the VM 2 also uses an IOMMU, APICv, and hardware-assisted CPU and memory virtu-
alization methods. The difference to the first case is that the VM 2 uses driver designed 
to use virtual functions so it can use the SR-IOV enabled device 2. This allows it to use 
the device directly and still share it with the VM 3 which uses the device with full virtu-
alization methods. 
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The ARM CPU architecture implements many similar hardware-assisted virtualization 
methods for the I/O. It implements a similar hardware-component to the IOMMU, but 
instead of calling it as an IOMMU, it is called as System Memory Management Unit 
(SMMU). It implements two staged address translation for the DMA capable devices in 
a similar manner to the IOMMU. It can also be used to protect software running in some 
VM from corrupting the memory of software running in another VM. [75] 
The interrupt virtualization in the ARM CPU architecture is quite different from the 
interrupt virtualization in the x86 architecture. In the ARM architecture there is a one 
interrupt controller called as Generic Interrupt Controller (GIP). This interrupt control-
ler collects all the interrupts and then forwards them to correct CPUs by using CPU in-
terfaces. The ARM’s virtualization extension adds virtual CPU interfaces to this con-
troller. These virtual CPU interfaces can be assigned to different VMs. When an inter-
rupt arrives, it is forwarded to a VMM which can do the correct translations and gener-
ate a virtual interrupt which is sent back to the GIP. The GIP then sends the virtual in-
terrupt to a correct virtual CPU interface which interrupts the correct VM. [8] How the 
interrupt virtualization works in the ARM architecture can be seen from the Figure 26. 
The parts belonging to the I/O virtualization are marked with black. 
 
Figure 26. The interrupt virtualization in the ARM CPU architecture [8]. 
This method of interrupt virtualization requires the VMM to generate the virtual inter-
rupts from the physical interrupts requiring some VMM intervention. However, the GIC 
doesn’t need to be emulated and the VMs can use it without any VMM intervention 
allowing better performance. 
5.5.2 Management 
There are few different ways the hypervisors can use the physical I/O devices. The type 
1 hypervisors can either implement their own device drivers or they can assign privi-
leged VMs which can use the I/O devices directly [1]. In the second case the native de-
vice drivers are installed in privileged VMs along with the device emulators or para-
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virtual back-end device drivers. The privileged VMs can also be called as driver do-
mains. The privileged VMs run some existing operating systems. The hypervisor pro-
vides means to communicate between the privileged VMs and the non-privileged VMs. 
Using privileged VMs allows the hypervisor to use the pre-existing native device driv-
ers which have been developed for the operating system kernel running in the privileged 
VM [1]. This also provides stronger fault resistance for malfunctioning device drivers. 
If a device driver malfunctions and crashes the kernel it’s running on, only the operating 
system kernel running in the privileged VM will crash and the hypervisor itself stays 
unaffected. In addition the privileged VMs can be used to provide protection for the 
device drivers from each other. A crash in one of the privileged VMs won’t crash the 
rest of the privileged VMs. The disadvantage is that the performance is slightly worse 
than if the hypervisor implemented its own device drivers as now the execution must be 
transferred between the hypervisor, the non-privileged VMs and the privileged VMs [1]. 
If the hypervisor implements its own device drivers, it can cause portability issues if the 
hypervisor doesn’t have the device drivers for the devices the host machine has. At the 
same time the code base that the hypervisor must implement becomes larger. [1] The 
type 2 hypervisors use the native drivers provided by the host guest operating system 
kernel they share the hardware with. This resembles the method where the type 1 hy-
pervisor uses existing operating system kernel for the native drives. However, on type 2 
hypervisor this doesn’t provide protection from malfunctioning device drivers as the 
operating system kernel and the hypervisor both run in the supervisor mode. The type 2 
hypervisors can implement functionality which allows communication between the host 
operating system and the guest operating systems [97]. One example of this kind of 
functionality is the clipboard functionality which allows copying and pasting data. User 
could copy something in the host operating system and the paste it inside the guest op-
erating system. 
The hypervisor manages which devices the VMs can see and use. It also manages the 
passthrough of devices. If the device doesn’t have SR-IOV, it can only be passed 
through to a one VM. Additionally if the device can use DMA, IOMMU is required to 
protect the memory of the hypervisor and other VMs [99]. With the type 2 hypervisors 
it might be impossible to use device passthrough. The reason for this is that the host 
operating system generally owns the devices and the hypervisor can’t manage them [1]. 
However, if the type 2 hypervisor is implemented as a kernel module, it is possible to 
allow the device passthrough as the hypervisor and the host operating system kernel can 
work more closely together. 
The I/O management consists of things like partitioning and sharing the I/O resources 
between multiple VMs. This involves scheduling the I/O operations [9][10] and limiting 
the usage of the I/O device [109]. The limiting can be done for example with bandwidth 
limiting, with I/O operations limiting, or by giving shares to the VMs to use. These 
functions are often called as QoS functions. The QoS functions can be provided by the 
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hypervisor, the host operating system kernel, or the device itself and the implementation 
of the QoS functions can vary a lot and be dependant of the device for which they are 
implemented for. This is why these QoS functions are not explained here. The guest 
operating systems schedule the I/O as well [10]. Some schedulers schedule based on the 
state of the I/O device for which they are scheduling for. These schedulers might not 
work properly in virtualized environment as the state of the virtual I/O device doesn’t 
necessarily mirror the actual state of the I/O device. For example some I/O device might 
be congested yet the virtual I/O device is not. The combination of the guest I/O sched-
ulers and the hypervisors I/O schedulers can affect the performance and proper sched-
ulers should be selected based on the workloads [10]. 
The I/O management in the hypervisor can also provide other functionality as well [9]. 
For the network management the hypervisors can for example implement virtual 
switches to provide communication between the VMs it hosts. The hypervisor connects 
virtual network interface cards (NICs) inside the VMMs to the virtual switches. The 
virtual switches can also be connected to the physical NICs on the host machine. [99] In 
addition to these features the hypervisor can implement any other network features it 
wants. It can for example implement a software firewall to control the traffic that goes 
through the virtual switches [9][99]. 
The VMMs provide virtual block devices for the VMs and the guest operating systems 
to use. The blocks written to these virtual devices can be stored into a file or they can be 
written directly to a physical storage device [97]. For this reason the hypervisor should 
implement a file system and be able to use some block virtualization technologies. If the 
blocks are written to a file, the file acts like it is a storage device. The size of the emu-
lated storage device can be controlled by changing the size of the file. If the blocks are 
written directly to a physical storage device, the storage device should be divided into 
logical volumes. Each VM will get its own logical volume where it can write data. For 
example a LVM can be used for this purpose. If networked storage devices are used, the 
hypervisor should implement a file system which can use these devices. Writing data 
blocks to a file typically provides worse performance than writing the data blocks di-
rectly to a storage device [130]. The reason for this is the extra layer added by the file 
system to the storage access stack. 
Timekeeping in hardware virtualized environment requires special attention. In virtual-
ized environment there are three different concepts of time: real time, virtual time and 
wall-clock time. The real time is counted from the starting of the host machine. The 
virtual time is counted from the start of a VM and it is counted only when the VM is 
executed. The wall-clock time is the absolute time. As the hardware clocks are emulated 
for the VMs, they run in virtual time and the guest operating systems use the virtual 
time to make their decisions. [9] However, sometime software requires real time for its 
functionality to make proper calculations and users of the VMs often require the VMs to 
have proper wall-clock time. In paravirtualization the hypervisor can offer the guest 
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operating systems the real time to use and it can even be used to make more intelligent 
scheduling decisions in the guest operating systems [22]. 
Operating systems typically keep real time in one of two ways: either by tick counting 
or by tickles timekeeping. In tick counting the hardware is set to interrupt the operating 
system periodically. The hardware has clocks which generate interrupts called as ticks. 
The operating system calculates the time by counting the ticks and by knowing the fre-
quency of the ticks. In virtualization the VM might not be executing while the ticks 
happen. The guest operating system will lack behind as it can’t process the ticks. The 
hypervisor and the VMM will collect a backlog of clock ticks which the VMM should 
inject to the VM once it is its turn to execute. The tick counting relies on the ticks arriv-
ing periodically so they cannot be processed immediately in one chuck. The hypervisor 
can try to solve this problem by increasing the speed it injects the interrupts to the VM 
or simply just ignoring the backlog if it grows too big. Either way the timekeeping in 
the VM will not be perfectly accurate. Even if the VM was executing and receiving 
ticks, it might still lack behind in the timekeeping. The reason for this is that the hyper-
visor and the VMM might have to intervene when injecting the ticks causing the inter-
rupt frequency to be smaller than what it really is. Tick counting can also cause scalabil-
ity issues. Even if the software in VMs doesn’t have anything to do, the VMs must be 
assigned some CPU time so they can process the ticks. The assignment of CPU time 
could be avoided if the timekeeping was done by using some other method. Some of the 
problems of tick counting can be tried to be avoided by changing the frequency the 
guest operating system uses for ticks and by avoiding overcommitting the CPU of the 
host machine so there is enough CPU time to allow processing the ticks for each VM. 
Any memory management methods which affect performance should also be avoided. 
[77][115] 
In tickles timekeeping a hardware device keeps a count of time units since the system 
has been booted. This is done by having a hardware counter and a clock which runs at 
constant known frequency. In tickles timekeeping the operating system simply asks for 
the value of the counter and deduces the time from that value and from the known fre-
quency. This method of timekeeping is much better for virtualized environment as a 
guest operating system can ask for the time when it needs it and no constant ticks are 
needed to be passed to the operating system. The hypervisors needs to know if the guest 
operating system uses tickles timekeeping. Otherwise it has to assume it uses tick count-
ing as a timekeeping method. Paravirtualized device driver can be used to inform the 
hypervisor that the guest operating system uses tickles timekeeping. [115] 
Machines initialize the wall-clock time either from a battery-backed real-time clock or 
by querying it from a network during the booting phase. If the timekeeping is not accu-
rate, the kept wall-clock time can drift apart from the real wall-clock time. The hypervi-
sor should keep an accurate wall-clock time either by using the hardware clock or by 
querying the time from a network. The guest operating systems can synchronize to the 
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wall-clock time by either using paravirtualized device drives, which asks the wall-clock 
time from the hypervisor, or by querying the time themselves directly from a network. 
[115] 
5.6 Encapsulation 
The hypervisor is in control of the hardware and any attempts to manage and configure 
the hardware should be possible only through the hypervisor. This allows the hypervisor 
to know the exact state of the VMs and their virtual hardware. The state of the VMs is 
encapsulated and the software running in the VMs is decoupled from the actual physical 
hardware. This property allows the hypervisor to provide some functionality which 
wouldn’t be possible in environments without virtualization. 
Since the hypervisor is aware of the whole state of a VM, it can save it to a storage de-
vice. The state of a VM includes things like the contents of the memory, the contents of 
the VM’s storage devices and the status of the hardware devices the VM uses [63]. The 
state is typically saved on a storage device as a single file or a folder [97]. It is also pos-
sible that the data in the VM’s storage devices is directly stored on its own volume in a 
block format and only the metadata linked to this volume is stored in a file [123]. There 
are two different approaches for saving the state: one can save the state without the con-
tents of the memory and the status of the hardware devices, or the contents of the 
memory and the status of the hardware devices can be included.  
In the first approach the saved state is called as a virtual machine image [97]. The VM 
image can be used to restore back the VM to run on the hypervisor. The restored VM 
acts like it is booted up after a shutdown [63]. This feature can be used to create images 
which have all the necessary tools and software already installed in the VM. Whenever 
a new VM is required, the image can be used to launch a new VM which is already 
properly configured. To create the VM image safely, software that could alter the data 
stored in the VM’s storage device should be set to a state where the VM image can be 
created safely [63]. One way of doing this is by shutting down the VM for the duration 
when the VM’s image is being created. Another way is to have special software in-
stalled on the guest operating system which sets the file system and any other software 
in the operating system into safe state before making the VM image [63].  
In the second approach the contents of the memory and the status of the hardware de-
vices are saved as well. The saved state in this case is called as a virtual machine snap-
shot [97]. With the VM snapshot the contents of the memory can be restored to the VM 
as well. This allows restoring the VM to the exact same state when the snapshot was 
taken and the VM doesn’t require booting up. When a snapshot is being made, the 
whole VM must be halted so that the memory can be written to a file [63]. If the VM 
was running, it could alter the memory in middle of the process and the saved state 
wouldn’t be consistent. The saved state should be stored in specific point in time. Some-
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times snapshots can create a hierarchical structure. When a snapshot is created, only the 
data which has been modified from the last snapshot on the VM’s storage device are 
stored [63]. This saves storage space and speeds up the snapshotting process as the data 
from old snapshot is still valid and only the modified data needs to be stored. 
The VM images and snapshots can be used to implement fault recovery features in the 
hypervisor. The hypervisor could restore a VM back to run if there is a failure with it. 
Similarly multiple hypervisors could communicate with each other and in case one of 
the physical hosts becomes faulty, some other hypervisor could restore the VMs from 
that host assuming that the VM images and snapshots were stored in network storage. 
[76] The hypervisor could be used to provide fault tolerance against faulty devices as 
well. If a physical device becomes faulty on the host machine, the hypervisor could map 
the virtual devices which use the faulty physical devices to another physical device 
which is able to provide the same functionality. [124] 
Another new feature allowed by the state encapsulation is called as live migration. The 
live migration is a technology which allows transferring a working VM from one physi-
cal host to another with a minimal downtime for the VM. This requires transferring all 
the necessary parts of the state. The whole state is not necessarily required to be trans-
ferred if the storage, which the VM uses, is in networked storage. In this case the data in 
storage doesn’t need to be transferred. The live migration can consist of three different 
phases: a push phase, a stop-and-copy phase, and a pull phase. In the push phase the 
data is copied from a source VM’s state to the destination VM while the VM is running. 
Data which is changed during the push phase must be resent to make the changes effec-
tive on the transferred copy. In the stop-and-copy phase the VM is stopped and the data 
is copied from the source to the destination. Changed data is not a problem as the VM is 
not running. In the pull phase the new VM executes at the destination and every time it 
tries to access data that has not yet been copied, the data is copied from the source. Any 
combination of these phases can be part of the implementation of the live migration 
functionality. For example the live migration can consists only of the stop-and-copy 
phase in which case the VM has long downtime while the data is being copied to the 
destination. [18] 
A one way of doing the live migration is shown in the Figure 27 on the next page. The 
live migration consists of five different stages: pre-migration, reservation, iterative pre-
copy, stop-and-copy, commitment, and activation. In the pre-migration stage the VM, 
which will be migrated, is simply running and operating normally. In this stage it is also 
possible to select the target hypervisor where the VM will be migrated when needed. 
The target hypervisor should maintain enough free resources for the VM in case it is 
migrated. In the reservation stage the available resources are confirmed from the target 
hypervisor and an empty VM reserved in the target hypervisor. If there are not enough 
resources available, the live migration will not be done. [18] 
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Figure 27. Stages of live migration [18]. 
In the iterative pre-copy stage the data is copied to the target hypervisor. In this stage 
the VM is kept running and the data is copied to the target hypervisor in iterations. If 
some data is changed during this face, it is marked somehow and then copied again on 
next iteration. For memory copying this requires that all the edits to the memory need to 
be trapped to the hypervisor. This can be done by setting the memory pages as read on-
ly. When software in VM tries to edit a memory page, the edit is trapped and the edited 
page is marked as a dirty page in the hypervisor and then the memory page is edited. 
This will cause negative performance impact as all the memory edits must be trapped by 
the VMMs on which the VMs run. As the hardware-assisted memory virtualization 
technologies support marking edited memory pages, this can be used to minimize the 
performance loss as the VMMs don’t need to intervene every time when a memory page 
is edited. The iterative pre-copy stage ends after some conditions are fulfilled. In the 
stop-and-copy stage any network communications are redirected to the new VM on the 
target hypervisor and the source VM is suspended. In this stage the last pieces of data, 
which weren’t transferred in the iterative pre-copy stage, are transferred to the target 
hypervisor. The downtime for the VM can be as low as 60ms, but the downtime de-
pends on the amount of data required to be transferred, the bandwidth of the network 
connections, and the behaviour of the applications the VM hosts. In the commitment 
stage the new VM is made to be the primary VM and the source VM can be discarded. 
Stage 0: Pre-Migration
Active VM on Host A
Alternate physical host may be preselected for migration
Block devices mirrored and free resources maintained
Stage 1: Reservation
Initialize a container on the target host
Stage 2: Iterative Pre-copy
Enable shadow paging
Copy dirty pages in successive rounds
Stage 3: Stop-and-copy
Suspend VM on host A
Generate ARP to redirect traffic to host B
Synchronize all remaining VM state to host B
Stage 4: Commitment
VM state on host A is released
Stage 5: Activation
VM starts on host B
Connects to local devices
Resumes normal operation
VM running normally 
on host A
Overhead due to copying
Downtime
(VM out of service)
VM running normally 
on host B
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Lastly in the activation stage the devices the VM uses are mapped to the devices on the 
new hypervisor and the VM is set to run. [18][81] 
The encapsulation allows also record and replay capability for the VMs. The record 
capability is used to save the state of the VM as it executes so that the state can be re-
peated by using the replay capability. To save the state, the hypervisor needs to store 
events that happen on the hardware and the time when they happen. However, it is not 
necessary to save everything that happens on the hardware. Much of the functionality is 
deterministic and the next state of the VM can be determined from the previous state of 
the VM. The events caused by deterministic functionality don’t need to be stored. Still 
some of the functionality is not deterministic. For example any inputs from I/O devices 
cannot be determined by examining the functionality of the hardware and the previous 
states of the VM. In these cases the non-deterministic events are required to be stored in 
a log. The entry in the log contains the time when the non-deterministic event happened 
and any data that is related to that event. The time can be indicated for example by 
counting instructions executed by the VM and noting after which instruction the non-
deterministic event happened. [66][133] The starting state of the VM should be stored 
as well so that any deterministic functions can be replayed correctly. 
To replay the states of the VM, the execution should be started from the stored starting 
state. The VM is executed normally until the first logged non-deterministic event hap-
pens. The hypervisor executes this non-deterministic event at the correct time during the 
VMs execution. As the devices work differently, the record and replay functionality 
should be aware how the devices work in order to correctly record and replay the re-
quired data associated with the non-deterministic events. [66][133] 
The hypervisor can also monitor the resource usage of the VMs and provide information 
of the resource usage. To get the proper measurement of the host machine’s resource 
usage, the monitoring must be done in the hypervisor. If the monitoring is done inside a 
VM, the monitoring can give approximately correct results for the resource usage of the 
virtualized devices and not for the actual physical devices [115]. 
All these features require that the whole state of the VM is encapsulated and the soft-
ware is fully decoupled from the hardware. The hypervisor needs to know the state of 
the VMs and it should be able to control the operation of the VMs if necessary. The 
device passthrough feature breaks the encapsulation property by allowing the software 
inside the VMs to directly use the I/O devices. The VMM can’t monitor the state of the 
devices and the hypervisor isn’t able to formulate the device state and control the devic-
es. This prevents the hypervisor from implementing the features presented in this chap-
ter [124]. The devices which are passed through to the VMs should be first disconnected 
to be able to use these features. 
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6. OPERATING SYSTEM –LEVEL VIRTUALIZA-
TION 
Operating system (OS) –level virtualization is another technology comparable to the 
hardware virtualization. While the hardware virtualization aims to virtualize the ISA 
and the hardware, the operating system –level virtualization aims to virtualize the Ap-
plication Binary Interface (ABI) and the operating system kernel [105][128]. The ABI 
is an interface provided by on operating system kernel. It provides system calls which 
can be used to manage the hardware through the operating system kernel. User ISA is 
also part of the ABI. [103] The OS-level virtualization provides emulated versions of 
the operating system kernel. An operating system contains operating system kernel 
which is bundled up with application and libraries. Since the OS-level virtualization 
virtualizes only the operating system kernel, multiple operating systems can be run on a 
same host machine assuming that they all use the same operating system kernel [105]. 
This allows running different distributions of Linux to be run on same virtualized oper-
ating system kernel as the distributions share the same kernel. However, running Win-
dows and Linux on same host machine is not possible. 
In OS-level virtualization the emulated operating system kernels can be called as virtual 
machines [105], containers, or zones [91]. This thesis uses the term container. The pur-
pose of the containers is to create isolated environments for applications to run in. Any 
application running in a one container should not be able to see or manipulate the re-
sources belonging to some other application running in a different container. Each of the 
containers can contain multiple applications or just a single application. This is similar 
to what hardware virtualization does. However, in hardware virtualization each isolated 
environment has its own operating system kernel. One of the containers is designated as 
a host container which contains all the management tools and which has privileged ac-
cess to the operating system kernel [105]. In OS-level virtualization a single operating 
system kernel is shared with all the isolated environments [105].  The operating system 
kernel must be modified or it should already support creating isolated environments. 
The OS-level virtualization offers better performance than hardware virtualization as it 
removes the need for the guest operating system kernels. Difference between hardware 
virtualization and OS-level virtualization is shown in the Figure 28 on the next page. 
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Figure 28. The difference between OS-level and hardware virtualization. 
In OS-level virtualization the resource isolation can be done in one of two different 
ways: by using namespaces or by using context IDs [91]. The term namespace was al-
ready mentioned in the storage virtualization chapter when discussing about file sys-
tems. The file systems contain tables which are connected to each other by addresses. A 
namespace can be considered as a table which contains data and which is accessed from 
some other table. This same principle can be extended to other resources the operating 
system kernel has. Tables are created which contain addresses to other tables. Each ta-
ble is a container specific table and contains only the data belonging to that container. 
The isolation is achieved by having the data in separate tables and restricting the con-
tainers’ access to only to the tables that belong to them. [105] The other method is using 
the context IDs. Instead of creating a new namespace for each container, the existing 
data structures are modified to contain a context ID [91]. Each container is assigned a 
unique context ID which is checked when a container tries to access data. The operating 
system kernel isolates the containers from each other by managing the access to the data 
structures by matching the context IDs. Using the namespaces or context IDs can be 
categorized as contextualization. Controlling the container access based on these meth-
ods can be called as filtering [105]. 
The shared resources which require isolation between containers are: file systems, pro-
cess IDs, Inter-Process Communication (IPC), I/O devices, CPU, and memory [127]. As 
the file systems already use namespaces by design, it is natural to use the namespaces to 
isolate the containers from each other. Each container is given its own directory which 
works as its own file system namespace. When software inside a container executes, the 
root directory of the file system is changed to the directory which belongs to the con-
tainer. [127] Many operating system kernels provide functionality which can be used for 
this operation. Examples of this kind of functionality are the Linux kernel’s chroot() and 
pivot_root() system calls. The chroot() system call has the problem that any software 
that has proper privileges inside the container can use the chroot() to change the root 
directory again and break the isolation. Pivot_root() system call doesn’t have this prob-
lem and it is used in many of the OS-level virtualization solutions. [91] 
Process IDs (PIDs) are stored in tables inside the kernel. Each process has its own 
unique ID which other processes can use to identify the process [127]. Both namespaces 
and context IDs can be used to virtualize the process table. With context IDs processes 
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can’t have same ID as they reside in the same PID table. With namespaces each con-
tainer can have its own PID table and the IDs can be reused. [105] 
Processes communicate with each other by using concepts like shared-memory seg-
ments, semaphores, and messages [127]. These reside as objects inside the kernel. Pro-
cesses inside a one container should not be allowed to communicate with the processes 
inside other containers. For this purpose the namespaces or context IDs can be used to 
separate the IPC objects. [91] 
Similarly to the hypervisors, the operating system kernel in OS-level virtualization has 
to implement methods to limit the resources the containers can use. This involves things 
like CPU scheduling, limiting the amount of memory containers can use, scheduling for 
I/O devices, and QoS for the I/O devices. The scheduling algorithm should be selected 
based on the use case. [105][91] In some cases the schedulers can take into account the 
containers and their priorities [127] and sometimes the scheduler can just schedule 
based on all the processes. Storage and network virtualization technologies can also be 
used in the operating system kernel. For the memory isolation the operating system ker-
nel can use the hardware memory virtualization technologies though the nested page 
tables are not needed as there are only two levels of protection needed: the operating 
system kernel and the applications in the containers. The access to the I/O devices must 
also be restricted and multiplexed similarly to the hardware virtualization. Containers 
should not be able to create device nodes in the kernel unless the devices are purely vir-
tual, stateless, or user namespace-aware [91]. Purely virtual devices are designed for 
virtualization and each container can have its own version of the virtual device. State-
less devices do not contain state so using these devices is safe. User namespace-aware 
devices can identify the container and act accordingly so they are safe to use as well. 
For example in Linux kernel control groups (cgroups) can be used to control and limit 
resources for containers. [91] 
Sharing common data with multiple containers is one of the key components of the OS-
level virtualization as the whole kernel is shared between the containers. If some con-
tainer tries to modify data that is shared with multiple containers, copy-on-write feature 
can be used and new copy of the data can be made for the container. After this the con-
tainer can modify and use the copied data [105]. 
While in the OS-level virtualization the kernel is required to implement similar man-
agement methods to that the hypervisors implement, the kernel can also implement the 
extra functionality allowed by the encapsulation. The kernel can implement snapshot-
ting and live migration for easier container management. [127] Using namespaces for 
isolation allows easier implementation of these as same PIDs can be used for different 
containers. With context IDs the PIDs would need to be properly changed after a snap-
shot restore or a live migration if some PID is already in use. [105] 
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The benefit of OS-level virtualization compared to the hardware virtualization is the 
better performance. However, it provides less isolation than hardware virtualization 
[128]. Other disadvantage is that the kernel has to be shared between the containers. 
Operating system kernels are complicated which makes it harder to implement isolation 
between the containers. Any modifications to the kernel or security issues within the 
kernel can cause security issues with all the containers. In addition if some software 
would require special kernel modules or modification, they can’t run on the shared ker-
nel if those are not implemented and virtualized on it. The last disadvantage of the 
shared kernel is that other operating systems cannot be used on same OS-level virtual-
ization platform if they don’t use the same kernel. To solve some of the problems solu-
tions like CoreOS have been developed. CoreOS [21] is an operating system from 
where all the unnecessary functions are stripped away and only the bare minimum is left 
to support OS-level virtualization. The whole operating system is also developed espe-
cially with OS-level virtualization in mind by having tools which are meant for contain-
er management. The CoreOS is not meant to function as an end user operating system. 
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7. APPLICATION VIRTUALIZATION 
Application virtualization is a virtualization technology that closely resembles the OS-
level virtualization. Both of these technologies focus on virtualizing the ABI. The dif-
ference between these two virtualization technologies is how they implement the virtu-
alization. The OS-level virtualization implements the virtualization by modifying the 
operating system kernel and changing its own functionality to provide the virtualization 
support. In the application virtualization the operating system kernel is not modified 
[122]. Instead a virtualization layer is created on top of the kernel which intercepts sys-
tem calls the applications try to make [7]. There is also difference in the level of isola-
tion these technologies provide. In the OS-level virtualization the aim is to isolate the 
containers from each other completely. In the application virtualization the goal is to 
isolate the applications from the operating system itself. This separation from the oper-
ating system allows applications to be used without requiring them to be installed on the 
operating system. The application virtualization is used to resolve application conflicts, 
to provide application migration, to isolate untrusted applications, and to support porta-
ble application environments. The difference between the application virtualization and 
the OS-level virtualization is shown in the Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. The difference between application and OS-level virtualization. 
The application virtualization is based on intercepting technologies. The virtualization 
layer intercepts any system calls applications try to make and then virtualizes them. 
There are two ways of implementing the interceptor: there can be a separate piece of 
software which works as an interceptor for all the virtualized applications or each appli-
cation can have its own interceptor. If all the virtualized applications use a common 
interceptor, this interceptor must be used to launch the application. If each application 
uses its own interceptor, the application and the interceptor can be combined into one 
single executable file that can be used to launch the application. The interceptor can be 
implemented in supervisor mode or in user mode. The benefits of implementing the 
interceptor in supervisor mode is that the interceptor has better view of the system, it 
allows to virtualize installers and system processes, and inter process communication 
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becomes easier. User mode implementation on the other hand offers better protection. 
[7] 
The interceptor is used to capture system calls which modify the operating system’s 
state somehow. What system calls are intercepted depends on the operating system on 
which the virtualized application runs on. Any system calls that modify files in a file 
system are examples of system calls which modify the state of the operating system 
[7][40]. On windows operating systems any system calls which modify the registers of 
the operating system are also system calls which need to be intercepted [7][122]. When 
such system call is used from the application, the system call is modified by the inter-
ceptor. For example any file writes can be redirected to a single directory or they can be 
redirected to memory instead [7]. When the same file is read, the read is directed to the 
single directory or to the memory. This allows any modifications the applications do to 
be contained. If the writes are directed to memory, the state of the operating system 
stays unchanged as well as no files are written to the file system and other applications 
stay unaware of the existence of the virtual application. This doesn’t prevent the virtual 
application from communication with other applications with inter process communica-
tion. The downside is that any changes done in the virtual application won’t stay in ef-
fect unless they are specially written to files. This redirection of modifications to some 
contained area is also called as sandboxing [41]. 
Using the interceptor for the isolation also allows packaging all the dependencies of the 
application into a one place. All the pieces of software and data which the application 
needs are packaged into a single location. For example if the interceptor and the appli-
cation are combined, all the dependencies can be combined into the same executable. 
The data and the software dependencies are loaded into memory when the virtual appli-
cation launches. When the application uses one of its dependencies, the interceptor redi-
rects the calls to the proper memory location. [122][40] The packaging can be done for 
example by taking two snapshots of the operating system: one before an installation of 
the application and one after the installation of the software. The required dependencies 
can be deduced from the changes to the operating system and the package can be creat-
ed. [122] 
The packaging of the whole runtime environment of an application into single file pro-
vides many benefits. The most important benefit is the ability to migrate the application 
easily. When the entire runtime environment of the application is stored in a single file, 
the application can be moved to other machines and no installation is needed. The virtu-
alization layer makes sure that the applications have the access to the packaged depend-
encies. [7][122][41] The file can also be divided into small data blocks. These data 
blocks can then be transferred over a network. This is called as application streaming 
[40]. In the application streaming the virtualized application is launched on some other 
machine through the network. First some data is transferred over the network to the ma-
chine from where the virtual application was launched. This data is stored in memory. 
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When there is enough data, the application is launched. After this the data is transferred 
to the machine when the application needs it. The application streaming allows storing 
the virtual applications in one centralized location. [122] This makes the management of 
the applications easier. Instead of installing the applications to each machine that needs 
them, the applications can be made into virtual applications which can be streamed to 
the machines and no installations are needed. Simultaneously the update management 
becomes easier as there is only one application which needs to be updated. 
The isolation of the application virtualization is limited to the state of the operating sys-
tem. In application virtualization it is not possible to manage how the hardware re-
sources are shared between the applications. It is the operating system kernel’s job. The 
interceptor implemented in supervisor mode offer less protection than the interceptor 
implemented in user mode [7]. If there is vulnerability in the interceptor, it can com-
promise the whole system. In addition if there are any bugs in the code, it might crash 
the whole system. The user mode interceptors don’t have these problems and other ap-
plications and the operating system is protected from the virtual applications [122][41]. 
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8. VIRTUALIZATION SECURITY 
The virtualization technologies add more layers to the computer systems. As many of 
the virtualization technologies work at some other privilege mode than user mode, the 
security of these technologies can affect the security of the whole system. The virtual-
ization technologies can provide some benefits for the security of the systems, but at the 
same time they also have some risks and challenges which must be addressed. This 
chapter focuses on explaining the different aspects of the virtualization security. 
8.1 Benefits 
The greatest benefit of many virtualization technologies is the isolation which they pro-
vide [94][97]. All the virtualization technologies focus on sharing resources and decou-
pling the components from each other. For example, if a hypervisor decouples the guest 
operating systems from the hardware with emulation and it shares the resources between 
the emulated hardware properly by using scheduling and QoS functions, an infected 
guest operating system which does malicious activities won’t affect the other guest op-
erating systems running on the same machine [97]. From the virtualization technologies 
the hardware virtualization can be considered to offer the most isolation because of the 
small interface that needs to be virtualized. The application virtualization offers the least 
isolation as only the functions which try to modify the operating system state are virtu-
alized. The processes are still able to communicate with other processes. The OS-level 
virtualization is the middle ground between these two technologies. It offers better iso-
lation than application virtualization, but because of the complexity of the operating 
system kernels, it cannot provide as good isolation as the hardware virtualization can 
[128]. The isolation allows executing multiple software-stacks with different security 
levels simultaneously on same machine [94]. 
Hypervisors can also provide security monitoring with VM introspection. A special in-
trospection feature is implemented in the hypervisor which allows monitoring the ISA 
instructions and the memory which the VMs use. These instructions can be analysed by 
special security software which can reside inside some other VM than the VM that is 
being inspected. [36][30] This allows moving the security tools out from the guest oper-
ating systems to a separate location [94]. Now if a guest operating system becomes in-
fected, the infection won’t compromise the security tools residing in different VM. 
The encapsulation properties and the technologies based on them can also be used to 
improve security. The systems can be made more resistant against attacks by imple-
menting automatic VM restarts from VM snapshots and VM images if a VM crashes 
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because of an attack or if a VM gets infected [64]. Multiple copies of the same VM can 
also be started to provide more processing power to prevent the attacks from taking all 
the resources and from denying the services the VM provides. Live migration can be 
used to move the VM away from a host computer to where the malicious attack is di-
rected. [94] It is also possible to use the snapshots for forensic purposes. If an infected 
VM is noticed, a snapshot can be made of it. This stores the contents of the memory of 
the VM and special forensic tools can be used to inspect the memory for the malicious 
software [97]. Even if the VM is not infected, the snapshots can be inspected just in 
case to notice any malicious software that has not been noticed by the run-time security 
software. As the snapshot is a self-contained file, it can be processed on some other ma-
chine than the machine which runs the VMs to prevent the inspection from taking any 
computing resources from the VMs. 
The hypervisors have additional security benefit as well. As they work directly on top of 
the hardware and the interface they need to emulate is relatively small, the code needed 
to implement is smaller than the code needed to implement an operating system [97]. 
For example the Xen hypervisor has less than 150 thousand lines of code [130] while 
the Linux kernel has over 16 million lines of code [69] which runs in the supervisor 
mode. The code which runs in the supervisor mode creates the trusted computing code-
base for the rest of the software. Hypervisors provide smaller trusted codebase making 
them easier to secure than operating system kernels. 
8.2 Challenges, Risks and Issues 
Virtualization software manages the virtual environments and the underlying architec-
ture is shared between these environments in hardware and OS-level virtualization tech-
nologies. This virtualization software works as a single point of failure and any security 
vulnerabilities affecting the virtualization software can cause devastating effects as the 
vulnerabilities will affect many isolated environments at the same time [97][64]. Virtu-
alization software can be typically attacked in one of two ways: from the software 
which is in control of the hardware or from the software which runs in a virtualized en-
vironment.  
In hardware virtualization the type 2 hypervisor inherits any vulnerability from the host 
operating system kernel. As the host operating system kernel and the hypervisor share 
the supervisor mode in the type 2 hypervisor’s implementation, the hypervisor can be 
altered from the host operating system kernel [97][64]. This is a security risk. Type 1 
hypervisors don’t have this problem as the hypervisor is the only software running in 
supervisor mode. The alternative is attacking the hypervisor from the VMs. If there are 
coding errors or vulnerabilities in any of the interfaces the hypervisor provides for the 
VMs to use, the software running in a VM could use these vulnerabilities to gain control 
of the hypervisor or gain access to other VMs. This is called as a VM escape [97]. For 
example buggy paravirtualized device drivers could allow sharing data between VMs 
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causing the isolation between the machines to break. The malicious code can easily 
identify if the operating system it is running on is executing in a virtual environment. 
The identifying can be done by checking for hypervisor artefacts in processes, file sys-
tems, registry or memory, by checking for any instructions which are hypervisor-
specific (paravirtualization), or by checking for hardware devices which are only used 
in virtual environments (generic virtual hardware devices). Any vulnerability in the vir-
tualization software is a serious risk as the virtualization might be used to virtualize 
software-stacks with different security levels and malicious software from a VM with 
low security could attack the virtualization software through the vulnerability and com-
promise a high security VM. [97] 
The type 2 hypervisors have other security risks as well. The VMs share the run envi-
ronment with ordinary applications. Any malicious application could steal the resources 
the host operating system assigns for the hypervisor to use. This can affect the perfor-
mance of the VMs. Additionally the host operating system can possibly be used to read 
any files the hypervisor writes for the VMs and an application running in the host oper-
ating system could be used to extract information from these files [64]. Any conven-
ience functions the hypervisor offers could also be used as an attack vector. For exam-
ple sharing clipboard between the host and the guest operating systems could be used to 
transfer malicious data or to read data which one is not supposed to read [64]. 
The OS-level virtualization can have same kind of problems. It is possible to run soft-
ware with root privileges inside a container. If this hasn’t been taken into account when 
the virtualization support has been implemented in the operating system kernel, it might 
be possible for the software to escape the container and read data from the other con-
tainers or control and manipulate them. An example of this is the earlier mentioned 
chroot system call which is used to change the file system root folder [91]. With privi-
leged access to the operating system kernel, the same system call can be used to change 
the root folder to higher level in the directory hierarchy and to access the other contain-
ers. The operating system kernel should implement some kind of protection for this kind 
of problems. As the ABI is often much larger than the ISA, securing OS-level virtual-
ization technology can be more challenging than securing hardware virtualization tech-
nology. 
It is also important to note that virtualization doesn’t remove any vulnerability from the 
guest operating systems and the guest applications. If the VMs or containers are con-
nected to each other with a network and if one of the VMs or containers gets infected or 
compromised, all the VMs and containers in the network can become compromised. 
[97] The virtualization technologies don’t make obsolete any security approaches which 
are applied to non-virtualized environments. 
Virtualized environments provide their own challenges for the security. It can become 
hard to make sure that the software base is current and up to date. The reason for this is 
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the easy ability to make backups, snapshots, and to live migrate VMs, containers and 
applications. One can easily have old versions of software if the software is not properly 
managed and monitored. It is also possible to lose information with the backups and the 
snapshots [64]. If some software crashes and it is restored from a backup or a snapshot, 
all the modifications done after taking that snapshot are lost. If the software has been for 
example updated and no new backup or snapshot has been made after that, the update is 
lost after the restore. As it is easy to create new VMs and containers in a virtualized 
environment, VM sprawl is also a problem which can cause security issues. VM sprawl 
is a term which is used to indicate a situation where more and more VM and container 
images are created unnecessarily which as a result creates a larger attack surface and 
increases the security maintenance [97][64]. Last security risk with snapshots and back-
ups is the data which they contain. Passwords and sensitive data can be stored into the 
images and snapshots. [97][64] If some malicious person gets access to such file, he can 
use introspection tools to inspect the contents of these files. This can be considered as 
bad as stealing a physical machine. 
The monitoring of the software can become hard with the live migration. Identifying 
VMs can be harder than identifying physical machines and it might be possible that 
software migrates from one administration domain to another when changing the host 
machine with live migration. Data leaks can also happen more easily in virtualized envi-
ronment. The networks can be virtual networks and it can be hard to make sure that eve-
rything is properly configured and the networks are properly isolated from each other. 
In physical environment the networks can easily be done by connecting physical cables 
to physical devices. In virtual environment the same is done by filling text fields and 
selecting options. This is more error prone than simply connecting a cable to a device. 
Some virtual switches might not even include network monitoring tools which can fur-
ther increase the change of data leaks in virtual networks [97][64]. 
The memory management in hypervisors can also cause risks. If the hypervisor uses 
advanced memory management methods with performance impact, it is possible for 
malicious software inside a VM to affect the performance of all the VMs for which the 
memory management methods have been enabled. [9] The DMA-capable devices can 
cause security issues as well. These security issues are not virtualization specific, but 
they can affect larger software base in virtualized environment as the hardware is shared 
between multiple VMs and containers. The DMA-capable devices can access the 
memory without restrictions and this can be used to modify the behaviour of the hyper-
visor or to read data to which one is not supposed to have access to [124][88]. This is 
known as a DMA attack. One way of doing DMA attack is by creating fake MSIs. 
There are few ways these can be done [126]. One can for example access the device 
configuration space and modify it to make the device do malicious activities. Addition-
ally device drivers can have bugs which can cause the devices to modify memory in 
places where they shouldn’t modify it.  
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Hardware-assisted CPU virtualization methods can also be used for malicious purposes. 
It is possible to hide malicious code by setting it run in the place of a hypervisor in root 
mode. This allows the malicious code to control any non-root software and to collect 
and to modify data without the software running in non-root mode knowing it. One ex-
ample of such malware is the Blue Pill [96]. 
Network card interfaces can also cause security issues in virtualized environment. Some 
NICs can provide Media Access Control (MAC) -address changing function and pro-
miscuous mode. Promiscuous mode is a mode where the NIC reads any data sent to it 
even if the data is not meant for that NIC. In a virtual environment this could be used to 
read the virtual network labels or any other data the networks transfer causing a security 
risk. The MAC-address changing function could be used to change the network configu-
ration which also can cause security issues. With virtual NICs a hypervisor or an operat-
ing system kernel can control these functions, but with device passthrough these func-
tions cannot be controlled. Even the storage area networks can be unsecure in virtual-
ized environment. Fibre channel and iSCSI use clear text format meaning that anyone 
with an access to the network can read the data moving in the network [64]. 
The network virtualization technologies provide their own challenges for security. Most 
of the network virtualization technologies don’t have any security mechanisms of their 
own and the security must be implemented in some other ways. Legitimate but mali-
cious tunnel endpoints could also spoof network identifiers [39]. Some of the labelling 
protocols might not work with existing network equipment because the network equip-
ment doesn’t understand them [34]. 
8.3 Security Approaches and Recommendations 
To secure a virtualized environment, the virtualization software shouldn’t allow any 
code modifications to it during its runtime. DMA-capable devices can cause problem in 
this case as they can write directly to memory and even modify the virtualization soft-
ware’s code. To prevent this there are few things that should be done. The first thing is 
to thoroughly test any device drivers the virtualization platform uses to remove any 
bugs from them which could cause the devices to malfunction and to write in wrong 
location in the memory. The second thing is to make sure that any virtualized software 
cannot configure or use the devices however they want. In software-based virtualization 
this means that the virtualization software captures any tries to use or to configure the 
devices. This is part of the device emulation and shared I/O device management in the 
virtualization software. In hardware-based virtualization the devices can be passed 
through, in these cases an IOMMU should be used to protect the memory with its ad-
dress translations. [126] The IOMMU can be used even in OS-level virtualization. The 
usage of the IOMMU for security is advised in all cases as it is hardware based solution 
which removes code from the virtualization software and lowers the change of errors 
and bugs in the code. 
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The virtualization software and the host operating system should be updated regularly. 
This is to apply any bug fixes for bugs which might compromise the security. If the vir-
tualization software requires a host operating system, security tools should be installed 
in the host operating system as the host operating system can be attacked. Any unused 
devices should be disconnected from the host machine. Similarly in VMs and containers 
any unused virtual devices should be disconnected. This reduces the code which can 
possibly be used in the virtualization software and which might contain bugs. At the 
same time it also reduces the possible attack surface. In host operating system any un-
necessary applications should be removed to reduce buggy code and the possible attack 
surface. In virtualization software any unused tools should be disabled as well for the 
same reasons. [97][64] 
The proper configuration is important for virtualized environments. For this reason, 
before using the virtualized environment, one should check that each virtual device is 
associated with a correct physical device and that the virtual devices are connected to 
the correct networks. One should also make sure that the networks don’t leak data to 
other networks in virtual switches, in virtual machines or in containers. As the proper 
configuration is necessary for good security in virtualized environment, any manage-
ment networks in the system should be secured. This can be done either by having a 
dedicated physical network for the management communication or the management 
communication needs to be encrypted with some security protocol. Mandatory access 
policies need to be implemented as well for the access to the management interface of 
the virtualization software components. The access for the virtualization software’s 
management interface should be allowed only for administrators of the virtualized envi-
ronment. If virtualization software uses host operating system for its functionality, the 
access to the host operating system must also be restricted as it controls the virtualiza-
tion software. [97][64] 
The network virtualization technologies don’t often have any security functions. For 
this reason some special security protocol needs to be used [39]. Typical protocols 
which are used in virtualized environments are: Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure SHell (SSH) 
[64]. These protocols are used to encrypt the sent data before it is sent to virtual net-
works. These protocols allow two endpoints to authenticate each other and agree on 
things like security keys and tokens before sending the data. The security endpoints 
should be selected to be in such way that sensitive data doesn’t leak into networks 
which are not secure. Similarly if storage networks and devices are shared between 
VMs or containers, any sensitive data should be encrypted before sending it to a storage 
network or storing it to a storage device. This can be done in software or alternatively 
storage devices can provide encryption services.  
Virtual network endpoints should be selected in a way which prevents data from leaking 
from one virtual network to another. For example the virtual switch in the virtualization 
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software has to work as the endpoint if the physical host can have VMs or containers 
that belong to different virtual networks. If all the VMs and containers on same physical 
host belong to a same virtual network, the endpoint can be the first physical switch to 
which the physical host is connected to. If a NIC or a virtual NIC (vNIC) provides pro-
miscuous mode, it should be only connected to a network which is assumed to be unse-
cure. The reasoning for this is that if malicious software gains control of the NIC or 
vNIC, it could read any sensitive data from the network. If the network is assumed to be 
unsecure, no sensitive data should be transported in it and the malicious software won’t 
gain any useful information by collecting the data in that network. NICs and vNICs 
which can change their MAC-addresses should only be connected to networks which 
are not critical and are unsecure. The reasoning for this is that if malicious software 
gains control of the NIC or vNIC, it could change the MAC-address to some other 
MAC-address which is already in use in the network. This can cause the data to be for-
warded in unpredictable ways and some of the data will end up for the malicious soft-
ware. 
Monitoring tools should be deployed in the virtualization software. These tools can be 
special security tools developed for virtualized environments or simply tools which 
monitor the resource usage. The special security tools can improve the security in some 
cases compared to non-virtualized case. If guest operating system cannot use any mod-
ern security tools, the security tool can use VM introspection to monitor the guest oper-
ating system and to provide security that way. If the virtual switches the virtualization 
software uses don’t provide monitoring, the traffic should be routed through software or 
hardware which can provide the monitoring. [97] This can be for example a separate 
VM where the monitoring software resides and all the traffic is forwarded through it. A 
physical switch with monitoring capabilities can also be used. 
As the virtualization technologies don’t remove any security issues in the software that 
is virtualized, the VMs and the containers should be treated as if they are their own 
physical machines. The same security measures should be applied to them as one would 
apply to the physical counterparts. Especially any VMs and containers which are con-
nected to networks should be secured properly to avoid any malicious software from 
gaining access to the networks. [97][64] In virtualization environment it is possible to 
use security tools which are specialized for the virtual environment. A one example of 
such tool is a driver-based antivirus tool. Instead of having own antivirus agent in each 
of the VMs, there is only one antivirus agent in its own VM. Special small weight driver 
is installed in all the VMs which are supposed to be monitored by the antivirus soft-
ware. [33] 
The physical security is also important in the virtualized environments. Each physical 
machine contains more software than in traditional non-virtualized environment. If any-
thing happens to a physical machine, the consequences are more severe in virtualized 
environment. [97] Additionally any configurations can be ruined by simply changing 
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the physical network layout. SDN can be used to reconfigure the virtual network layouts 
in case the physical network layout is changed. The access to the physical hardware 
should be controlled and only the administrators should be allowed an access to the 
hardware. 
Any data the software in virtualized environments use is stored into the storage devices. 
As the data can contain sensitive information, the data should be properly isolated by 
the virtualization software or by using storage virtualization methods for each VM and 
container. VM and container images are also stored in storage devices along with any 
snapshots which have been taken from the VMs or containers. These files can contain 
sensitive information as well which means that the access to them should be managed. 
The access to the storage devices should be controlled by mandatory access policies and 
with physical security. Any data should be backed up often and into different storage 
device to avoid problems caused by device malfunctions. VM and container images 
should have backup copies made of them as well. Snapshots should be done periodical-
ly to minimize any data losses caused by crashes or malfunctions. In order to increase 
the security of the stored images and snapshots, cryptographic checksums should be 
calculated for them periodically. The checksums can be then used to identify if any 
modifications have been done to the images or snapshots. Different kinds of security 
tools should also be used to scan the contents of images and snapshots periodically to 
detect rootkits, viruses or malware. [97] 
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9. VIRTUALIZATION IN INDUSTRIAL AUTOMA-
TION 
Most of today’s virtualization technologies are relatively new and haven’t been used for 
that long even in traditional IT environments. As a result of this there is relatively little 
publicly available research that has been done of using virtualization in industrial auto-
mation systems. In this chapter some of the previous research and literature that has 
been done of this subject is presented, some virtualization solutions are compared, the 
virtualization applicability to industrial automation is analyzed, and a suggestion is 
made how virtualized industrial automation system could be implemented. Lastly some 
suggestions for future research work are presented. 
9.1 Previous Research and Literature 
H. P. Breivold and K. Sandström researched usability of virtualization for testing pur-
poses in industrial automation in their paper [12]. First they present some hardware-
related challenges in software testing (availability of test infrastructure, fault tolerant 
facilities, flexibility of test environment setup, and fault reproduction for debugging and 
cost) after which they give a very short overview of virtualization technologies and pre-
sent some technologies addressing the challenges. Lastly they analyze some of the im-
pacts virtualization has for industrial automation requirements. The virtualization helps 
with allowing multiple instances of software to be tested on same hardware, changing 
the testing environment configuration easily and allowing functionality like injecting 
faults to the virtual machines the software is running on. In addition the save and replay 
functionality is suggested for debugging. The conclusion of the paper is that the virtual-
ization can be used to assist in testing the functionality of software, but it cannot replace 
the testing on proper hardware as the virtualized environment has different performance, 
timing, determinism, reliability, availability and safety properties than typical industrial 
automation environment. 
Wenbin Dai et al. presented in their paper a configurable cloud-based testing infrastruc-
ture for interoperable distributed automation systems [23]. The paper describes a plat-
form which provides testing capabilities for software. The platform provides virtualized 
devices which can be used to test the software. The virtualized devices emulate the be-
havior of the actual physical devices. This is simple software I/O virtualization. The I/O 
calls directed to the virtual devices can be handled in two different ways. The first 
method is to return pre-recorded data for the virtual device which then emulates the be-
havior of the devices at a correct moment for the software using it. The second method 
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is to retrieve the necessary data from some external source in real-time. This could be 
for example some kind of process simulation or an actual process. 
There are some research and literature done of the security of virtualized industrial au-
tomation systems. Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cybersecurity 
(LOGIIC) is a program which aim is to research and develop the level of cybersecurity 
in critical industrial automation systems. Part of this program is researching the security 
of virtualized industrial automation systems and one document has been made publicly 
available of this subject [74]. This document describes how existing virtualized automa-
tion systems were tested and what kind of results was achieved. The testing was focused 
on the 2-3.5 levels of the automation system. This means that the levels 1 and 4 are not 
focused on the research. The testing done for existing virtualized industrial automation 
systems consisted of three steps: reconnaissance, information capture / data retrieval 
attempts and targeted attacks. The architecture and the systems tested were considered 
to be known when testing the security issues of the systems. Test vector consisted of 
things like hardware, shared memory, software and hosts, security of the VM OSes, 
VMware and Hyper-V hypervisors, functionality testing, patch management, and update 
mechanisms. The testing was done by using tools like Kali Linux distribution for pene-
tration testing, Wireshark, computer forensic tools, custom attack scripts, existing ex-
ploits, and reverse engineering tools. The detailed results and methods are not presented 
in the document. The most important finding according to the document is that the secu-
rity of a virtualized industrial automation system needs to be considered during the 
whole lifecycle of the system as the virtualization technologies change how the systems 
are built. The hypervisors and their management software is part of the security consid-
erations. The findings of the research also indicate that the proper configuration of the 
system is important. Networks need to be configured properly to avoid cross communi-
cation between networks and perimeter security is required. Patching was found to be 
really important for the hypervisor as many of the vulnerabilities were found because 
patches were not applied to the hypervisors. The research was fully focused on empiri-
cal research of security vulnerabilities on existing virtualized industrial automation sys-
tems which use either VMware or Hyper-V hypervisors and the detailed description of 
the research is not publicly available. 
Another security related document is one of the Intel’s white papers in which they dis-
cuss how an open source hypervisors along with Intel’s special security hardware can be 
used to securely launch hypervisors and guest operating systems [134]. The paper is 
focused on industrial automation systems. Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) 
was used to provide security for the system. The TXT is a hardware-based component 
which verifies launched software to be trusted. It does this by comparing critical ele-
ments of the software against a good known source. It uses cryptographically generated 
digital signatures for this and the digital signatures are generated with a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM). The TPM is a hardware component which purpose is to generate 
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cryptographic keys. The TXT provides security only at software launch. Other security 
solutions are required after that. The paper uses Xen as their hypervisor and a pre-kernel 
module called Trusted Boot is used to enable the Xen to use the TXT. Both the Xen and 
the Trusted Boot are open source software. With the TXT the hardware prevents launch-
ing software which has been compromised by some malicious software. 
The Rockwell Automation has made a document [119] describing guidelines for virtual-
izing industrial automation systems by using VMware’s hypervisor and their automa-
tion software. The document gives guidelines how to select hardware and assign re-
sources for the software. The contents of the document cannot be generalized for other 
industrial automation systems because the document is made for specific software made 
by the Rockwell Automation. 
There are many different papers discussing about real-time virtualization and providing 
hard real-time guarantees with virtualization platforms. N. Mahmud, K. Sandström and 
A. Vulgarakis research in their paper if it is possible to use virtualization to virtualize 
and run multiple industrial automation controllers on same hardware [72]. They use Xen 
as their virtualization platform and they use real-time Linux (Yocto Linux Distribution) 
for their guest operating systems. Virtual switches (Open vSwitch) are used on physical 
machines to direct the traffic. The connections used between physical machines use 
normal Ethernet without any real-time capabilities. Two testing set ups were made: one 
without virtualization where two real time Linux operating systems run on separate 
computers and communicate through an Ethernet connection and one with virtualization 
where two physical machines both host four virtual machines and the communication is 
through a shared Ethernet connection. In the virtualized case the computers support 
hardware-assisted CPU and memory virtualization and IOMMU. All the virtual ma-
chines were pinned to their own CPUs to avoid problems with vCPU scheduling. Three 
different things are tested: latency and jitter, network throughput, and CPU load. The 
latency and jitter testing showed that the average latency is around 90 microseconds 
worse than in the case without virtualization and the average jitter was around 11 micro-
seconds worse. However, the average latency was less than 400 microseconds and the 
average jitter was less than 20 microseconds for a round-trip time meaning that the vir-
tualization could be used for most real-time applications. In network throughput no sig-
nificant difference was noticed. It was noted that computation, which took 10.16 sec-
onds on a non-virtualized machine, took 12.13 on virtualized machine. 
Intel has also published a paper where real-time capabilities of virtualization are tested 
[2]. They test how much latency and jitter the system has between sending an interrupt 
from a PCI device and receiving an answer from a real-time operating system. Hypervi-
sor used was Wind River’s hypervisor and the real-time operating systems were Wind 
River’s VxWorks. General purpose Wind River Linux operating system was running 
alongside the real-time operating systems. The average interrupt latency they got in vir-
tualized case was 5.89 microseconds while the minimum latency and maximum latency 
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were 4.90 and 12.38 microseconds. The paper concluded that this latency would be 
suitable for control loops in the 100-300 microsecond range and that their test was a 
best case scenario. 
S. Ghosh and P. Sampath have also tested real-time virtualization for industrial control 
in their paper [38]. In their experiment they used VT-x enabled hardware. The hypervi-
sor used was type 2 hypervisor Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) and the host op-
erating system was Ubuntu with rt-preempt real-time patch. The machine hosted three 
virtual machines: two hosting general purpose operating systems and one hosting real-
time controller. The output of the system was monitored by an oscilloscope and the 
communication protocol used was EtherCAT. The test was conducted with different 
levels of stress applied to the system. With the test it was noticed that the real-time con-
troller was able to provide average scan time of 592 microseconds with jitter being 
around 30-40 microseconds. This is suitable for most industrial applications as well. It 
was also noticed that the extra stress added to the system had negligible effects to the 
real-time execution of the controller. 
There has also been some research about virtualizing Controller Area Networks 
(CANs). Controller area networks are commonly used in automation systems to provide 
communication between different components in the system. H. Herber et al. describe in 
their paper two different implementations for virtual CAN controller which can be used 
with hypervisors [45]. They implement paravirtualized CAN controller and in addition 
they implement SR-IOV enabled CAN controller. In their tests the paravirtualized CAN 
controller added around 35 microseconds extra latency to a complete transmit-receive 
loop compared to a non-virtualized case. The SR-IOV enabled controller added around 
20-25 microseconds extra latency to a complete transmit-receive loop compared to a 
non-virtualized case. L. Niemistö implements virtual CAN bus in his thesis [83]. The 
virtual bus consists of two elements: a virtual device driver and a virtual CAN hub. The 
virtual CAN hub implements multiple channels on top of a physical CAN bus and the 
virtual device driver is used to access the virtual CAN hub.  
9.2 Benefits and Challenges of Virtualization 
The virtualization can offer many beneficial features for industrial automation systems. 
The virtualization can be used in two ways to benefit the industrial automation systems: 
it can be used for testing and development or it can be used in live systems. 
9.2.1 Testing and Development 
The testing in industrial automation can be costly because of the complexity and the 
requirements of the automation systems. Virtualization can be used to assist with the 
testing and to lower the development costs. Instead of every developer needing their 
own hardware to test software, shared hardware can be used and each developer can be 
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provided a virtual environment where to test the software. This saves in hardware costs. 
Changing the test environment can also be done more easily in a virtual environment 
than in a physical environment. In a virtual environment new virtual machines can be 
created easily and virtual networks formed between them. The configurations of the 
machines can also be saved into snapshots and images. In a traditional environment one 
would have to buy new machines, connect them physically and then manually configure 
each new machine. 
The virtualization can also be used to inject errors and faults to the systems being tested. 
For example I/O calls which are sent to device emulators or back-end drivers can be 
routed to a backend testing tool instead of the native device drivers. This testing tool 
can then be set to generate outputs which emulate hardware faults for the emulated or 
paravirtualized devices. The record and replay functions of hypervisors can also be used 
for testing purposes. Many of the real-time software in industrial automation systems 
work on single CPU because it’s simpler to develop and it provides better determinism. 
However, some non-real-time software might work on multiple cores. For example data 
collection services could work on multiple cores to improve the performance. It is 
known that debugging concurrent programs can be hard as the execution is not neces-
sarily deterministic and different parts of the software can execute in different order 
every time the software is executed. This makes it hard to reproduce some of the bugs in 
the code. Record feature of the hypervisors can be used to record the execution of the 
software when testing it and if a bug is encountered, its execution can then be replayed 
and the bug analyzed from the recorded execution. The bug can also be easily repeated 
in this manner. It is important to note that if virtualization is used to test software which 
is not deployed in a virtual environment, the actual execution of the software differs 
from what it will be in the actual run-time environment. The reason for this is the inher-
ent overhead the virtualization technologies have from intercepting different calls and 
instructions and labeling different entities to recognize them and to isolate them from 
each other. In a virtual environment the resources are also shared. This is why the soft-
ware should be tested in an actual physical environment as well. 
9.2.2 Live Systems 
In live systems the virtualization can provide many benefits as well. The most obvious 
benefit is the reduced amount of hardware which is needed. Traditionally pieces of 
software are isolated from each other by having them executed on separate physical 
machines. With virtualization the isolation for the pieces of software can be provided 
within a single machine. As a result of this the costs of building an industrial automa-
tion system can be lowered. The smaller amount of hardware also lowers the operational 
costs of the industrial automation systems. Because there is less hardware being used, 
less electricity is required to run the hardware and the energy costs will be lower than in 
a non-virtualized environment. At the same time the hardware becomes better utilized 
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as the computing resources can be used more efficiently between pieces of software. 
With hardware virtualization there is no need to keep old machines to host old operating 
systems and software to configure old equipment. If the software is needed, a new VM 
can be created with the old operating system and the software so that the equipment can 
be configured. 
The virtualization can also ease administration and decrease the required deployment 
time for industrial automation systems. The deployment time can be decreased as the 
required environments for pieces of software can be preconfigured and packaged into 
images and snapshots. The images and snapshots can then easily be deployed to the 
industrial automation systems. Similarly any patches can be deployed with images. A 
patched version of software is packaged into an image along with its environment and 
then the new version of the software can be launched into the virtual environment. As 
the whole environment of the software is packaged into same image, the patched soft-
ware can be fully tested before its deployment into the live industrial automation sys-
tem. In addition the images can be used to provide no downtime during the software 
patching operation. When a patch is required to be applied, a new virtual machine or 
container can be started with the patched version of the software. Once the patched ver-
sion of the software is up and running, any traffic can be redirected to it from the old 
unpatched software version. If the hardware is required to be updated or faulty piece of 
hardware must be replaced, live migration can be used to move software to other physi-
cal machines for the duration of the maintenance. 
Many of the features which virtualization technologies offer can be used for fault toler-
ance and disaster recovery. The ability to create new virtual machines and containers 
quickly can be used as disaster recovery method. If some software crashes or hardware 
becomes faulty, a new VM or container can be started somewhere else and the traffic 
can be redirected to that VM or container. Similarly live migration can be used if a 
faulty device is noticed on the physical machine to transfer the VMs and containers to a 
physical machine with working hardware. 
Applying virtualization to industrial automation systems has its challenges. All the vir-
tualization technologies add some form of overhead. For example in hardware virtual-
ization the ISA instructions that would change the state of the hardware need to be 
trapped. Similarly in OS-level and application virtualization any system calls which 
would modify the state of the operating system need to be intercepted. In network and 
storage virtualization extra overhead comes from adding labels to the messages and do-
ing address translations. The problem with many address translation mechanisms is also 
that they will cause jitter when used. For example the address translation in MMU and 
IOMMU use TLBs to store translated addresses and to speed up the memory access. 
The problem is that the size of the TLBs is limited and old translated addresses are re-
moved in order determined by some algorithm. When there are multiple different VMs 
executing on same machine, the VMs can execute in some order determined by the hy-
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pervisor. Any software in the VMs can access the memory and cause some translated 
address in the TLB to be replaced. Now the replaced address must be translated again 
when the memory in that address is accessed. This will cause there to be different dura-
tions for the memory access operations causing some latency variation. In addition the 
different level caches can cause variation for the memory access. If the shared cache is 
not isolated between VMs, one VM could replace all the data in the shared cache and 
other VMs would have to retrieve the data they need again from the memory. This caus-
es jitter as well for the memory access as retrieving data from memory is slower than 
retrieving it from the shared cache. 
The resource sharing can also be a problem with virtualization. It is possible to over-
commit the resources so that all the pieces of software which require the resource are 
not able to use them. The underlying physical hardware needs to have enough resources 
available to support all the VMs and containers on that hardware. The resource sharing 
algorithms might not be suitable for industrial automation systems either. Many of the 
virtualization solutions are made for traditional IT environments where real-time appli-
cations are not that common. As such the resource schedulers are not designed to pro-
vide real-time capabilities. 
In some rare cases licensing can cause problems as well. Some licenses are tied to 
hardware and in a virtual environment the hardware is virtual hardware. If the license is 
tied to the virtual hardware, it can cause problems when the VM is live migrated and the 
composition of the virtual hardware might change. 
The specialized devices in industrial automation are also a problem. Each device that is 
used in a virtualized environment requires it to be virtualized if it is used with multiple 
VMs or containers. However, the devices used in industrial automation systems are not 
often used in traditional IT environments and as such the virtualization solutions don’t 
include device emulation or paravirtualized device drivers for such devices. The devices 
used in industrial automation systems don’t also include hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion support because virtualization hasn’t been used in these systems. 
The last problem is the complexity of virtual environments. Using and configuring vir-
tualization tools requires a specialized skill set. It is easier to configure the system badly 
in a virtual environment than it is in a physical environment. Industrial automation sys-
tems are often managed by plant technicians and process engineers without proper train-
ing or understanding for virtual environments. This can cause security and safety risks if 
the virtualized environment is managed by a person without the required knowledge. 
9.3 Comparison of Different Virtualization Solutions 
In order to estimate the applicability of virtualization to industrial automation, some 
virtualization solutions’ features are compared. The virtualization solutions for the 
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comparison were selected based on the popularity of the solutions, the suitability for 
real-time applications, and the availability of the technical information. From hardware 
virtualization solutions the following hypervisors are compared: Hyper-V, KVM, 
VMware ESXi (vSphere 6.0), VMware Workstation 12 Pro, Wind River Open Virtual-
ization, Xen 4.6 and XtratuM. From OS-level virtualization solutions the following vir-
tualization solutions are compared: Docker, Linux-VServer, LXC, LXD, OpenVZ and 
Virtuozzo. From application virtualization solutions the following solutions are com-
pared: BoxedApp, Cameyo, CDE, Microsoft App-V and VMware ThinApp.  
9.3.1 Hardware virtualization 
Seven hypervisors were selected to be compared. Three of the hypervisors are proprie-
tary and the rest of the hypervisors are open source projects. The proprietary hypervi-
sors are the Microsoft’s Hyper-V hypervisor [113] and the VMware’s ESXi and Work-
station 12 Pro hypervisors [120]. The open source hypervisors are KVM [58], Wind 
River Open Virtualization [125], Xen [130] and XtratuM [132]. From these the Wind 
River Open Virtualization is not really its own hypervisor, but instead it uses the KVM 
and other open source projects to create a modified hypervisor for real-time purposes. 
All the hypervisors take slightly different approach for the hardware virtualization. The 
general information of the hypervisors is collected into the Table 1. 
Table 1. The general information of the compared hypervisors. 
The x86-64 CPU architecture support on the table means that the hypervisors support 
also the 64bit machines on the x86 architecture. In the table there are host operating 
systems marked even for the type 1 hypervisors which execute alone in the supervisor 
mode. The reason for this is that these hypervisors use privileged VMs for the device 
Hypervisor Type Supported host  
CPU Architectures 
Host OS License 
Hyper-V 1 x86-64 
Windows Server 2008 or  
Windows Server 2012 
Proprietary 
KVM 2 
x86-64, ARMv7, 
ARMv8, PowerPC, 
S390 
Linux, FreeBSD Various 
VMware ESXi  1 x86-64 Doesn’t use one Proprietary 
VMware 
Workstation 
12 Pro 
2 x86-64 Windows, Linux Proprietary 
Wind River 
Open  
Virtualization 
2 
x86-64, ARMv7, 
ARMv8, PowerPC, 
S390 
Linux, FreeBSD Various 
Xen 1 
x86-64, ARMv7, 
ARMv8 
Linux, FreeBSD, Hurd, 
NetBSD, OpenSolaris 
GNU GPL2 
XtratuM 1 
x86, ARM, LEON2, 
LEON3, LEON4 
Linux, LithOS, µLithOS, Partikle, 
RTEMS, Android, Meego 
GNU GPL2 
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drivers and management software. The marked operating systems are operating systems 
which can be used in the privileged VMs for the hypervisor. In the license column the 
“various” indicates that the project uses various different open source licenses. 
One of the responsibilities of a hypervisor is to emulate and to share the physical CPUs. 
Different hypervisors have different methods for doing this. The features meaningful for 
industrial automation virtualization are shown in the Table 2. 
Table 2. The CPU virtualization features of the compared hypervisors. 
Many of the virtualization solutions support CPU virtualization only with the hardware-
assisted virtualization technologies. Only the VMware’s products offer full virtualiza-
tion methods. The VMware used to offer paravirtualization as well, but the support has 
been removed from the newer products when the hardware-assisted virtualization tech-
nologies became more common [120]. Only the Xen and the XtratuM support para-
virtualization. 
The Hyper-V uses its own proprietary CPU scheduler. Any vCPU that wants to execute 
informs the scheduler about it. The scheduler selects vCPUs to run on free pCPUs in a 
way which allows each vCPU equal change to execute. This makes the scheduler not 
suitable for real-time applications where the execution needs to be deterministic. The 
VMs can be set CPU usage reservation and usage limits to control the CPU usage. No 
co-scheduling is supported as the guest operating systems are expected to be designed to 
Hypervisor Supported  
virtualization 
methods 
Schedulers Co-scheduling Real-time  
support 
Hyper-V 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Proprietary No No 
KVM 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Depends on the host OS Depends Depends 
FIFO No Yes 
Round robin No Yes 
CFS No No 
VMware ESXi 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Relaxed co-scheduler Yes No 
VMware 
Workstation 
12 Pro 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Depends on the host OS Depends Depends 
Wind River 
Open  
Virtualization 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Depends on the host OS Depends Depends 
Xen 
Paravirtualization 
Hardware-assisted 
  virtualization 
Credit No No 
Credit 2 No No 
RTDS No Yes 
ARINC 653 No Yes 
XtratuM Paravirtualization ARINC 653 No Yes 
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run in virtual environments where vCPU skew can exist. The CPU scheduling can be 
made NUMA-aware. [90] 
The KVM uses by default the Linux’s default Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS) which 
tries to schedule the VMs fairly [58]. It does not support real-time scheduling or co-
scheduling. Other possible schedulers in Linux are the First In First Out (FIFO) and 
Round Robin schedulers. With these schedulers it is possible to set priorities to different 
VMs which can be used to prioritize soft real-time VMs. Additionally the round robin 
scheduler allows limiting the time one VM can use for its operation. Co-scheduling is 
not supported as these are the operating system kernel’s schedulers and not schedulers 
made for a vmkernel. Linux is NUMA-aware so KVM becomes naturally NUMA-
aware. [28] However, all these properties depend on the actual host operating system 
the KVM uses. One can for example apply a real-time patch (rt-preempt for example) to 
the Linux allowing the KVM to use the hard real-time schedulers provided by that 
patch. 
The VMware ESXi uses a special made vmkernel. Special relaxed co-scheduler has 
been made for this kernel. It tries to schedule different VMs fairly while taking into ac-
count the vCPU skew. The scheduler counts the time vCPUs execute and tries to keep 
the vCPU skew within some limits for a VM. The scheduler doesn’t support real-time 
VMs. The scheduler is NUMA-aware. [120] 
On the VMware Workstation 12 Pro the scheduling is dependent of the scheduler used 
by the host operating system. As such the real-time properties depend on the operating 
system used. Co-scheduling is most likely not used as operating systems don’t need 
such feature. 
The Wind River Open Virtualization is based on the KVM. As such it is dependent of 
the scheduler in the host operating system as well. Yocto Project is used to create oper-
ating systems for embedded environment in the Wind River Open Virtualization. [125] 
These operating systems can use the rt-preempt patch. Because of this, the Wind River 
Open Virtualization solution provides better real-time capabilities than a general pur-
pose Linux with the KVM. 
The Xen hypervisors supports currently only the credit scheduler. This scheduler is a 
proportional fair share scheduler. This means that the vCPUs are scheduled based on the 
total CPU usage and weights set to the vCPUs. Co-scheduling and real-time are not 
supported with this scheduler. The credit 2 scheduler is improved version of the credit 
scheduler and it is currently experimental. The Real-Time-Deferrable-Server (RTDS) 
scheduler is a real-time scheduler which follows preemptive global earliest deadline 
first scheduling policy. It’s currently experimental and doesn’t support co-scheduling. 
Lastly the ARINC 653 scheduler is specially made for real-time scheduling. It is based 
on the ARINC 653 specification which is made for aviation domain to specify domain 
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isolation on same hardware. The scheduler schedules predetermined set of VMs period-
ically repeatedly with fixed periods. As such the scheduling is perfectly deterministic. 
Currently the scheduler doesn’t support multi-core scheduling and the support for the 
scheduler is not clear. The lack of multi-core support means that each pCPU has to have 
its own scheduler. The Xen supports NUMA-aware scheduling. [130] 
Lastly the XtratuM uses only the ARINC 653 scheduler for its vCPU scheduling [132]. 
Scheduling for multiple cores is not possible as the ARINC 653 specification doesn’t 
specify it. As such the scheduler cannot be NUMA-aware and co-scheduling is not sup-
ported. 
Supported memory virtualization methods for the hypervisors are shown in the Table 3. 
Almost all the hypervisors use the same memory virtualization methods. 
Table 3. The memory virtualization methods of the compared hypervisors. 
All the virtualization solutions apart from the XtratuM support both full and hardware-
assisted memory virtualization. The reason why the XtratuM lacks the hardware-
assisted virtualization is because it is more focused of virtualizing LEON processors 
which lack the hardware-assisted virtualization support. Instead the XtratuM uses para-
virtualization for the CPU architectures which have a MMU for its better performance 
compared to full virtualization. [132] The Xen hypervisor is the only other virtualization 
solution which offers paravirtualization for the MMU virtualization [130]. Other im-
portant feature when considering using virtualization for industrial automation is the 
Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) as it prevents VMs from affecting each 
other with the shared memory cache. However, the CAT is so new technology that most 
of the virtualization solutions don’t have support for it yet. Only the Xen hypervisor has 
official support for it currently [130]. 
Hypervisor Supported virtualization methods 
Hyper-V 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
KVM 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
VMware ESXi 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
VMware Workstation 12 Pro 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
Wind River Open Virtualization 
Full virtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
Xen 
Full virtualization 
Paravirtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
XtratuM Paravirtualization 
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In I/O virtualization the hypervisors need to provide support for different virtualization 
methods. Some of I/O virtualization features are shown in the Table 4. 
Table 4. The I/O virtualization features of the compared hypervisors. 
Most of the virtualization solutions provide support for all of the virtualization methods. 
The Hyper-V provides full virtualization and paravirtualization methods for devices. 
Hardware-assisted virtualization is not as well supported. Only some devices which 
have proper drivers can support the device passthrough. For example storage devices 
can be passed through. [113] The VMware Workstation doesn’t support device 
passthrough because the host operating system is the one in control of the device drivers 
and the hypervisor doesn’t have control of the host operating system. The XtratuM 
doesn’t provide full virtualization as the device emulation would complicate the code 
and it would provide worse performance than paravirtualized devices. 
All of the hypervisors apart from the XtratuM provide some kind of virtual switch, file 
system and volume manager. These are not provided by the XtratuM as the goal has 
been to make its code base small as possible and easily certifiable [132]. The virtual 
switch provided by the Hyper-V provides basic layer 2 functions and some more ad-
vanced functionality like network traffic monitoring and bandwidth limiting. In addition 
the functionality of the switch can be expanded with extensions which can for example 
be used to enable SDN. [113] The KVM uses a virtual switch provided by the QEMU 
emulator the KVM uses for device virtualization [58]. The full virtualized or paravirtu-
alized NICs are connected to this switch and the switch can be connected to the host 
machine’s network. The switch doesn’t offer SDN. If SDN is desired, one can use open 
source virtual switch called Open vSwitch as it supports OpenFlow protocol. The 
VMware ESXi provides a basic virtual switch [120]. This switch doesn’t provide QoS 
functions. QoS and SDN capable virtual switch can be purchased as a separate software 
Hypervisor Supported virtualization methods Virtual switch File  
system 
Volume 
manager 
Hyper-V 
Full virtualization 
Paravirtualization 
Partial hardware-assisted  
  virtualization 
Yes Yes Yes 
KVM All Yes Yes Yes 
VMware ESXi All Yes Yes Yes 
VMware 
Workstation 
12 Pro 
Full virtualization 
Paravirtualization 
Yes Yes Yes 
Wind River 
Open  
Virtualization 
All Yes Yes Yes 
Xen All Yes Yes Yes 
XtratuM 
Paravirtualization 
Hardware-assisted virtualization 
No No No 
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component in a virtualization product called VMware NSX. Similarly the VMware 
Workstation provides a basic virtual switch, but more advanced switch can be bought 
with the VMware NSX. [120] The Wind River Open Virtualization hypervisor uses the 
Open vSwitch in the KVM hypervisor instead of the QEMU switch to provide SDN 
capabilities. [125] The Xen provides two possibilities as well. A basic virtual switch can 
be used which provides the basic layer 2 functionality or the Open vSwitch can be used 
to take advantage of more advanced features. Both of these provide basic QoS functions 
for rate limiting. [130] The Open vSwitch also supports VXLAN, GRE, STT, GENEVE 
and IPsec protocols. 
The hypervisors which use a host OS typically use the file system and the volume man-
ager provided by that host OS. The VMware ESXi implements its own filesystem and 
volume management [120]. For example the KVM and the Xen use the virtual file sys-
tem and the logical volume manager provided by the Linux operating system. 
Lastly some features which can be useful in virtualized industrial automation systems 
are compared. These features are live migration, save and restore, virtual trusted plat-
form module, virtual machine introspection, fault tolerance, and tracing. These are 
shown in the Table 5.  
Table 5. The extra features of the compared hypervisors. 
The live migration is the ability to move a running VM from one physical machine to 
another. All hypervisors apart from the XtratuM and the VMware Workstation support 
live migration. The save and restore feature is the ability create VM images and snap-
shots. All hypervisors apart from the XtratuM support this. The trusted platform module 
is a hardware security component used for generating digital signatures. Many of the 
virtualization solutions can use it for their own functionality, but only the Xen supports 
virtualizing the TPM [130]. As such only the guests on the Xen hypervisor can use the 
TPM for their own functionality. VM introspection tools allow inspecting the state of 
the VMs. This can be used to implement isolated security tools outside the VMs. All 
Hypervisor Save / 
restore 
Live  
migration 
Virtual 
TPM 
VM 
introspection 
Fault 
tolerance 
Tracing 
Hyper-V Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
KVM Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
VMware ESXi Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
VMware 
Workstation 
12 Pro 
Yes No No No No Yes 
Wind River 
Open 
Virtualization 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Xen Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
XtratuM No No No No No Yes 
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hypervisors apart from the Hyper-V, the VMware Workstation and the XtratuM support 
some form of VM introspection. The Xen and VMware ESXi support it naturally 
[130][120] while the KVM and the Wind River Open Virtualization require a special 
tool for it (LibVMI). The fault tolerance is a feature where a redundant copy of a VM is 
running simultaneously with the primary copy of the VM. If something happens to the 
primary VM, a redundant copy is made as the primary VM and the execution continues 
normally with a minimal downtime. The actual implementation of the fault tolerance 
may vary. For example the Xen takes often snapshots which are copied and merged to 
the redundant copy to update the copy [130]. The VMware ESXi simply stores the non-
deterministic events and injects them to the redundant copy that is running at the same 
time. Any messages out from the redundant copy are blocked. [120] The last feature is 
tracing. Tracing is simply a method of collecting data from the hypervisor. This data 
can be used for example for debugging or finding out things like pCPU usage during the 
run time [130]. The tracing can also be used for the save and replay functionality. Only 
the VMware products support the save and replay functionality [120]. 
9.3.2 OS-level Virtualization 
Six different OS-level virtualization solutions are compared. Five of them are open 
source projects and they all virtualize the Linux operating system kernel. One of the 
compared solutions is proprietary and it can be used to virtualize both the Linux and the 
Windows operating system kernels. The general information of the virtualization solu-
tions is shown in the Table 6. 
Table 6. The general information of the OS-level virtualization solutions. 
In the table the column labeled as “Virtualization level” indicates the granularity of the 
software packaged into containers. The Linux-VServer, the LXC, the LXD, the 
OpenVZ and the Virtuozzo all work with operating system level containers. This means 
that each container has its own set of system libraries and each container hosts multiple 
applications. The Docker is a bit different and it works with application level containers 
[27]. This means that one container can only host a one application and if the applica-
tions need to communicate with each other, the containers have to be linked together. In 
the Docker the container images are layered and each layer can be shared between mul-
Virtualization 
Solution 
Base operating 
system 
Virtualization level License 
Docker Linux Application Various 
Linux-VServer Linux Operating system GNU GPL2 
LXC Linux Operating system Various 
LXD Linux Operating system Apache 2 license 
OpenVZ Linux Operating system Various 
Virtuozzo 
Linux 
Windows 
Operating system Proprietary 
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tiple images. Only the top layer can be written to and all the other layers are read-only. 
[27] The Virtuozzo is the only OS-level virtualization solution which offers virtualiza-
tion for the Windows kernel. As the Windows is a proprietary operating system, the 
virtualization is implemented by implementing a virtualization layer on top of the OS 
kernel. This layer implements its own proprietary filesystem and service abstractions 
which are used by the software in the containers. [112] The Linux implementation of 
the Virtuozzo is based on the OpenVZ [85]. Most of the Linux OS-level virtualization 
solutions use the existing namespace and cgroup features in the Linux kernel to provide 
virtualization. The LXD uses the LXC as a base and implements some alternative man-
agement tools and extra features to the LXC [68]. 
The Table 7 shows the different features provided by the different OS-level virtualiza-
tion solutions. The term limits is used to indicate any methods that can be used to isolate 
the resource usage between containers. 
Table 7. The features offered by the compared OS-level virtualization solutions. 
The save and restore feature is similar to the hypervisors corresponding feature. It al-
lows storing container images and snapshots and then restoring them. Only the Linux-
VServer doesn’t support this feature [70]. The live migration is also similar feature to 
what hypervisors have. It allows transferring containers from one physical host to an-
other. Only the LXD, the OpenVZ and the Virtuozzo have this feature natively. Alt-
hough not mentioned in the table, a fault tolerance feature is provided only by the 
Docker. The Docker allows creating swarms where there exists a primary container and 
multiple secondary containers [27]. If the primary container crashes, one of the second-
ary containers can take over. 
In Linux the control groups (cgroups) can be used to control the access to resources. 
Each container has its own cgroup. The Linux contains two different schedulers which 
can be used to schedule the control groups. These schedulers are Completely Fair 
Scheduler (CFS) and Real-Time (RT) scheduler. [84] While many of the virtualization 
solutions use cgroups, most of them don’t offer interface to change the scheduler. Only 
the LXC offers interface which can be used to use the RT scheduler [68]. This same 
interface is also included in the LXD so it can use the RT scheduler as well. Rest of the 
Virtualization 
solution 
Save / 
restore 
Live  
migration 
Real-
time 
support 
CPU 
limits 
Memory  
limits 
Network 
limits 
Storage 
limits 
Docker Yes No No Yes Yes No Partial 
Linux-
VServer 
No No No Partial Yes No Partial 
LXC Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial 
LXD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial 
OpenVZ Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Virtuozzo Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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virtualization solutions either use the CFS or adapt their own scheduler which works in 
similar manner allowing fair sharing of the CPUs. It is important to note that the RT 
scheduler in the Linux only supports soft real-time for containers. 
The different OS-level virtualization solutions offer different levels of limitations one 
can set for the hardware resources the containers use. The Docker can limit the CPU 
usage of the containers by setting share constraints to each container. A share constraint 
tells how much of the CPUs the container can use compared to the other containers on 
the same machine. In addition one can limit what CPUs the containers can use and how 
long the CFS scheduling period is. Lastly CPU quotas can be set for containers. These 
limit how much of the CPUs the containers can use at most. [27] On the Linux-VServer 
one can set hard limits for CPU usage. These limit how much CPU time containers can 
use at once. [70] The LXC allows using the cgroups supported by the Linux kernel. This 
allows the LXC and the LXD to use same CPU limits as the Docker uses. For real-time 
cgroup one can set a period and a maximum runtime. [68] The OpenVZ limits the used 
CPU with shares and with upper limits for used CPU time [85]. The Virtuozzo provides 
same kind of limits as the Docker does [112]. 
All the virtualization solutions can limit the maximum memory the containers can use. 
In addition many of them can also limit swap file size for their virtual memory. For 
network limiting the LXC and the LXD offers tagging the network packets with a class 
identifier which can be used in the Linux Traffic Controller to identify the packets from 
different containers [68]. The OpenVZ provides a fair I/O scheduler where one can as-
sign priority to containers and the bandwidth is distributed according to these priorities 
[85]. The Virtuozzo allows setting maximum and minimum bandwidth rates for con-
tainers [112]. 
In the Docker it is possible to limit the bandwidth usage of block I/O. However, the lim-
iting is only done by giving a weight for each container and this weight is used to con-
trol how much of the block I/O device each container can use. The used storage space 
cannot be limited. [27] In the Linux-VServer it is possible to limit the used storage 
space, but limiting the used I/O bandwidth is not possible [70]. The LXC and the LXD 
both can use weights similar to what the Docker uses. In addition maximum allowed I/O 
operations can be specified. The allowed storage space for each container cannot be 
specified. [68] If the storage space is wanted to be limited, one can use the logical vol-
ume manager to create logical volumes for each container. The OpenVZ can limit the 
storage space the containers use [85]. A fair I/O scheduler is used for the I/O operations. 
The Virtuozzo can limit the storage space the containers can use, prioritize the I/O oper-
ations, and limit the I/O operations the containers can make [112]. 
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9.3.3 Application Virtualization 
Five different application virtualization solutions were compared. The BoxedApp [11], 
the Cameyo [15], the Microsoft App-V [6] and the VMware ThinApp [120] are proprie-
tary solutions while the CDE [40] is open source. The Table 8 shows features of these 
virtualization solutions. Execution mode indicates if the virtualization software runs in 
user mode or if it runs in supervisor mode. With these virtualization solutions it also 
indicates if each application has its own virtualization software or if the virtualization 
software is common for each virtualized application. Solutions working in user mode 
provide virtualization software for each virtualized application while the solutions 
working in supervisor mode provide shared virtualization software. The virtualization 
mode indicates how the virtualized application is handled. It tells if the packaged files 
are extracted to a storage device or if they are extracted to memory. Isolation mode in-
dicates how the virtualization solution handles the access to data in the operating sys-
tem. 
Table 8. The features of the compared application virtualization solutions. 
All the application virtualization solutions apart from the CDE work on Windows oper-
ating systems. Only the Cameyo and the CDE work on the Linux and only the Cameyo 
works on the Mac OS. The Cameyo supports most operating systems as it has ability to 
stream applications through HTML5 [15]. The CDE and the Microsoft App-V require a 
kernel component to be installed to use them. Almost all of the virtualization solutions 
extract the runtime environment of the virtualized application to memory. The CDE is 
the only one which uses the environment directly from a storage device [40]. The 
Cameyo is the only solution which offers both options. 
In the BoxedApp it is possible to select if the file system or the registers are virtualized. 
This allows isolating the applications from the actual file system or letting the applica-
tions to use it if needed. [11] The Cameyo provides three different levels of isolation. 
Data mode lets the applications to access and to write any data in the operating system’s 
user folder or in network locations. Any other writes and reads are directed to an isolat-
ed folder. In isolated mode all the writes and reads are directed to the isolated folder. 
Virtualization 
solution 
Operating 
system 
Execution 
mode 
Virtualization 
modes 
Isolation modes Application 
streaming 
BoxedApp Windows User RAM Varied No 
Cameyo 
Windows 
Linux 
Mac OS 
User RAM / Disk 
Data mode 
Isolated mode 
Full access mode 
Yes 
CDE Linux Supervisor Disk Seamless execution Yes 
Microsoft 
App-V 
Windows Supervisor RAM 
Isolated 
Strictly isolated 
Yes 
VMware 
ThinApp 
Windows User RAM 
Merged 
WriteCopy 
Yes 
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Full access mode allows the applications to modify the files and registry entries on the 
host machine. [15] In the CDE all the writes and reads are directed by default to special 
isolated application folders. However, if the virtualized applications are launched from 
other some folder, they can use the files in that folder assuming that there are no virtual 
counterparts to them. This is called as seamless execution mode. [40] The Microsoft 
App-V has two modes. In isolated mode the virtualized applications can read any files 
from the file system. However, all the writes are done into isolated folders and not in 
the actual file system. In strictly isolated mode the applications can’t read files from the 
file system and are restricted to only the files in the isolated folders. [6] The VMware 
ThinApp supports two isolation modes as well. The merged mode allows the virtualized 
applications to modify the filesystem and the registry entries of the host machine. In 
writecopy mode all the writes are directed to isolated folders. [120] All of the virtualiza-
tion solutions apart from the BoxedApp support application streaming. As the virtual-
ization solutions only focus on virtualizing the applications, they don’t do any resource 
management. As such any real-time capabilities need to be provided by the operating 
system itself. 
9.3.4 Virtualization Applicability to Industrial Automation 
The previous research has shown that it is possible to meet the real-time requirements of 
many real-time applications when executed in a virtual environment. From the virtual-
ization solution comparisons one can see that there is some effort at trying to implement 
virtualization solutions for industrial automation systems. Most notably the Wind River 
Open Virtualization and the XtratuM are designed for industrial automation systems 
which have hard real-time requirements. The Wind River’s solution is more focused on 
mixed criticality systems where real-time operating systems and general purpose operat-
ing systems execute simultaneously on same hardware. The XtratuM is more focused on 
embedded real-time systems and as such the features it provides are minimal. This 
makes it easier to verify the trusted codebase it provides. Even the Xen provides some 
support for real-time with its real-time schedulers. With OS-level virtualization there are 
no solutions which would support hard real-time requirements natively and as such they 
are not suitable for applications with real-time requirements. The real-time capabilities 
of the application virtualization solutions are dependent of the operating systems they 
are used on. The more advanced virtualization features (save/restore, live migration and 
fault tolerance) tend to stop the execution of VMs for a moment when the data is copied 
from one location to another. As such they are not suitable for real-time applications. 
Some alternative methods need to be implemented to provide the fault tolerance and the 
availability. 
Not all the applications in industrial automation systems have real-time requirements. 
These applications can utilize the more advanced features of the virtualization solutions. 
With these capabilities it is possible to provide the fault tolerance and the availability 
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for the industrial automation systems. The application virtualization is not necessarily 
useful in industrial automation systems to virtualize the main software as it provides the 
worst isolation of all the virtualization technologies. However, the application virtual-
ization could be used to move software out from the factory floors. Instead of having 
piece of software installed in every human machine interface in the factory floor, the 
software could be located in centralized location and streamed to the human machine 
interfaces. This would allow replacing the human machine interfaces with simple moni-
tors and input devices which are easy to replace if they become faulty. Almost all of the 
application virtualization solutions provide application streaming and the applications 
are extracted to memory instead of disk. 
As there are virtualization solutions available for hard real-time applications and one 
virtualization solution is even aimed purely for embedded devices, the virtualization can 
be used for all the levels in industrial automation systems from the level 1 to the level 4. 
The largest problems with using virtualization in industrial automation are the lack of 
comprehensive studies of the performance and the real-time capabilities of different 
virtualization solutions and devices, the lack of industrial automation specific device 
and protocol support in the virtualization solutions, and the lack of virtualization sup-
port in the industrial automation devices. For example network virtualization is not use-
ful in real-time applications if the devices don’t provide schedulers suitable for real-time 
communications. Using virtualization in industrial automation systems require proper 
design, configuration and testing. 
9.4 Implementing a Virtualized Industrial Automation System 
Virtualization requires careful configuration and proper hardware for it to provide a 
virtualized environment which fulfills all the requirements of the system. As such virtu-
alization should be taken into account at every step in the lifecycle model of an industri-
al automation system. Implementation of virtualized automation system is described in 
this chapter by using a lifecycle model. The requirements and considerations the virtual-
ization brings are described for each step in the model. The lifecycle model used is 
shown in the Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. The lifecycle model of an industrial automation system. 
The steps in the used lifecycle model are: requirement analysis, system design, imple-
mentation, testing, and operation and maintenance. From any step in the model it is pos-
sible to return to any previous step in the model if some problems are noticed or chang-
es are needed. The whole process should be documented along with any security deci-
sions made during the process. 
Implementation Testing
Operation and 
maintenance
System 
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9.4.1 Requirement Analysis 
The first step is the requirement analysis. In this step all the requirements for the indus-
trial automation system are identified. The requirements can be functional or non-
functional. Some examples of requirements are the real-time requirements for the pro-
cesses and availability requirements for important subsystems. Virtualization adds some 
requirements which should be taken into account when designing the virtualized indus-
trial automation system. The Table 9 lists these requirements. 
Table 9. The virtualization specific requirements. 
No. Requirement Description 
1. Temporal isolation 
Functional behavior of a VM or a container should not affect the 
performance of other VMs or containers. 
2. Spatial isolation 
Software in a VM or a container should not be able to read or 
modify any data that belongs to other VMs or containers. 
3. Real-time 
When real-time is required, the virtualization solutions should pro-
vide deterministic methods for executing the functional logic of the 
system. 
4. Network isolation 
Virtual networks should not crosstalk. Management and monitoring 
networks should be isolated and secured from normal traffic. The 
physical resources allocated for virtual networks should be limited. 
5. Network access 
Virtual networks should only be accessed through trusted virtual 
network endpoints. 
6. 
Management  
interface access 
Access to the management interfaces of the virtualization solu-
tions and host operating systems should be managed and access 
allowed only for people with proper training. 
7. 
Image/Snapshot 
access 
Access to the VM or container images and snapshots should be 
managed physically and digitally. Any images or containers con-
taining sensitive data should be protected with encryption. 
8. 
Image/Snapshot 
protection 
The images and snapshots should be backed up in separate loca-
tion. Images and snapshots should occasionally be scanned for 
viruses and cryptographic checksums should be calculated to 
identify any unwanted changes. 
9. 
Timekeeping and 
synchronization 
Virtualization friendly timekeeping methods should be used in 
guest operating systems. The clocks should be synchronized in 
the guest and host machines. 
10. 
Fault tolerance and 
availability 
At least three physical hosts should be used to provide fault toler-
ance and availability for important components in the system. One 
works as a primary copy, one as a secondary copy and one works 
as a backup machine when updating or maintaining components. 
11. Monitoring 
The total resource usage of the host machines should be moni-
tored per VM or container basis. Inter-host communications should 
be monitored. 
12. 
Virtual machine 
and container  
security 
Virtualization doesn’t remove the need for traditional security solu-
tions between networks and machines. As such these should be 
implemented in the virtual machines and containers. 
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The requirement 1 is required for safety reasons. If some VM or container becomes in-
fected and starts using more resources than it should use, its behavior should not affect 
the performance and the functionality of the other VMs and containers. The requirement 
2 is needed for security as well as a virtualized environment can have VMs and contain-
ers with different security levels. If one of them becomes infected, the sensitive data 
could leak from other VMs or containers or the behavior of the software running in 
those could be modified. The requirement 3 is needed for the real-time applications as 
the virtualization solutions provide the base for the applications to run on. 
The requirement 4 applies partially to traditional networks as well. Networks should be 
configured in a way that doesn’t let data to be read from other networks if it’s not in-
tended to be read. The virtualization adds the extra requirement that the physical re-
sources virtual networks can use should be limited. This is to make sure that all the vir-
tual networks have enough physical resources to allow the networks to operate. As the 
network virtualization technologies don’t have any inherent security features, the access 
to the virtual networks need to be managed. As such the requirement 5 is needed. 
The configuration of the virtualized infrastructure is important. As such the access to the 
management interfaces should be controlled. Otherwise anyone could break the config-
uration and break the isolation between VMs and containers. Similarly configuring host 
operating systems could affect the performance of the VMs and as such the access to the 
host operating systems should be managed. The access should be given only for few 
people who have proper training for managing virtual environments. This creates the 
requirement 6. 
The requirements 7 and 8 are focused on the images and snapshots made from VMs and 
containers. The images and snapshots can contain sensitive data like passwords. As 
such they need to be protected and the access to them allowed only for few trusted peo-
ple. To validate that the images and the snapshots are safe, they should be scanned for 
viruses and malware periodically. Cryptographic checksums should also be calculated 
to notice any malicious modifications to them. 
The requirement 9 comes from the fact that the timekeeping in virtualized environments 
can cause problems in some guest operating systems. Mostly the guest operating sys-
tems which use tick counting as timekeeping method. The tick counting can cause per-
formance issues and the clock won’t necessarily stay in proper time because of the vir-
tualization. Any applications which require precise time should use operating systems 
which use timekeeping methods suitable for virtualized environments and the clocks 
should be synchronized in some way. 
The virtualization lowers the amount of hardware required lowering the cost of building 
a system. The cost savings can be used to offer greater redundancy in the system by 
having multiple hosts running copies of the guest software. The three is recommended 
96 
amount for physical hosts to provide fault tolerance and availability for the software 
components. Two are required to provide the fault tolerance and failover incase the pri-
mary copy becomes faulty. The third machine can be used if one of the other two ma-
chines requires maintenance or becomes faulty. This allows having fault tolerance even 
when maintenance is carried out for one of the machines. This creates the requirement 
10. 
The monitoring the usage of resources inside VMs doesn’t necessarily produce truthful 
values. As such the monitoring should be done in the virtualization software. The moni-
toring should also be done per container or VM basis to notice any abnormal behavior. 
The inter-host communication between VMs and containers should also be monitored in 
some way. As this communication differs from normal network communication be-
tween two machines, same monitoring tools cannot necessarily be used. These create 
the need for the requirement 11. 
Lastly the requirement 12 is needed to remind that the virtualization is not a security 
solution on its own. The virtual machines and containers act like they are physical ma-
chines and as such they need to be treated in a similar manner. 
9.4.2 System Design 
In this step the architecture of the system is designed. The virtualization adds some 
changes how the industrial automation system architecture should be designed. The se-
lection of virtualization technologies which are wanted to be used in the system direct 
how the system should be designed. The hardware virtualization solutions offer better 
isolation than the OS-level virtualization solutions. In OS-level virtualization solutions 
the applications should be divided into trusted applications and untrusted applications. 
Trusted applications are executed on their own physical machines separated from the 
untrusted applications and security measurements are added between the trusted and 
untrusted applications to prevent the trusted applications from becoming compromised. 
The reasoning for this is to allow using the better performance of the OS-level virtual-
ization while avoiding the problems which malicious applications could cause with us-
ing all the resources on the host machine. If application virtualization is considered for 
its streaming capabilities, the architecture for the application storage and streaming 
should be designed. 
The DMZ should be implemented into the system in similar manner to a non-virtualized 
environment. However, in a virtualized environment it is easier to improve the security. 
Physical firewalls are expensive and they increase the costs. Virtual firewalls can be 
duplicated easily. This allows implementing more firewalls into the systems with no 
increased cost. This enables creating multilevel DMZs easily. The most critical parts of 
the systems are behind multiple firewalls and multiple DMZs can be implemented be-
tween them and the office and the external networks. This can be taken as far as having 
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an own firewall for each application which can be configured only for the purpose of 
the application. Deciding which antivirus technology to use should also be part of the 
design. There are two choices: agentless or agent-based antivirus software. The agent-
based antivirus software is installed on each VM or container. This takes resources from 
the actual computing in the VMs and the containers. Agentless antivirus software uses 
the VM introspection. This allows the antivirus software to reside outside the VMs and 
the containers taking less of their computing resources. 
Monitoring should also be decided in this step. The inter-host communication monitor-
ing relies largely on the technologies used. If the virtual switches provide monitoring 
features, these can be used for the monitoring. An alternative is to route the traffic 
through a physical switch with monitoring capabilities. The last alternative is to use 
special monitoring VM or container. Any traffic is routed through this VM or container 
and it has the monitoring tools installed in it. From this VM or container the traffic is 
then directed to the correct destination. 
Real-time applications cannot use the more advanced features the virtualization solu-
tions provide. Snapshotting, live migration and fault tolerance often halt the execution 
of a VM or a container for a moment. As such some alternatives should be used. One 
possible way of implementing these features could be to have two copies of the soft-
ware running at the same time. The primary copy would execute normally without any 
interference. Any network messages directed to this software would be duplicated by 
using a SDN capable switch and the messages would be directed to the secondary copy. 
Any messages leaving from the secondary copy would be dropped by a SDN switch. 
Now the state of the secondary copy would follow the state changes of the primary 
copy. Snapshots could be taken from the secondary copy if required without it affecting 
the performance of the primary copy and simultaneously the secondary copy could be 
used as a failover if something happens to the primary copy. An example of updating 
secondary copy with SDN-capable switches is shown in the Figure 31. The arrows rep-
resent messages. 
 
Figure 31. Updating a secondary copy of a VM. 
The problem with this approach is the non-network-based events (mouse or keyboard 
inputs for example). These won’t be delivered to the secondary copy. This method re-
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quires support from the software itself or from the hypervisor if these kinds of events 
exist. Additionally a method needs to be implemented which monitors the state of the 
primary copy. The VMware ESXi supports this kind of fault tolerance by default. The 
default advanced features offered by the virtualization solutions can be used for non-
real-time applications. 
The virtual networks don’t often have any security features and as such the access to 
these networks needs to be controlled. Special access points to the virtualized infrastruc-
ture must be designed into the architecture. For example a connection to Internet should 
go through a separate physical NIC to a VM or through a switch which adds virtual 
network labels to the packets and which implements security functions like authentica-
tion or a firewall. Similarly any outgoing data should go through these access points. 
Management and monitoring networks should also be separated and protected. 
One should also consider how the storage space is virtualized. In hardware virtualiza-
tion it is possible to store the data blocks that VMs write either in files or directly to 
storage devices. While the files can be easier to manage, the performance of accessing 
the data in the files is worse than if the data blocks are directly accessed from a storage 
device. The reason for this is the extra layer added by the file system in a hypervisor. 
One thing that needs to be considered as well is where the data is stored. If the data is 
stored locally for each host, accessing the data will be faster and the system is easier to 
build but more advanced features like live migration or fault tolerance require the data 
in storage devices to be copied from one place to another. If SAN is used, the data can 
be stored in a same place all the time. Data should be backed up in somewhere. 
The last thing one should consider when designing the architecture is the image and 
snapshot management. In traditional industrial automation systems this is not required. 
The images and snapshots need to be stored and secured in some way. Also backups are 
needed to be created. The architecture should contain design choices how these features 
are implemented. Image and snapshot management policy should also be created to 
avoid creating excessive amounts of images and snapshots which increase the attack 
surface and which need to be secured. 
There are many ways they architecture of a virtualized industrial automation system can 
be implemented. As an example the architecture of an existing virtualized industrial 
automation system is shown here. The virtualized industrial automation system is a test 
laboratory made in Tampere University of Technology. The laboratory has been built to 
test the virtualization in industrial automation systems and it had been designed before 
this thesis had started. The architecture of the system is shown in the Figure 32 on the 
next page. In the figure the lightning symbols represent wireless connections, vFW is a 
virtual firewall, the ICS network is the industrial control system network, and PCSs are 
process controllers. The virtualization technology used is hardware virtualization. 
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Figure 32. Example architecture of a virtualized industrial automation system. 
The architecture shows only the layers 2-3.5 from industrial automation system archi-
tecture. The architecture implements a DMZ between the ICS network and the office 
network. All the machines in the DMZ are virtual machines and some of the machines 
that belong to the ICS network are virtual machines as well. There are three actual phys-
ical machines on which the virtual machines run on. The hypervisor used is the 
VMware’s ESXi without any extra network virtualization solutions. As such the virtual 
switches are only basic layer 2 switches without any more advanced functions. Current-
ly one of the challenges with the system is the functions that have real-time require-
ments. Because how the system has been implemented, it cannot provide any real-time 
guarantees for real-time applications. 
9.4.3 Implementation 
In this step the actual system is implemented. Hardware and software for the system is 
selected. To fulfil the temporal isolation requirements the virtualization solutions used 
should provide QoS functions for the physical resources used. Especially limiting the 
usage of the resources is important. The virtualization technologies should be selected 
based on the requirements of the system. From hardware virtualization the paravirtual-
ization and hardware-assisted virtualization offer the best performance. However, the 
performance of hardware-assisted virtualization might vary depending on how often the 
execution needs to be transferred to the hypervisor. OS-level virtualization generally 
offers better performance than hardware virtualization. In hardware virtualization it is 
possible to provide better temporal isolation by using driver domains. These are the 
dedicated VMs which are responsible for running device drivers. The device domains 
restrict the effects of malfunctions and crashes between the drivers from affecting each 
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other. If the system should provide support for multiple different types of operating sys-
tem kernels without any modifications, the only choices for virtualization technologies 
are the full and hardware-assisted virtualization methods in hardware virtualization. The 
used devices also affect which virtualization solutions can be used. The virtualization 
solutions should have virtualization support or device passthrough capability for the 
used devices. Alternatively the device manufacturer should provide paravirtual device 
drivers for the devices or the devices themselves should provide hardware-assisted vir-
tualization. Spatial isolation is provided by the different virtualization technologies in 
different ways. The hardware-assisted virtualization provides it directly in the hardware 
while full virtualization, paravirtualization, OS-level virtualization, and application vir-
tualization rely on checks in software. As such hardware-assisted virtualization should 
be preferred whenever possible. Type 2 hypervisors which are not implemented as ker-
nel modules should be avoided for performance sensitive applications. 
Proper memory configuration is important. The memory access in hardware-assisted 
virtualization can take longer because of the more complicated address translation. The 
effect of this can be mitigated by using larger memory pages. If the memory access is 
fully random, it might be better to use paravirtualization as it allows faster memory ac-
cess with only a one level of address translation. The downside is that modifying the 
page tables is slower than in hardware-assisted virtualization. Advanced memory man-
agement should not be used if performance critical VMs or containers are hosted or re-
al-time is required. Malicious software could use these methods to slow down the 
memory access for VMs or containers. IOMMU should be used to provide spatial isola-
tion for the software components and the cache allocation technology should be used to 
provide temporal isolation when using the memory. 
For real-time applications the virtualization solution should implement real-time sched-
uling algorithms. However, this is not the only way to provide the real-time capability 
for CPU usage. The other way is to simply dedicate a physical CPU to a real-time VM 
or a container. This way there won’t be competition for the CPU usage and there is no 
need to schedule the CPU. With real-time scheduling algorithms one has to configure 
the scheduling parameters correctly for each VM and container to provide the real-time 
guarantees. Even if real-time schedulers are not used, proper selection of scheduling 
parameters is important as they can affect the performance of the VMs and the contain-
ers. Overcommitting the CPUs should also be avoided. There is a limit how many VMs 
or containers a CPU can handle before the CPU becomes fully utilized. When the CPU 
becomes fully utilized depends on the workloads of VMs and containers. 
The used guest operating systems should support tickles timekeeping as it is better in 
virtualized environments than tick counting. Paravirtualization can be used for the tick-
les timekeeping. The hosts and the guests should synchronize the clocks. Guests can do 
this through the host or through a network. Proper settings need to be configured for the 
virtualization solution to use the selected method for the guests. Clock synchronization 
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service should be implemented into the system and it should be secured as retrieving 
time directly from the Internet is not suitable for industrial automation systems. 
If the system has networks which span over untrusted networks, these should be secured 
with proper protocols like IPsec, STL, TTL, or SSH. The management and monitoring 
networks can be isolated from other networks by having physically isolated network 
connections or by using security protocols. The system should also be hardened and any 
unnecessary devices and features from the hosts and guests should be removed and dis-
abled. This includes disabling promiscuous mode and MAC address changing in the 
NICs. Any tools and features provided by a virtualization solution that can be used to 
share data between host operating systems, VMs, and containers (For example clipboard 
on type 2 hypervisors.) should be disabled. Access control to all the virtualization solu-
tions and any host operating systems should be set. In some cases the virtualization so-
lution can offer tools for managing the access control but in some cases these have to be 
implemented separately. 
When configuring I/O for the system, one should select simple schedulers in the guest 
operating systems. Schedulers which try to adapt the scheduling accordingly how the 
device is used and what is the state of the device can have worse performance in virtual 
environments than schedulers which use simple scheduling algorithms. If performance 
is required, device passthrough can be used. Device passthrough can also be used to 
allow using devices which don’t have paravirtual device drivers or for which there is no 
device emulation support in the virtualization solution. However, the device 
passthrough means that the device cannot be shared unless the device itself supports 
virtualization. This also disables many of the advanced features the virtualization solu-
tions provide like live migration. IOMMU is required for the device passthrough. 
9.4.4 Testing 
One important aspect of implementing any industrial automation system is testing that 
the system meets all the requirements. Virtualized automation systems need to be tested 
as well. Testing the different aspects of isolation is important for virtualized industrial 
automation systems. To test the temporal isolation one should test three different as-
pects: CPU, memory and I/O. To test these one should have a program with some kind 
of workload. The workload should use resources for which the isolation is being tested. 
The time that it takes for the program to finish the workload should be tested in a case 
where the system is not stressed. The time to finish the workload can be measured by 
recording the time when the workload is started and the time when the workload is fin-
ished. The program is launched in one of the VMs or the containers on the tested ma-
chine. Next some testing tools are launched in some other VMs or containers which 
stress the CPU, the memory, or the I/O devices. These VMs or containers mimic the 
behavior of malfunctioning or malicious VMs or containers. The time to finish the 
workload is again measured and then compared to the value of the test where no stress 
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was applied to the system. Isolation Benchmark Suite is ready made tool for this kind of 
testing [55]. If it is noticed that the I/O requirements cannot be met, a way to improve 
the I/O performance is to dedicate CPU cores for the device drivers if it is possible. 
There are no easy methods for testing the spatial isolation. If the data is sensitive, one 
must make sure that only the VM that uses the data can access the data. If the data is not 
sensitive, it can be shared with other VMs or containers. Some kind of data protection is 
required in this case as well. This protection can be for example copy-on-write feature 
which allows the data to be shared safely between VMs and containers while preventing 
any modifications to the shared data. One should make sure that the shared data is not 
modified without any protection. 
To test the real-time capabilities, one should have two physical machines. One is the 
tested machine. A message is sent to the tested machine from the other machine. The 
tested machine should have a control program that reacts to the message and answers to 
it by sending a new message to the other machine. The time between sending the first 
message and receiving the second message should be measured. As the address transla-
tions and other functionality can cause jitter, one should repeat the test many times to 
find the worst case scenario and to find the average round-trip time and jitter related to 
it. The isolation should also be tested simultaneously by running VMs or containers 
which stress the CPU, memory or I/O to be sure that the other VMs won’t affect the 
real-time performance. An example of testing set up for testing the real-time capabilities 
is shown in the Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. An example set up to test real-time capabilities. 
In the figure there are two machines. One uses virtualization to host multiple virtual 
machines. The machine which doesn’t use virtualization has a real-time testing tool in-
stalled on it. It sends a message to the VM 1 through the network connections (marked 
as black lines on the figure) and marks down the time when it sent the message. Then it 
waits for an answer message from the controller in the VM 1. The hypervisor is config-
ured to provide real-time capabilities and the VM 1 uses real-time operating system. 
Once the machine, which doesn’t use virtualization, receives the answer, it marks down 
the time when the message was received. Then the round trip time can be calculated 
from these times. The other VMs have different kinds of testing tools which stress the 
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different aspects of the machine. These tools are used to make sure that the behavior of 
the other VMs doesn’t affect the behavior of the real-time VM. 
Many of the already existing testing tools can be used to test security as VMs and con-
tainers behave like physical machines. One should test that the networks in the system 
don’t leak data into other networks and monitor that the virtual networks have band-
width limits. To do this one should stress the networks with a proper testing tool. One 
should also make sure that any NICs that can enable promiscuous mode or change 
MAC addresses are controlled only by trusted software components like hypervisors. 
Otherwise the NICs shouldn’t be connected to trusted networks. Access to any man-
agement interfaces should be tested to make sure that they are secured. The timekeeping 
should be validated inside the VMs. One should let the systems run for a while and 
monitor the time inside the VMs and make sure that the times correspond to the actual 
time. The fault tolerance methods should also be tested to make sure that they work. 
9.4.5 Operation and Maintenance 
During this step the system is maintained. With virtualized environments it is important 
that the virtualization solutions are updated whenever they get updates. The virtualiza-
tion solutions create the trusted code base for the system. If they have vulnerabilities, 
the whole system can be compromised. With SDN capability the updating can be done 
easily. There should be at least three machines which can be used to run VMs and con-
tainers. Two of the machines are actively used. One for the primary operation and one 
for the fault tolerance support. The third machine should work as a support in case one 
of the other two machines requires maintenance. When a virtualization solution needs to 
be updated, the updated version of the virtualization solution should be installed on the 
third machine. After this the copies of the VMs or the containers from the primary ma-
chine should be launched in the third machine. Any outgoing network connections from 
the third machine should be blocked at this point. Once the copies of the VMs and con-
tainers are running, one should check that everything works correctly. Lastly SDN can 
be used to forward to traffic to this third machine instead of the primary machine and 
any outgoing traffic from the primary machine can be blocked while any outgoing traf-
fic on the third machine can be allowed. Now the primary machine can be shut down 
and updated. One possible problem with this method is the synchronization of the data. 
It also might be that the selected fault tolerance technology does not work correctly be-
tween different version of the virtualization solutions. This could mean that there is a 
period of time during which the fault tolerance is not working. An alternative would be 
using live migration to transfer either the primary copy or the secondary copy to the 
third machine assuming that the live migration works between different versions of the 
virtualization solution. Despite of these possible problems, these methods allow smaller 
down time than traditional systems as the system can be updated and configured during 
runtime. In addition images and snapshots can be used to speed up the process. In a tra-
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ditional environment this kind of updating would not be feasible as each machine re-
quires one extra machine which would increase the cost of building the system and 
make the system a lot more complicated. In virtualized environment the amount of used 
hardware is reduced and the configuration is easier to do with virtual networks so this 
kind of update method is more feasible. 
Other important tasks at this step are monitoring and backup creation. One should moni-
tor the resources the VMs and containers use. This can be used to identify any possible 
problems in the system. If new VMs or containers are created, one should be careful to 
not overcommit the resources of host machines and networks. Snapshots should be cre-
ated for the VMs and the containers as well to back up any data changes there has been. 
Any data stored into storage devices should also be backed up to prevent loss of infor-
mation in case of a hardware failure. 
The users of the systems should also be trained. The users of the industrial automation 
system are typically plant technicians and process engineers. They don’t typically know 
anything about virtualization as virtualization is not something that has been used in 
industrial automation systems. Some people should be trained to understand how the 
virtualization works, how to properly configure and how to monitor virtualized automa-
tion systems. These people should be responsible for managing the virtual environment. 
9.5 Future Research Work 
This thesis has created an overview of different virtualization technologies, compared 
some of the existing virtualization solutions, estimated their suitability for industrial 
automation, and identified some requirements and considerations one should take into 
account when designing a virtualized industrial automation system. There is still much 
that still needs to be researched. Currently there are no comprehensive studies of the 
available real-time-capable virtualization solutions. The real-time capabilities of these 
solutions should be thoroughly studied and tested and the real-time capabilities docu-
mented. In addition the OS-level virtualization solutions didn’t seem to have hard real-
time capabilities. No info was found of using rt-preempt patch and the Linux OS-level 
virtualization solutions together. It should be studied if these two technologies can be 
used together in similar manner to how KVM and the rt-preempt patch can be used. 
One research subject could be to research if SDN could be used to create real-time ca-
pable network without requiring Industrial Ethernet protocols. The SDN uses central-
ized controller which makes it easier to determine the state of the network. Applications 
could inform the controller about their real-time requirements and the controller could 
set forwarding rules for the network according to this information. The controller could 
also calculate if it is possible to meet the real-time requirements in the current network 
by using some kind of algorithm. The SDN offers also more flexible forwarding poli-
cies than traditional networks. For example it is possible to forward the traffic com-
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pletely differently based on what protocols are used to transfer the packets. As there is 
only one controller controlling the routing in the network, the network could be made 
deterministic more easily. 
XtratuM is a hypervisor aimed for embedded devices and as such it has very little ad-
vanced features. It could be studied if the XtratuM could be used to provide security for 
field devices that can be connected to Internet with Industrial Ethernet. The architecture 
for this kind of device could contain two virtual machines, one running real-time operat-
ing system running real-time applications and one running general purpose operating 
system with security features. There could be separate network connections for the real-
time operating system and the general purpose operating system. From within the indus-
trial automation system any real-time data could be transferred through the real-time 
connection. Any non-real-time data would be transferred through the connection for the 
general purpose operating system. The general purpose operating systems could be used 
for example to monitor and get data from the device through the Internet. Access con-
trol, antivirus, intrusion detection and other security features could be implemented in it 
to provide security and these features wouldn’t affect the operation of the real-time op-
erating system. Additionally application streaming could be provided through the gen-
eral purpose operating system to provide an interface for the device. It would basically 
implement a DMZ inside the device itself for outside connections while allowing real-
time communications to be used with the rest of the industrial automation system. Re-
search is required to find out if this kind of approach is possible or even feasible. 
Some research could be done on how to implement a testing platform for industrial au-
tomation software by using virtualization. One possible way of using hardware virtual-
ization for testing purposes could be to use two different VMs. One VM has the soft-
ware that is being tested and one VM has a process simulator and testing tools running 
in it. The hypervisor would need to implement device emulation for all the common 
devices that are used in industrial automation systems and the backend for these emulat-
ed devices would direct the I/O calls to the testing tools and the process simulator in the 
other VM. To make the tests reliable, timing should be also properly controlled. The 
VM which executes the tested software should use virtual time specific for that VM. 
The hypervisor should control when the VM with the tested software executes and man-
age when the emulated devices return responses. This is to emulate the latencies in an 
actual physical system. To implement this kind of testing platform, some modifications 
are required for a hypervisor and device models for industrial automation devices are 
needed to be created. The hypervisor needs at least a method how the I/O calls from one 
VM are directed to a VM hosting the testing tools and the simulator. In addition the 
hypervisor needs an intelligent scheduler which manages when the VMs are executed 
and when the responses for the emulated devices are delivered to emulate the latencies 
of the physical systems. It could be possible to provide the testing as a service by selling 
VMs for customers to test their software on. The benefits of implementing the software 
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testing in this manner are the ability to control the execution of the VMs and the ability 
use emulated devices. This allows the software to be tested without any modifications to 
the software while still emulating the timing constraints of an actual physical system. 
The testing environment can also easily be modified for different scenarios because of 
the ability to create VMs and virtual connections between them. 
The contents of this thesis are based on a literature review. As such nothing suggested 
in this thesis has been tested in actual systems. Future research work would be to see 
how well the suggestions presented in this thesis work in practice. For example the ide-
as presented for fault tolerance by using SDN needs to be tested and researched to see 
what kind of problems they have and if they are even feasible to implement. Similarly 
further research is required to see what kind of problems the updating method with three 
hosts has and if it possible to use it to minimize the down time caused by updates. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
In this Master of Science Thesis most of the current virtualization technologies have 
been reviewed. As the virtualization technologies focus on emulating different parts of 
the computer, storage, and network architectures, one has to understand how the emu-
lated hardware and software components work. Because of this, understanding virtual-
ization technologies require deep understanding of the computer, storage and network 
architectures and technologies. 
In virtualization solution comparison it was noticed that there are some solutions which 
are aimed for hard real-time applications. One of the solutions is even aimed to be used 
on embedded devices. Some studies have also showed that it is possible to reach under 
millisecond cycle times while using virtualization. These kinds of cycle times are suita-
ble for most real-time applications in industrial automation. As such the virtualization 
could be used from level 1 to the level 4 in industrial automation systems. Many of the 
more advanced features like snapshotting and live migration cannot be used with real-
time applications as they will cause pauses in virtual machine execution. One problem 
is also that current virtualization solutions don’t necessarily have support for I/O devic-
es used in industrial automation. To use I/O devices in virtual environment one has to 
have at least one of three things: device emulator, paravirtual device driver, or virtual-
ization support in the device itself. As virtualization hasn’t been used in industrial au-
tomation, industrial automation specific I/O devices don’t have these things. 
The virtualization provides security by isolating different pieces of software that exe-
cute on same hardware. This allows creating virtual machines, containers and virtual 
applications. However, the virtual machines and containers act like they are physical 
machines. This means that the security in them must be implemented in same way as in 
the actual physical machines. In industrial automation this includes implementing de-
militarized zones to isolate untrusted and trusted networks. When designing a virtual-
ized industrial automation system, the virtualization has to be taken into account in eve-
ry step in the system’s lifecycle. Virtualization adds some new requirements for the sys-
tem which affect the different steps in the system’s lifecycle. The virtualization affects 
everything from the architecture of the system to the maintenance of the system. Espe-
cially if virtualized components have any real-time requirements, the testing is im-
portant to make sure that the requirements can be met. The physical resources can also 
be configured to be shared in many different ways in virtualized environment and as 
such proper configuration is important. Proper hardware and virtualization solution se-
lections are also important when virtualizing industrial automation systems. 
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APPENDIX A: VIRTUAL SWITCHING 
Switches are devices which forward data based on the OSI-model’s layer 2 protocol 
addresses. The basic Ethernet switch is typically virtualized in one of two ways. These 
methods are defined in the 802.1Q standard under a term called Edge Virtual Bridging 
(EVB) and they are called as Virtual Edge Bridge (VEB) and Virtual Edge Port Aggre-
gator (VEPA). Both of these methods focus on implementing virtualized Ethernet 
switch at the machines which reside at the edge of a network. The goal is to provide 
switching functionality for virtual machines (VMs). [50] The VEB and VEPA can be 
implemented in many ways and the standard doesn’t specify how one is supposed to 
implement them. It simply specifies what functions and properties the VEB and VEPA 
need to fulfil to be 801.Q compliant. In Software Defined Networking (SDN) switches 
are also used to forward data, but these switches are not restricted to forwarding the 
traffic based on layer 2 protocol addresses. The forwarding can use for example use 
information from layer 2, 3 or 4 protocol headers to forward the data. These switches 
can be implemented in similar manner to the VEB and VEPA, but the actual implemen-
tation details depend on the SDN technology being used. 
The VEB is a method where the virtual switch is completely implemented at the edge 
machine [47]. The VEB can be implemented fully in software, fully in hardware, or 
partially in both. These implementations can be seen in the Figure 34 and they use me-
dia access control (MAC) –addresses and virtual local area network (VLAN) IDs to 
forward the traffic to correct locations [47]. 
 
Figure 34. The different implementations of VEB. 
The software implementation is the easiest method to implement, but it also has the 
worst performance as all the computations must be done in the central processing unit 
(CPU) which is also used for many other computations. When the VEB is implemented 
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fully in hardware, it is done by implementing it on a Network Interface Card (NIC) 
which uses Single Root Input/Output Virtualization (SR-IOV) technology [47]. The 
physical functions are used to configure the virtual switch inside the NIC and the VMs 
can use the virtual functions to access the NIC. The NIC can then forward the traffic to 
the external network or to a VM if it happens to reside inside the same machine. Partial 
implementation in hardware is possible with a technology called Virtual Machine De-
vices queues (VMDq) for example. The VMDq has been developed by Intel for NICs to 
move some computations from the software to the hardware. Most importantly it moves 
the forwarding decisions to the NIC and provides multiple receiving and transferring 
queues which can be dedicated for VMs [54]. The concept of VMDq can be seen in the 
Figure 35. The software component is still required to move the data between correct 
the queues and the VMs, and to do functions like VLAN tagging. 
 
Figure 35. Intel’s VMDq technology. 
The problem with the VEB is that some data never leaves the edge machine. The effect 
of this is that any network tools and features developed for physical network cannot be 
used for this data. The support for these tools and features must be implemented sepa-
rately for the VEBs and these are not always implemented for the virtual switches 
[107][47]. In software-based VEBs this is not as big of a problem as software is easy to 
create and modify, but the hardware-based VEBs can have problems. The hardware-
based VEBs work in NICs which have very limited computing capabilities and they 
have many other responsibilities than just to work as a switch. This means that no com-
plicated tools and features can be implemented in them. Another problem with the VEB 
is that the switch configuration is part of the edge machine configuration. This means 
that the network administrators cannot configure the virtual switches the same way as 
normal network devices are configured and the virtual switch configuration is part of 
the server administrator’s job who manages the server [47]. The advantages of the VEB 
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are that it doesn’t require an external switch and it allows fast traffic transferring be-
tween VMs which reside inside the same physical machine [107]. 
The VEPA takes a bit different approach. Instead of implementing the virtual switch 
completely in the edge machine, it implements it only partially in it. The VEPA uses the 
functionality of an existing switch to implement the virtual switch [107]. The compari-
son between VEB and VEPA can be seen in the Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36. Comparison between VEB and VEPA. 
Instead of forwarding the traffic inside the edge machine, the VEPA uses an existing 
switch to do the forwarding and to provide all the functionality of a switch. All the net-
work traffic is first sent out from the edge machine to a switch and then in the switch it 
is forwarded back to the port it came from. Normally switches cannot send traffic back 
to the port the port from which they received it from. This requires the switch to have a 
small firmware update which updates the switch to have a reflective relay which allows 
it to send traffic back to the same port it received it from. [107] The traffic forwarding is 
done based on the MAC addresses and the VLAN IDs [47]. The edge machine requires 
a small component which forwards the received packet to the correct VMs and does 
functions like VLAN tagging. This can be done either fully in hardware or fully in 
software similarly to the VEB. [107] 
The benefit of the VEPA is that it can use the features of the existing switches. This 
allows any tools and features developed for physical networks to be used with it 
[107][47]. The switch configuration is also moved out to the physical switches allowing 
network administrators to configure the switches the same way as they configure all the 
physical switches [107]. 
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APPENDIX B: ADVANCED MEMORY MANAGEMENT 
Hypervisors can provide many different advanced memory management techniques. 
These techniques allow overcommitting the memory on the physical host machines. 
This means that that the virtual machines can use more memory than is actually availa-
ble on the physical machine. These advanced memory management techniques are: bal-
looning, page sharing, hypervisor swapping, and memory compression.  One way how 
traditional operating system kernels allow memory overcommitting is by swapping 
memory pages [117], which haven’t been used in a while, into a storage device. The 
memory pages are written to a file and read from it when the memory page is needed 
again. As the reading from the storage device is slower than reading from the memory, 
the memory access will be slower sometimes, but in exchange more memory can be 
used. The file on the storage device can be considered as an extension of the memory. 
Some of the advanced memory management techniques use memory swapping as well. 
The ballooning is a technique where the hypervisor can control how much memory the 
guest operating system kernels inside the virtual machines (VMs) can use. In this tech-
nique the software running on top of the VMs is not aware of the host physical memory. 
The available guest physical memory is controlled by installing a special purpose driver 
called as a balloon driver in the guest operating system kernel [117][73]. The balloon 
driver can be used to pin guest memory pages inside the guest operating system kernel 
and it is controlled by the hypervisor. The communication between the hypervisor and 
the balloon driver is done by using paravirtualization methods. The pinning means that 
the memory pages are reserved for the balloon driver and they are always kept in guest 
physical memory and never swapped to a storage device. As the balloon driver doesn’t 
actually do anything with these guest memory pages, the hypervisor can use the host 
memory pages corresponding to these guest memory pages in somewhere else. The bal-
loon driver simply allows the hypervisor to control the host physical memory the VM 
uses between the minimum and the maximum memory values. [117] The concept of 
ballooning is show in the Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37. The ballooning technique. 
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If the guest operating system kernel has some free guest physical memory, this tech-
nique won’t affect the performance in anyway. If the guest doesn’t have free guest 
physical memory, it is under memory pressure and it has to swap memory pages to a 
storage device. This slows down the memory access of the software running inside the 
VM. [117] The benefit of this technique is that the guest operating system kernel can 
decide itself what memory pages to swap to the storage device [117][73]. It can do more 
intelligent decisions than the hypervisor as the hypervisor doesn’t understand the con-
tents of the VM’s memory and can’t know which memory pages are less likely to be 
used. [117] 
The page sharing is a technique where a host physical memory page is shared with mul-
tiple different VMs. This is possible if the VMs’ have a memory page which contains 
the same data. [117][73] This can be useful as many of the VMs might be running the 
same operating system kernel and much of the data might be duplicated in the memory. 
The page sharing simply allows saving some memory which can then be used else-
where. This technique is transparent to the VMs meaning they don’t know that the tech-
nique is being used. The host physical memory is scanned from time to time to identify 
duplicated memory pages and the scanning will take some resources to do. [117] If du-
plicates are found, the memory mappings are changed to one of the memory pages 
which will be shared between VMs and the rest of the memory pages are freed. When 
some VM tries to write to a memory page that is shared, copy-on-write feature [73] is 
used. The contents of the memory page are copied to an empty memory page and the 
VM’s write is directed to this new memory page [117]. This will make the memory 
write slower that what it would be without the page sharing. [117] The page sharing is 
demonstrated in the Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38. The page sharing technique. 
The hypervisors can implement their own memory page swapping. This is called as hy-
pervisor swapping. The hypervisor swapping works exactly the same as the swapping 
the operating system kernels do. The hypervisor has a file on the storage device where it 
writes memory pages when the host physical memory is full and new data is required in 
the memory. The hypervisor swapping is shown in the Figure 39. The usage of hypervi-
sor swapping is not advisable as the hypervisor lacks the information of what memory 
pages are best candidates to be swapped to the storage device as it doesn’t understand 
the contents of the VMs’ memory. This can cause the hypervisor to swap memory pages 
to the storage device which the guest wants to access often causing huge performance 
issues for the guest. Another problem which might occur is that the hypervisor and the 
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operating system kernel both swap the same memory page to a storage device. This 
causes the memory page to be written twice in the storage device wasting some storage 
space. Additionally when swapping the memory page back to the memory, the swap-
ping must be done twice. The benefit of this method is that it is immediate. The hyper-
visor can do the swapping when it is needed. The ballooning is reliant of the function-
ality of the guest operating system kernel which can delay the reclamation of the 
memory pages. The page sharing on the other hand relies for the VMs to have duplicat-
ed memory pages that can be shared and the page scans are done in predetermined times 
and not when they are needed. [117] 
 
Figure 39. The hypervisor swapping technique. 
The memory compression technique is very similar to the hypervisor swapping. The 
difference is that instead of swapping the memory page to a storage device, it is com-
pressed and stored in the memory as shown in the Figure 40. [117] 
 
Figure 40. The memory compression technique. 
Part of the host’s physical memory is dedicated to work as a cache where the com-
pressed memory is stored. When there is no more space in the memory for new memory 
pages, the least used memory page is compressed by using some algorithm and then 
moved to the cache. The compression allows the contents of a memory page to fit in 
much smaller space. When the compressed memory page is needed again, it is decom-
pressed and moved out from the cache. [117] The memory compression is much faster 
than hypervisor swapping as reads and writes to a memory are much faster than reads 
and writes to a storage device [117][73]. The problem is that the degree of the compres-
sion is dependant of the contents of a memory page. This is why the compression is 
only done on memory pages where the compression is efficient and only when the hy-
pervisor swapping would be used otherwise. If the cache in the memory becomes full, 
some old memory pages need to be decompressed and then swapped to a storage device 
to free some space in the cache. [117] 
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